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The Sabbatino Case and the Sabbatino
Amendment: Comedy-or Tragedy-of Errors
William Harvey Reeves*
The issues and decisions in the Sabbatino litigation1 and the significant concepts of the Sabbatino legislation2 are here reviewed and
considered in five parts. Part I discusses the mistaken beliefs of the
Congress as to the reasons for proposing and enacting the Sabbatino
Amendment. Part II then examines the relations between Cuba and
the United States, explaining how Cuba's insult made possible the
judicial errors in the Sabbatino decisions, which were reversed by the
Supreme Court, and also prompted the subsequent Sabbatino legislation. In Part III, proof will be given of congressional misintelpretations of foreign law and foreign court decisions in considering
and passing the Sabbatino Amendment. Part IV will then present
some unanswered questions with respect to the Sabbatino Amendment's relation to the Constitution of the United States. Finally,
Part V will offer a better method for accomplishing the desired results.
I. Tim MISTAKEN BELIEFS OF CONGnESS AS RqEASONS FOR PROPOsING
AND ENACTING TEE SABBATINO AIENDLENT

A. Introduction
The Sabbatino opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States 3
has already taken its place among the famous controversial decisions
of the high court. It had been eagerly awaited, for the decision in
the federal court of the Southern District of New York and the
unanimous affirming opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit bad already been the subject of wide comment. Much of
that comment was laudatory of the new principle of law enunciated
by the district court and approved by the court of appeals-that a
governmental act by any country confiscating within its own territory
a foreigner's property-an act of state contrary to international lawis null and void in that very country which has seized property
under its own law and, therefore, the confiscating government can
* Member of New York Bar.
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aft'd,
307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); after the passage of Sabbatino Amendment, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),

and supplementary opinion not yet reported.
2. 78 Stat. 1009, 1013, (1964), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. I,
1965).
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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acquire no title by its act of confiscation; and the courts of any
other country may so declare. "... [W]e conclude that, since the
Cuban decree violated international law, the appellant's title [Cuba's]
The Supreme Court of the United States in an
is invalid. .
eight-to-one decision reversed the decisions of the lower courts in
the Sabbatino case and restored the act of state doctrine to United
States jurisprudence. This brought forth a further outpouring of comment and opinion-much of it unfavorable.
The decision in Sabbatino had hardly been handed down by the
Supreme Court before Congress, reading the decision not as an
exposition of United States law, as it then was and always had been,
but rather as something new, revealing, if not a gross judicial error,
at least a lack or weakness in our law, took steps to reverse the judicial
rule.5 Congress enacted the Sabbatino Amendment: "The amendment is intended to reverse in part the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Banco de Nacionat de Cuba v. Sabbatino."6 The
amendment was attached as a rider to the Foreign Assistance Act
then pending before the Congress. By this new legislation, Congress directed the courts of the United States to proceed as Congress understood the district court had proceeded and as the court
of appeals had affirmed in Sabbatino. The direction by Congress to
all courts of the United States was:
"...4

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to
make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party
claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of
compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection . . ..

The Supreme Court had directed the courts to refrain from such
judicial conduct, and from making such decisions based on a new
principle of law. The Supreme Court had said:
4. 307 F.2d at 869, (1962). The appellant was Banco Nacional de Cuba which
the courts found was the agent of Cuba.
5. See Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, introduced June 23, 1964, discussed
in S. REP. No. 1188, pt. I, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964) [hereinafter cited as S.
RP. No. 1188].
6. Ibid. The name of the plaintiff was Banco Nacional de Cuba. For text of
Sabbatino Amendment as amended in 1965, see Appendix I, p. 541 infra.
7. Text in part of Sabbatino Amendment as amended in 1965. This added the words
"to property" following the words "other right." This law contains certain exceptions.
For the three circumstances to which the law would not apply, see text of law,
Appendix I, p. 541 infra.
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[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in
the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding concomplaint alleges that the taking
trolling legal principles, even if the
8
violates customary international law.

Obedient to the direction of the Congress rather than the decision

and mandate of the Supreme Court, the district court (on a new or
renewed motion to dismiss the complaint) found that under the act
of Congress the overruled decision of the court of appeals was controlling; the district court thus reinstated the underlying principle of
its own overruled decision:
Congress determined that the national interests in the areas of foreign
investment and international trade and commerce require the elimination

of the act of state doctrine except where the president determines otherwise. 9
Here is one of the strangest legal anomalies ever to occur in the
United States, for although the Supreme Court's opinion was clear and
unequivocal, lacking unanimity by the vote-of but one Justice, that
decision and opinion is not now the law of the land and never has
been followed as a precedent, notwithstanding that the principle
of law it confirmed had heretofore always been the accepted law
administered in all courts within the United States. Rather the minority opinion 0 has become the ruling opinion and is now followed
in the district court, whose decision the majority of eight Justices
overruled. The mandate of the Supreme Court directed to the district
court was never followed" and the Supreme Court's decision is a
nullity in the very case it reversed.
The future legal historian will doubtless be able to place this
case in its proper relation to the constitutional power of Congress,
the jurisprudence of the United States, and United States foreign
and domestic policy. But the future historian will not fulfill his
reportorial role properly if he does not record the multifarious errors
which were made in the decisions of this case. In fact, he must go
farther, for out of those errors grew the certain fixed beliefs of
Congress in considering the proposals which became the Sabbatino
Amendment-beliefs which were conclusions without premises, not
founded upon facts, and wholly erroneous.
The Sabbatino case began in-judicial error and continued in judicial
error. Many of these errors of the lower courts were corrected by
the Supreme Court, while others became irrelevant or harmless under
the Supreme Court's decision. Thaen Congress intervened and, ignor8. 376 U.S. at 428.
9. 243 F. Supp. at 972.

10. 376 U.S. at 439.
11. 243 F. Supp. at 961-62.
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ing the decision of the Supreme Court, restated and adopted some2
of these errors as its own credo and expanded and enlarged others.1
B. Reasons for the SabbatinoAmendment as Set Forthin
CongressionalRecords
The mind of a court can be determined from its opinion. What
motivates the Congress is shown in various and sundry documents
reflecting its opinions. The 'legislative intent" is no more clear or
cogent than is the "legislative belief and motive." The Congressional
motives behind the Sabbatino legislation are to be found in the memoranda published by the Senate in the Congressional Record and the
official report of the Committee on Foreign Relations in support of
the amendment, variously called the "Hickenlooper Amendment"
from the name of one of the Senators who sponsored it, the "Rule
of Law Amendment" because of the sponsorship of a certain committee of business corporations which voluntarily associated and
adopted this name for its group, or the "Sabbatino Amendment"
because it was intended to overrule the Supreme Court decision in
that case. Also the purpose of the Congress can further be studied
in the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the subsequent conference reports. 13
Although the amendment was introduced in the Senate, no public
hearings were held, either when the Sabbatino Amendment was introduced or at any later time, though the Senate amended the bill
slightly in 1965. The Senate memorandum referred to above, which
is published in the CongressionalRecord, a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the Foreign Assistance Act of
14
1964 in which there is brief reference to the Sabbatino Amendment,
and a conference report of 1965 giving the Senate's interpretation
of the slight changes made in 1965, constitute the complete published
record of the Senate's reasons for the introduction, sponsorship and
final approval of this law.
The House of Representatives held no hearings on the bill when
12. For specification of misconceptions by Congress, see pp. 433-47 infra.
13. The principal documents indicating reasons and intention of Congress in enacting
the Sabbatino Amendment include 110 CoNG. REc. 19546 (1964); 110 CONG. REC.
23674-82 (1964), and App. 5157 (1964); 111 CoNG. REc. 20723 (1965); S REP,. No.
1188, pt. I, 24; (concerning H.R. 11380); Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (Conference
Report), H.R. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964); S. REP. No. 170, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965); Report on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7750, H.R. REP. No.
321, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1965); Conference Report on Foreign Assistance Act of
1965, H.R. 7750, H.R. REP. No. 811, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965); Hearings on H.R.
7750 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7750 Hearings].
14. The amendment under discussion will be referred to hereafter as the Sabbatino
Amendment.
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it was introduced in 1964, but the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held quite extensive hearings in 1965, though in the final analysis
the House concurred with the Senate. These hearings, the conference
report of 1964 and the committee reports, including a final conference
report adopting the Senate's slight changes in 1965, reflect the purposes and intentions of the House of Representatives and its reasons
for approving the Senate-introduced and -sponsored bill.
These are the documents from which one can read the mind of
the Congress of the United States.
C. The Intention of the Congress
The intention behind the Sabbatino Amendment was good. It was
clearly the desire of Congress to take steps to discourage any
foreign country from adopting as a national policy the confiscation
of the property of United States nationals. The Congress had before
it an aggravated case of the seizure by the Cuban Government without compensation of property located in Cuba owned by United
States nationals. The intention of Congress-to do something about
this very outrage and generally provide for the future protection of
United States property invested abroad-was commendable. Also
there was popular opinion that "there ought to be a law," and
Congress complied.
It is the reasons motivating the Congress which must be examined
first. Three errors by Congress are outstanding: (1) Misinterpretation
of the foreign cases cited and of the laws of foreign countries. (2) Erroneous belief that in passing the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress
merely changed "presumptions" within the present power of United
States courts but did not make a fundamental change of United
States law, and that the amendment raised no constitutional questions. (3) Assumption that the Sabbatino Amendment would accomplish the desired results and was the best method for this purpose.
1. First Error: Misinterpretation of the Foreign Cases Cited and
of the Laws of Foreign Countries.-Congressbelieved that many nations in the world, including most of the great trading nations, have,
by their courts, determined that if some foreign country confiscates
property of their nationals, those nationals may apply to their own
courts (if jurisdiction over the confiscating sovereign or some part of
the confiscated property can be acquired) and gain a decision that
such foreign act, if contrary to international law, is null and void.
This is how the lower courts had decided the Sabbatino case. There,
Cuba, having wronged United States nationals by a confiscatory
decree 5 and the physical seizure of their property in Cuba, had
15. Public Law of Cuba 851, July 6, 1960, and three resolutions under the law
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committed a breach of international law. The executive department
of our Government had already said so in diplomatic notes. 6 Because the law of Cuba was contrary to international law, the lower
courts in Sabbatino declared the law null and void, and ineffective
to transfer title to the property seized in Cuba. This is the result
which Congress approved and wished to achieve by the Sabbatino
Amendment. Congress believed that many other nations had similarly
repudiated, as part of their own jurisprudence, the act of state doctrine, or had made an exception to it as to foreign sovereign acts
contrary to international law, and would have done so on the facts
of the Sabbatino case had their own nationals been affected. Congress intended to do no more than to bring our jurisprudence for
protection of foreign investment of United States citizens up to the
level of judicial force which Congress believed other countries had
exercised for this same purpose. 17 In this belief as to the jurisprudence and judicial determinations of other countries and the
laws of foreign countries, Congress was wholly mistaken.
The litigants before the courts of foreign countries, as shown by
the decisions of those courts, have sometimes asked a court to adopt
the thesis that a confiscatory act of some other foreign government,
the seizure of the litigant's property without compensation, is not a
valid exercise of that other foreign government's authority and ought
to be declared invalid by the courts of their country. But that thesis
(now adopted by the United States in the Sabbatino Amendment)
always has been rejected, in the final analysis, by all great independent trading nations.' 8
No great independent trading country in the world, other than the
United States by the Sabbatino Amendment, has ever repudiated the
act of state doctrine or made an exception to it, or permitted its courts
to do so by declaring a fully executed act of state of another country
designating the property to be seized. No compensation has been paid. United States
courts have found reference to compensation in the law to be illusory. Law 851 and
the first resolution are extensively discussed in the Sabbatino decisions. See 376 U.S.
at 402-04.
16. State Dep't Release No. 397, July 16, 1960 to Cuban Ministry of Foreign
Relations. See generally 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 141-42, 171 (1960).
17. E.g., Q. Would the amendment disrupt international commerce by creating new
uncertainties about title to property in that commerce?
A. No. The amendment, after all, would only bring U.S. courts to the position of courts in a majority of the industrialized nations of the world.
Quoted in H.R. 7750 Hearings 592; from memorandum entitled, "Rule of Law Amendment: 10 Questions and Answers," submitted in support of the amendment by principal witness for "Rule of Law Committee." Same memorandum was published as
part of the statement of one of the Senate sponsors of the Sabbatino Amendment. 110
CoNe. REc.-(1964).
18. For a discussion of foreign cases cited to the Congress by witnesses, see Part III,
§ A, p. 462 infra. For a digest of each foreign case cited as one on the principle of the
Sabbatino Amendment, see Appendix II, p.541 infra.
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to be null and void because in violation of international law. The
laws of every one of these great countries in the world, as shown
by the acts of their legislatures and the decisions of their highest
courts, are wholly consistent with the decision of the United States.
Supreme Court in Sabbatino; there are no exceptions. 19
The ultimate and conclusive proof of the fact on which any legal
determination is made, and the law which is applied, can be found
in the reading of the opinion of the court making the decision.
Thirty-seven foreign cases were cited in memoranda submitted to
Congress in support of the Sabbatino Amendment. A report or
digest in the English language is available in many law libraries for
somewhat difficult
most of these cited cases. Only a few would be 20
to secure and must be read in a foreign langauge.
Of these foreign cases, only those involving a national of one country whose property had been confiscated in another country, are relevant and of interest. The legal question in such a case is: Did the one
(not a citizen of the country where his property was located) who
owned the property at the time of confiscation (that is, physical
seizure with no, or inadequate, compensation) retain title to his
property in the foreign country in spite of the will of the foreign
government to transfer title to itself and the physical seizure of the
property for such purpose?
A reading and analysis of all of these cases will show that whenever
a court of an independent country2 ' has found by its decisions such
an exception to the act of state doctrine, that decision has been overruled by a higher court of that country; or in respect of one country,
the lower courts which had made such decisions were deprived of
jurisdiction to continue to hear and decide such cases. 22 It was the
19. Ibid.
20. There is a series of volumes published either under the name, InternationalLaw
Reports or Annual Digest of International Law Cases, which usually can be relied
upon. But as to some cases, recital of facts is insufficient for complete analysis or
case has not been reported. In such instances, reference to some of the foreign
cases should be read in foreign law journals or official reports of decisions. Two Dutch
cases are reviewed in a publication in the Netherlands, published in French, English
and Dutch, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor International Recht. A few lower court decisions in Germany summarized in the International Law Reports appear to support
an exception to the act of state doctrine. But the Allied Government in Germany
repudiated these lower court decisions and deprived all courts of Germany from
deciding such cases. For discussion, see Part III, p.. 483 infra, and digest of particular
cases, Appendix H, p. 546 infra.
21. There is only one case not overruled or repudiated within its own jurisdiction:
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316
(Sup. Ct. Aden) [hereinafter cited as The Rose Mary]. But this decision was not
of an independent country but of the British Protectorate, Aden. The case was
later criticized and distinguished by a higher British court. For further discussion and
testimony concerning this case before Congress, see Part III, p. 468 infra.
22. See note 20 supra.
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highest governmental authority of that one country which took a
series of such cases from its lower courts on the ground that such
decisions were not in accordance with the fundamental law of that
country. The courts of that country then confirmed.
Every case cited to the United States Congress in the Sabbatino
hearings or mentioned by any report of Congress in respect to the
Sabbatino Amendment will be analyzed in this memorandum. Many
are wholly irrelevant to the issues in the Sabbatino case or in the
Sabbatino Amendment. None is authority or precedent for the decisions
of the district court or the court of appeals in the Sabbatino
23
case.

2. Second Error: Erroneous Belief That in Passing the Sabbatino
Amendment, Congress Merely Changed "Presumptions" Within the
Present Power of United States Courts but Did Not Make a Fundamental Change of United States Law, and That the Amendment
Raised No Constitutional Questions.-The second great error which
clearly appears to have motivated the Congress in passing the Sabbatino Amendment was Congress' unwarranted assumptions concerning the judicial power of the United States courts, the decisions of
courts of other countries and the power of the executive branch of the
United States. Some assumptions merely had no basis in precedent.
Others were wholly erroneous. These assumptions included the beliefs: (1) That the courts of the United States had the inherent
right and power to declare acts of state of any other country affecting titles to property there, of United States nationals, to be null
and void if the courts of the United States should find such an act
to be contrary to international law. (For a consideration and refutal
of this assumption, see Part IV, p. 487 infra.) (2) That every court
23. In reading foreign cases, care should be exercised as to nomenclature. "Act of
state doctrine" relates to the international recognition of the validity of an act of a
foreign country in the country where the act took place, but does not recognize any
right of extraterritorial enforcement on property outside of the confiscating state at
the time of confiscation. Discussion of an act contra ordre publique emphasizes that a
foreign act of state will not be enforced extraterritorially (i.e., on property not in
the territory of confiscating country at time of confiscation but at that time under
the jurisdiction of the forum state), if contrary to the law of the forum. The two
are wholly consistent. It happens, however, that a large number of foreign cases
cited to the Congress relate to requests for extraterritorial enforcement of confiscatory
acts. They are wholly irrelevant to any discussion of the Sabbatino case or Sabbatino
Amendment which refers only to recognition of the validity of an act in Cuba (or other
foreign country), not to enforcement on property which at the time of confiscation
was outside of the confiscating country. For further discussion of the act of state
doctrine, see Part II, § D, p. 453 infra. See also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1027 (1966). For a general discussion of the cases cited to the United States
Congressr in-the Sabbatino hearings, or mentioned by any report of Congress with
respect to the Sabbatino Amendment, see Part III, p. 461 infra. For an analysis of
each foreign case cited see Appendix II, p. 541 infra.
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of every foreign country also had this same inherent right and power
and that many of the courts of the countries of Europe had exercised this power to declare acts of foreign countries null and void
or otherwise ineffective within that foreign country if that foreign
act of state were prejudicial to their own citizens and their court
found that national act to be contrary to international law. (For a
refutal of this assumption, see Part III, p. 461 infra.) (3) That the
courts of the United States have, however, never exercised this power
(no court in the United States before Sabbatino had ever attempted
to give such a decision) in deference to a "presumption" that any such
decision would embarrass the executive department in the conduct
of foreign relations. (4) That, however, the Department of State
could dissolve this "presumption" by a declaration to a court, that
United States foreign relations would not be impaired by such a
decision, and thus enable the court to declare a foreign act of
state to be contrary to international law and consequently invalid.
(For a refutal of the assumption above and that immediately preceding it, see discussion directly below). (5) That any court's
decision "on the merits" of rights, claimed or based upon a confiscatoly decree contrary to international law, would necessarily be a
determination that the confiscatory decree was invalid. (For refutal of
this assumption, see "Glossary of some equivocal words," Part II, §
E, p. 455 infra.)
Congress said:
The effect of the amendment is to achieve a reversal of presumptions.
Under the Sabbatino decision, the courts would presume that any adjudication as to the lawfulness under international law of the act of a foreign
state would embarrass the conduct of foreign policy unless the President
says it would not. Under the amendment, the Court would presume that
it may proceed with an adjudication on the merits unless the President
states officially that such an adjudication in the particular case would
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy.24

The origin of most of the assumptions Congress relied upon or
incorporated in the above quotation can be found in the first decision of the district court in Sabbatino. The judge framed the
question which was before him, as follows:
The crucial question remains, however, whether this court can examine
the validity of the Cuban act under international law and refuse recognition
to the act if it is in violation of international law.25

By the hypothesis stated, if this question were answered in the
affirmative, then the sugar company would still own the sugar, and
24. S. REP. No. 1188, 24;. 110 CoNG. REc. 19546 (1964).
25. 193 F. Supp. at 380.
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the law and the seizure under it would be ineffective to transfer
title to Cuba. If the question were answered in the negative, the
decision would be in favor of the agent of Cuba; Cuba would
hold title to the sugar. This very question foreshadowed the judge's
final decision, for he did examine the validity of the Cuban act of
state, and upon finding the act contrary to international law, refused recognition of it and declared it to be invalid in Cuba to
transfer title.
The judge's opinion shows his search for the proper rule to apply
in order to do justice to the parties, and it indicates what he believed was the basis for his authority to apply the rule when found.
The judge first sought guidance in decisions of United States courts;
and although he could find no case which had decided the question, he believed that none precluded an affirmative answer. He
dismissed United States cases with the remark, "To be sure, there
are dicta in a few cases but they furnish little aid."2 He then turned
to decided foreign cases but found little comfort in them, though
he did find "foreign forums have evidenced some willingness to
examine the validity of foreign acts under international law .... -27
The most encouragement, however, for an affirmative answer to his
own hypothetical question came from secondary sources, for as he
said, "by far the strongest support for such examination has come
from legal commentators and textwriters [sic]." 21 The judge names
a few of these commentators and textwriters, some of whom indeed
do believe that the proper rule of law for the future should be an
affirmative answer, that is, a foreign act of state contrary to international law should be declared null and void.29
A few months before the Sabbatino Amendment was enacted,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States had categorically
stated that the courts of the United States should make no effort
to consider and should not question the validity of a fully-executed
foreign act of state "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles ....
;" and there
was no relevant treaty with Cuba.
26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 380 n. 7 . Although the judge names but two, there are others, two of
whom, not mentioned, testified against the Sabbatino Amendment before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Testimony of Professor Stanley Metzger, H.R. 7750
Hearings 991-1032. See also, Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U, Pr. L. REv. 881 (1962); Metzger, Act-of-State Doctrine Redefined: the
Sabbatino Case, 1964 Sup. CT. RiV. 223, Testimony of Professor Louis Henkin, H.R.
7750 Hearings 1060-79. See generally Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the
Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 805 (1964); Henkin, Act of State:
Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress, 3 CoLUmf. J. TRANSxAT. L. 103 (1964).
30. 376 U.S. at 428.
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In enacting the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress in effect adopted
as law, which should be universally recognized, what were only the
suggestions of legal commentators and text writers as to what the
law of the future should be 3' in regard to foreign acts of state found
contrary to international law. However, Congress in published statements based its reasons for the enactment of the Sabbatino Amendment, not on its intention to adopt untried rules suggested by
commentators and text writers, but on other beliefs.
Now we must turn to the decision of the court of appeals in
Sabbatino. This court corrected the belief by the district court that
no United States court had passed on the question, and found
instead that the act of state doctrine had long been a consistently
recognized tenet of United States jurisprudence.32 But the court
of appeals also believed that it, or any other United States court,
could make such a decision if the State Department declared that
such a decision would not interfere with the conduct of international
affairs. The court of appeals further believed that it had been "enlightened" as to the attitude of the State Department in the Sabbatino
case by a certain series of letters which permitted it to make such a
decision, and, therefore, being relieved from the "presumption," the
33
court was enabled to, and did, affirm the lower court's decision.
After the court of appeals' decision in the Sabbatino case, the
United States Department of State denied that it had had any
intention of advising the court it could make such a decision, and
insisted that the series of letters if properly understood could not
be so interpreted.3
Whether or not these particular letters were, when written, intended as significant advice to the court, the Congress believed,
as did the court of appeals, that the State Department could have
done so if it had wished, and in fact they believed the State Department had done so in another case at an earlier date. This belief
was based upon a single incident: the "Bernstein letter."35 This
31. Over a half century ago, the United States Supreme Court gave a warning, in
one of the very cases cited by the lower courts in Sabbatino, that legal writers should
not be used as authority for what the law ought to be. The Supreme Court said in
this case: "Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations
of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is." The Paquete Habanna, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
32. 307 F.2d at 855-56.
33. Id. at 858-59.
34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 39-43, 376 U.S. at 420 n.19.
35. Submitted by U.S. Dep't of State. Text in 20 DEI'T STATE BULL. 592 (1949).
See also Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikansche Stoomvart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), modifying 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). In a previous
case, Judge Learned Hand had .dismissed a similar complaint on the grounds that the
court could not pass on the validity of the acts of the German Government (Nazi).
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.),
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letter has been erroneously interpreted as advising a court that it could
ignore or declare null and void an existing law of a foreign country.
The letter did no such thing. The State Department has never attempted to relieve any court from the duty of applying the act
of state doctrine. The "Bernstein letter" advised a court what were
the present and existing laws of Germany (then under the Allied
Occupation Government); it is no authority for establishing a presumption that the State Department can relieve the courts from following the act of state doctrine. A review of the facts of the case
can leave no doubt that no exception to the act of state doctrine
was accomplished either by the State Department or the courts in
the Bernsteincase.

One Arnold Bernstein, a German citizen, had, through a German
corporation of which he owned a majority of the stock, successfully
operated a fleet of ships from the United States to ports on the
continent of Europe.36 During the Nazi regime in Germany, he was
arrested for violation of the currency exchange laws, convicted, and
sent to jail. His fines were paid by proceeds from the sale of some
of his ships. Later he was able to leave Germany and return to the
United States, where, although not a United States citizen, he
had resided for some time before his ill-fated business trip to his native
country.
Shortly after the end of World War II, he instituted an action
in the federal court for the Southern District of New York to
recover some of his ships, then operated by the purchaser, and to
cancel the mortgage held by a New York financial institution on
those same ships. At the time of the commencement of his action,
he had become a citizen of the United States.37 Bernstein claimed
that he had been deprived of his ships under duress as practiced
under the "Nuremburg laws," known in the United States and the
world generally as a series of Nazi enactments for the oppression and
ultimate destruction of the Jewish population of Germany. Although
Mr. Bernstein had not been convicted or sentenced under these laws,
but under the foreign exchange laws which applied to all citizens,
there was nevertheless the possibility that his loss of the ships was
in some way connected with these infamous laws. He alleged duress,
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (Oct. 13, 1947). Judge Hand considered the new laws
imposed on Germany by Allied Occupation Authority, but could not find as of the date
of his opinion (July 10, 1947) that these required return of property seized under
Nazi law. The dissenting opinion of Judge Clark recommended continuation of the
case until the new laws of Germany were clarified. See note 39 infra.
36. Any statements of fact not appearing in the opinions above, cited in the
Bernstein case, are from the pleadings and other documents filed in that case with
the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
37. Mr. Bernstein was granted United States citizenship in 1940 after his ships
had been sold.
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but to recover his ships, he had to prove either a causal connection
with the universally condemned Nuremburg laws or that the application of similar principles had deprived him unjustly of his ships.
Also he claimed the Nuremburg laws to be null and void. The issue
then was: Had title been transferred under, or by reason of, the
Nuremburg laws and, if so, was this still to be recognized as a valid
transfer by a United States court? The State Department was asked
by Bernstein's attorney for an expression of opinion which was given,
this being the "Bernstein letter," addressed by the acting legal adviser
to Bernstein's attorney and dated April 13, 1949.
We must now consider the changes which had occurred in Germany prior to 1949, the date when the case was pending and the
letter was sent. In 1945, Germany had unconditionally surrendered.
The Allies soon had occupied the whole of Germany and, long before
1949, had organized the Government of Germany, which by the
surrender and subsequently by the courts of GermaAy itself (after
the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany) was recognizd as the sole legitimate Government of Germany succeeding the
Nazi regime. One of the first acts which this new Government of
Germany did was to rescind the Nuremburg laws and, soon thereafter,
to grant restitution of property transferred under them. Of special
importance here is Military Government Law No. 59, under which
was announced the Allied Government's policy of undoing forced
transfers, and restituting identifiable property to persons wrongfully deprived of such property within the period from January
30, 1933, to May 8, 1945, for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
ideology or political opposition to National Socialism (Naziism). 39
This policy, as enacted into law, applied generally despite the existence of any purchasers in good faith of property confiscated under
Nazi law. Thus at the time when Bernstein made his plea, the
laws of Germany provided that if he could prove he had been deprived of his ships unjustly under Nazi laws, those ships would be
returned to him notwithstanding the good faith of the purchaser or
of the company which held the mortgage. Since Bernstein had not
been convicted under the Nuremburg laws, and since a substantial
fund realized on the sale of the ships had been used to pay his fines,
the purchasers and mortgagors claimed they had good title and
that the Nuremburg laws were wholly irrelevant. The issues were
never tried for the case was settled. But even assuming a trial with
38. D. & W. GmbH. v. V. & V. Gmb H. (Joint Export-Import Agency Case),
Bundesgerichtshof (I. Zivilsenat.), Jan. 10, 1956, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 341 (Fed. Rep. Ger.), [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 183 (No. 23).
39. Military Gov't Law No. 59 on Restitution of Identifiable Property, Mil. Gov't
Gaz.-U.S. Zone, Nov. 10, 1947. See reference to text of Bernstein letter, note. 35 supra
and accompanying text.
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a wholly successful outcome for Mr. Bernstein with the return of
the ships to him, such decision would have been strictly in accord
with the laws of Germany. The same result would have occurred
in Germany itself.
The "Bernstein letter" did not authorize any United States courts
to declare null and void any existing and unrepealed laws of Germany.40
The assumptions or presumptions discussed above tend to conceal the more basic assumption on which they were founded. Congress in its statement of its intention in enacting the Sabbatino
Amendment, and its interpretation of the expected results, apparently believed that the amendment would not change, that is, not
enlarge, the inherent power of the courts of the United States nor
would it cause any change in United States fundamental law.41 This,
the most basic assumption of all, will be considered later.
3. Third Error:Assumption That the Sabbatino Amendment Would
Accomplish the Desired Results and Was the Best Method for This
Purpose.-The third error motivating Congress to draft and enact the
Sabbatino Amendment may be considered as one of omission rather
than commission. Congress has passed an act which can accomplish
in very small part, if at all, the desired purpose. 42 A simple law well
within the domestic law of the United States, and touching no more
of international relations than our courts have long been accustomed
to consider, would have
much more effectually accomplished the
43
intention of Congress.
The general purposes of the Sabbatino Amendment, as stated by
Congress, were to protect American foreign investment and discourage foreign countries from confiscating within their own territory
the property of United States nationals. These purposes were to be
accomplished in two ways. The first was by means of a warning to
foreign countries which might contemplate adoption of a national
40. The Sabbatino Amendment would not have applied to the Bernstein case even
if in existence at that time. The Sabbatino Amendment can be invoked only when
the court finds a breach of international law has occurred. The treatment by a
nation of its own citizens is not a violation of international law. Bernstein was a
citizen of Germany at the time of his arrest and incarceration. In a recent case, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that since
the seizure by Cuba of the property in Cuba of a Cuban-owned Cuban corporation
was not a violation of international law, the Sabbatino Amendment was not applicable.
F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also 307 F.2d
at 860.
41. See note 13 supra. A discussion of the Sabbatino Amendment in its relation to
the fundamental law of the United States, particularly the Constitution itself, is included
in Part IV, p. 487 infra.
42. Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets Civil Procedure,
59 Am. J. INT'L L. 899 (1965).
43. See Part V, p. 532 infra.
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policy of confiscation that if they did so, the great market of the
United States would be closed to the sale of any of those goods
confiscated from United States nationals. 44 Second, the policy was
to be accomplished by advising the world that should any confiscated
property come into the United States as property claimed by the
confiscating government, or of anyone claiming title by such confiscation, that the United States national who had owned the property prior to its seizure in the foreign country would be able to
take possession of it as his own, or in lieu thereof to secure the
purchase price.45 United States courts would declare there had been
no change of title.
If there is knowledge that the former owner could recover the
confiscated property in the United States, so the argument runs,
no property would be brought in. If the first proposition, therefore, were effective, and confiscated goods were wholly withheld
from the United States market, there would be no property for
the former owner to recover in the United States. The goal of
excluding confiscated goods from the United States market as a
deterrent to wrongful acts against United States property abroad
is not here criticized. There is no reason why appropriate legislation should not be framed to accomplish this purpose; but the
Sabbatino Amendment will not do it.
In the first place, there is no national prohibition by the Sabbatino
46
Amendment against sale in the United States of confiscated goods.
The power of the United States, in its executive capacity, to prevent
goods whose importation is prohibited, from coming into the United
States is not invoked. The former owner of confiscated property
must in every instance start a proceeding in a court, claiming title
to certain goods imported. This is not the way to enforce a national
policy against a foreign country which is a wrongdoer. No one individual could, as the United States itself can, have representatives in
every port to check every shipment as to origin and ownership.
Even if that were possible, the cost of such a policy would always
fall on the claimant under the Sabbatino Amendment; and cost of
44. "The United States shall not become a thieves' market." This phrase appears
in many places. It first appeared in the memorandum submitted by Senator Bourke
B. Hickenlooper and published in the Congressional Record, Aug. 14, 1964. It was
used in briefs and in oral argument before the Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case
and appears in the decision of Judge Frederick van P. Bryan, Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (1965).
45. This was the result, approved by the Congress, of the lower court decisions in
the Sabbatino case. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962).
46. A United States district court has already decided that the Sabbatino Amendment does not apply to property confiscated by a country from its own citizens. This
is not an act contrary to international law. F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, supra
note 40.
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litigation can be great. Obviously, this cost of policing shipments to
prevent importation of confiscated property should fall on the United
States. Still worse, the law is dependent wholly upon the strict identification of the particular property. Such identification is difficult in
Cuba where some sugar-producing companies are wholly or partially
owned by United States nationals, some are wholly owned by Cubans,
and probably others are owned in whole or in part by other foreigners.
More than five years have gone by since the property of Compania
Azucarea Verientes-Camaguey (C.A.V.) in Cuba was seized and that
one ship loaded with sugar sailed from Cuba to Africa. The right to
receive the purchase price of that sugar in New York is still being
contested between Cuba and C.A.V.
In 1963 the United States Government imposed a complete embargo over trade between Cuba and the United States. 47 One year
later, in 1964, the Sabbatino Amendment was passed. Any effect
which it might have had on Cuban trade with the United States
was a nullity for already, by law, there was no trade with Cuba.
Thus, up to this time at least, the Sabbatino Amendment may
properly be considered as a private bill for the relief of C.A.V. as
to one shipload of sugar, value 175,000 U.S. dollars. And even here
48
it has so far failed to accomplish its purpose.
But the Sabbatino Amendment is now a general statute49 of the
United States to be applied to commerce with any country if necessary. We may question how effective it will be in obtaining its
inconsistent goals of preventing the United States from becoming
a "thieves' market," and also restoring all confiscated goods which
come into the United States to the owner of these goods before
confiscation. Under the Sabbatino Amendment, taking Cuba as an
illustration, a claimant to any sugar coming to the United States
would have two tasks to perform in the field of legal evidence before he could be awarded the sugar or its purchase price; one
task would be difficult, the other impossible. The claimant must
first prove that a particular bag of sugar was his property and
confiscated from him. After the 1960 crop of sugar had been exhausted, no sugar produced in Cuba could ever have been in the
possession of this hypothetical claimant. 50 Even if the laws of evi47. On July 8, 1963, the United States Government imposed Cuba Assets Control
Regulations by Proclamation. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1966).
48. The case is still in litigation and the purchase price is still being held in escrow.
Lehman Bros. is now a party to the case and holds the proceeds. Sabbatino, a
temporary receiver for C.A.V., who originally received the payment, is no longer a
party to the case.
49. 79 Stat. 659 (1965), 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (Supp. I, 1965).
50. An Italian court held that a concessionaire of a confiscated oil field never had
title to oil pumped from the ground after the company had been ousted from its oil
producing facilities. The court held the former company could not acquire title to
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dence were generously applied, however, and he could satisfy this
first problem of identifying the sugar by showing that it had been
shipped from the mill which had been seized from him (an obviously
difficult task), he would meet an impossible cost accounting problem. He would have to show what proportion of the purchase price
should be allocated to him as "former owner," what proportion represented the property interest of some other confiscated company
as "former owner," (the job of which had been to furnish, however
unwillingly, the raw material grown upon land seized from some
sugar cane growers, and perhaps too, what proportion should be allocated to "the former owner" of supplies (twine, bags, fuel, etc.)
sent to the mill, including any other costs necessary to produce a
bagged quantity of sugar ready for shipment. The proper disposition
of labor costs would have to be determined, for obviously the claimant would not have contributed to these 5 '
C.A.V. had none of these problems. As to it, the sugar was easily
identified and all costs which had gone into creation of that readyfor-shipment sugar had already been paid or assumed by the company. That particular sugar, just two days before, had been the
identifiable solely-owned property of C.A.V.
Wherever a sovereign government deals with its own citizens,
however unjust or unfair the actions of the government towards
those particular citizens may be, there is no breach of international
law. The injured citizen cannot apply to any foreign government to
sponsor his claim against his own government. The Sabbatino Amendment would not, therefore, apply to, or in any way prevent, the
importation into the United States of sugar confiscated by Cuba from
Cuban citizens, for the court in such an instance could not find any
breach of international law. The Sabbatino Amendment, by its terms,
applies only to a case in which a court can find a breach of international law.52
goods in future. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.

(Unione Petrolifera per

l'Oriente S.P.A.), Civ. Ct., Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] I Foro Italiano 256, [1955]
Int'l L. Rep. 23 [hereinafter cited as The Miriella]. This was one of the several
reasons given by that court for upholding the title of the Iranian Government and
rejecting the claim of title by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. While there might be
controversy as to ownership of oil known to exist in the ground (tf. N.V. de Bataafsche

Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Comm'n, Ct. App., Singapore, April 13,
1956, [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810), there can be no argument over possession of sugar

not yet grown.
51. The civil law principle specificatio, incorporated in various forms in the civil
codes of some European nations, might give rise to the question as to whether or
not a person who creates a new product out of materials to which he had not
title can become the owner.
52. Sabbatino Amendment, first exception. The ,United States district court has
already held that Cuba acquired good title to property and supplies of Cubanincorporated, Cuban-owned cigar companies. The Sabbatino Amendment did not,
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A further question arises as to whether or not it was also the
intention of Congress to prevent entry into the United States of
property confiscated from citizens of some other foreign country.
Assume then that property was confiscated by Cuba, which had
been owned by citizens of, or corporations owned by citizens of,
the mythical country, Graustark, meaning thereby any European
country or any other capital-exporting country.
Graustark, as all of the countries of Europe, recognizes the act
of state doctrine. Under Graustark's law, therefore, the Graustark
citizen no longer has title to the property he held in Cuba, for the
title has been transferred to Cuba. On behalf of that citizen and
others, Graustark has demanded of Cuba reparations equal to the
full value of the seized property. Now suppose some of the property seized from a citizen of Graustark comes to the United States
and can be identified. May the citizen of Graustark sue in the United
States courts under the Sabbatino Amendment? Under the laws of
Cuba, the property is no longer his. Under the laws of Graustark,
his own country, similarly the property is not his. But under the
Sabbatino Amendment, as interpreted, the property would still belong to the citizen of Graustark, for the confiscatory act of state
must be declared null and void and invalid to transfer title. This
is what the Congress and a court have determined under the Sabbatino Amendment is a decision "on the merits." If the United
States courts do take this case, might Graustark complain diplomatically that by this judicial action a United States court would
be interfering with its national right to deal with Cuba exclusively
in behalf of its own citizens? Also Graustark might believe, as the
Attorney General of the United States has testified before the Congress,O that compensation, under the rule to be applied under the
Sabbatino Amendment, might reduce compensation owed by Cuba
to an amount less than the standard of "prompt, adequate and
effective compensation."
Furthermore, would such an adjudication by a United States court
violate the age-old rule that our Government will not espouse the
claims of a citizen of another country for wrongs he claims have
been done to him, not in the United States but by some third
sovereign power?
If the courts do not accept such cases then the restrictions on
importation of confiscated property are less; and the hopes that the
Sabbatino Amendment can prevent the United States from "becoming a thieves' market" fade further.
apply to the sale in the United States of cigars confiscated in Cuba. This trading
occurred after confiscation in Cuba and before the United States embargo. F. Palacio y
Compania v. Brush, supra note 40.
53. H.R. 7750 Hearings1234.
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With the limitations imposed by the Sabbatino Amendment itself,
this clumsy method of denying the United States markets to confiscators could only be effective where the confiscated property was
such as to belong solely to one company, one recognized as a national
of the United States. This would be possible only with respect to
unique unfungible property as works of art or, as to fungible goods,
a monopolistic grant or concession such as oil or ore; the product
is imported in the raw state or processed only by the company
which produced the raw material. Even here the cost accounting
problem of allocation might present difficulties.
As far as the Sabbatino Amendment is concerned, any quantity of
unidentifiable sugar from Cuba could even now be arriving in the
United States to be sold in this market. The importation of sugar
from Cuba is prevented not by the Sabbatino Amendment but by
the imposition of the embargo against all trade with Cuba invoked
under the Trading with the Enemy Act.54
II.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. CUBS'S
INSULT MADE POSSIBLE TIE JUDIcIAL ERRoRS IN THE SABBATINO
DECISIONS, WHICH WERE BLEVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT,

AND ALSO PROMPTED T=E SUBSEQUENT SABBATINO
LEGISLATION

In February, 1960, Farr, Whitlock & Company and C.A.V. entered
into the first contract of those referred to in the Sabbatino case.55
As this article is written, it is 1967, and the first decision under the
Sabbatino Amendment has been handed down. An appeal from that
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
is now pending. Within the past six years, there have been four
federal court decisions in this same case; two of them were overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Congressional legislation
superseded the rule of law confirmed by the Supreme Court, however,
and the fourth decision has been rendered by the district court on
motion in the remanded case, on the basis of the Sabbatino Amendment.
This section of the article will discuss the Sabbatino litigation and
Sabbatino legislation under the following topics: (a) The United
States and Cuba-1959-1960. (b) The Insult and the Injury-The
Confiscation and the Sabbatino Suit. (c) The Confiscator Before the
Courts. (d) The Act of State Doctrine Defined by the Courts.
(e) A Glossary of Some Equivocal Words.
54. Note 47 supra.
55. 193 F. Supp. at 376; 307 F.2d at 849; 376 U.S. at 401.
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A. The United States and Cuba-959-1960
Late in 1958 Fidel Castro Ruz, popularly known by his first two
names, as the leader of a revolutionary group, displaced the Batista
Government of Cuba. The United States promptly recognized the
Castro Government as the legitimate Government of Cuba. 56 Among
the first laws which were promulgated by that Government was one
recognizing the right of private property and promising protection
of the Cuban courts to property-owners in Cuba.5 7 Soon, however,
acts directed against property and property-owners became increasingly common and the Cuban courts were slow, if not loathe, to
correct these abuses. The United States, by the Department of State,
protested recurring and uncorrected invasions of private rights of
United States nationals. 58
An increase of trade with Russia was one of the policies introduced by the new Cuban Government which committed a large part
of the Cuban sugar crop to support this trade. The United States,
looking with increasing alarm at the trend of the national policy,
both political and economic, of this newly established and newly
recognized Cuban Government, 59 reduced the Cuban sugar quota
to the United States on the fear, expressed by the President of the
United States, that the increased allocations of Cuban sugar to Russia
might very well cause Cuba to be unable to meet the quota previously
granted, and thus deprive the American people of the supply of
sugar which they had come to expect. 60 The United States had

paid for Cuban sugar per pound substantially above the world
market. This was more per pound than the value fixed by Russia
in the barter agreement with Cuba.
56. Fidel Castro came to power in January, 1959. BUREAU oF PUB.
OF STATE,

FoREGN AFFAmS

OurLINEs,

DEvELoPNMNTS

AFFAmS, DEP'T
IN TuE CUBAN SITuATION,

Oct., 1962, No. 1. His Government was recognized Jan. 7, 1959, 40 DEP'T STATE BULL,
128 (1959).
57. On Feb. 7, 1959, an amended version of certain sections of the Fundamental
Law of Cuba was published. An English translation was immediately issued by the
General Legal Division of the Pan-American Union, Dept. of Legal Affairs, under the
authority of the Pan-American Union, General Secretariat, Organization of American
States.
58. 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 158 (1960).
59. Hearings Before House Committee on Agrigulture, on H.R. 12311, H.R. 12534
and H.R. 12624, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 193 F. Supp. at 383 n.15. See also 106
CONG. IEc. 14679-81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
60. The proclamation by the President on July 6 reduced the sugar quota. Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960). The district court in Sabbatino characterized this action as: ".

.

. A reading of the legislative history, however, leaves no

doubt that the basic reason for the legislation was to impose sanctions on a Government which Congress believed to be unfriendly and to place in the executive a
bargaining tool to obtain a change in the relations of the Cuban State toward this
country .... ." 193 F. Supp. at 383-84,
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On the very day that the Government of the United States reduced
the Cuban sugar quota, the Castro Government by a decree which
was frankly stated to be in retaliation, announced its national policy
of confiscating all private property in Cuba owned by United States
nationals. 61 Thereafter, by three resolutions, the Cuban Government
designated particular United States nationals' property, and from
time to time seized such designated property, and excluded the
owner and the owner's management from any such property. The
decree expressing the national intention was thus some months in
process of execution. A more complete nationalization of private
business within Cuba followed in due course. This is the background of the intergovernment relations and62 the cause of the Sabbatino case and the Sabbatino Amendment.
B. The Insult and the Injury-The Confiscationand
the Sabbatino Suit
When insult is added to injury, the sense of wrong is intensified;
the demand for some action to right the wrong becomes more insistent. So it was in the Sabbatino case. The injury which was the
basis of the Sabbatino litigation-the wrong which the lower courts
attempted to redress as to one shipload of sugar-was the confiscation
by Cuba of more than a billion dollars worth of property of United
States nationals in Cuba. This confiscation included that one shipload of sugar. Here was a wrong to be righted. The insult was the
effort by Cuba itself, in the institution of a suit in a United States
court, to recover the sale price of that very confiscated sugar, sold
by Cuba to a broker within the United States.
The New York broker was the purchaser under two contracts for
the same sugar. The first contract he had made with the sugar
company which had produced the sugar-a company owned by United
States nationals but incorporated in Cuba. Of course this contract
was made before Cuba seized the sugar. The other contract was
with an agency of the Cuban Government which then had possession
of the sugar and could deliver it. The sugar company did not have
any sugar in Cuba in its possession at this time, for Cuba had confiscated it.

The problem which faced the broker, when Cuba confiscated the
61. The Cuban Council of Ministers adopted Law No. 851 on July 6, 1960. For
full text, see 376 U.S. at 401-02 n.3.
62. Throughout the Sabbatino litigation and legislation, there have been no conflicting statements as to the facts in litigation. The political background and the
particular facts of the Sabbatino case are set forth in the decisions. The issues
litigated have been solely questions of law. There has been no trial; matters have
been raised solely by motion.
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sugar company's assets, and the sugar company could not perform
its contract, was how to get enough sugar to fulfill his commitments.
It was then that the broker made the contract with the representative
of the Cuban Government to purchase a second time that very same
sugar. This sugar was to be delivered to Africa and payment was
to be made in New York (as had been provided under the first contract). In fulfillment of the second contract, the Cuban Government finished the loading of the ship supplied by the purchaser.
The loading had been partially completed by the sugar company
before seizure of its assets. After loading, and execution of the new
contract, the Cuban Government permitted the ship to sail to Africa.
Through a foreign bank, the Cuban agent forwarded to the broker
in New York (the buyer) bills of lading with drafts attached. But
the sugar company claimed that it was entitled to receive the purchase price. The problem which faced the broker (the buyer) then
was how to pay for this sugar without incurring a double liability, a
liability under each of the two contracts, although the broker had
wanted and had received only one shipload of sugar. This sugar had
been delivered by Cuba. To solve this dilemma, upon presentment
of the draft with the bills of lading attached, the broker took the
bills of lading, negotiated them, and forwarded them to his customer
to obtain delivery of his sugar in Africa. In this way he fulfilled his
own contract for the delivery of the shipment to Africa and in turn
received payment. But he returned the draft unpaid to the collection agent of the Cuban Government. Then after some delay he
paid the purchase price of the sugar to the temporary receiver of the
sugar company's assets in New York.
The sugar company had induced him to make this payment to
its temporary representative in New York by offering him a ten
per cent discount in price and a guarantee to hold him harmless
against any liability to the agent of the Cuban Government for
failure to pay the draft for the purchase price of the delivered
sugar; and, as still further protection to him, secured an order from
the state court of New York, which had appointed the receiver of
the New York assets of the sugar company, directing payment by
the broker to that receiver. This initially successful endeavor by the
sugar company to obtain the purchase price was the event precipitating the suit which became known as the Sabbatino case-Peter L. F.
Sabbatino was the state court-appointed receiver for the New York
assets of the sugar company. He received the purchase price.
Then Cuba sued the New York purchaser, the broker, for conversion of the bills of lading which he had negotiated in order to
receive the purchase money from his own customers in Africa. Cuba,

ERRORS IN SABBATINO

in the same suit, also sued the receiver of the sugar company as one
received the purchase price of the sugar due and
who had unjustly
63
owing to Cuba.
Under the unvarying interpretation by the United States of national obligations assumed in mutual foreign relations, the seizure
of property of United States nationals in Cuba by Cuba, caused
Cuba immediately to become liable to the United States for the
benefit of those nationals of the United States whose property Cuba
had thus confiscated. "Prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" is the price demanded by the United States to satisfy the "forced
sale theory" and resulting obligation of an executed nationalization
by a foreign country of property in which nationals of the United
States have an interest. Demands were made by the State Department-a diplomatic protest was sent to Cuba. 64 No payment by Cuba
has been made.
The United States court of appeals in this case made a footnote
to its opinion:
If there had been adequate compensation for the seizure, regardless of the
it would be very
other circumstances surrounding the expropriations,
65
difficult to find any violation of international law.

Cuba had seized possession of all the sugar company's assets in
Cuba for which it had paid nothing. Cuba had parted with possession
of that one shipload of sugar on a promise of payment of the contract
price in New York. But the company, not Cuba, had received payment for that sugar. Until Cuba entered the United States courts,
no part of this obligation could be collected by private legal action
since no United States court had jurisdiction of Cuba, a sovereign
government, nor of any of the property it had confiscated.
It was the insult by Cuba in demanding the purchase price of
confiscated sugar and in entering our courts to collect that purchase
price of a sale of that confiscated property to United States nationals
to be paid in New York, that gave the courts jurisdiction over Cubaat least a limited jurisdiction; and, in the same case, jurisdiction over
the purchaser who readily admitted he owed the purchase price to
someone; and jurisdiction over the recipient-the receiver-of that
sum.
If Cuba had not with unbridled effrontery endeavored to sellwith the promise of receipt of payment in dollars in the United
63. Statement of facts reconstructed from decisions -in Sabbatino. Banco National
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d
Cir. 1962), rev'd 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

64. 43
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BuLL. 171, 316, 603 (1960).

65. 307 F.2d at 862 n.9.
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States-the same sugar to the same purchaser who previously had
contracted to buy it from the producing company, the validity of
Cuba's acts-making a fully executed act of state-could not have
been reviewed by a United States court. Neither could that effective
slogan have been coined, "the United States will not become a
thieves' market."
C. The ConfiscatorBefore the Courts
The situation before the United States district court was unusual.
Here, an agent of the confiscator itself appeared in court and complained he had not been paid for property which Cuba had confiscated from a Cuban corporation, predominantly owned by United
States nationals, and then sold to a United States partnership. Doubtless, if the Cuban Government had had any intimation that the drafts
would not have been paid on presentation, it would have insisted on
payment in Cuba before the sugar-laden ship was permitted to sail.
After Fair Wbitlock had failed to pay the draft accompanying the
bills of lading, the sovereign Government of Cuba had no means to
secure payment except to ask the court of another sovereign-the
very sovereign Cuba had wronged-to help obtain that purchase price.
The usual case involving a foreign confiscation is brought by a person
who was the owner of the property before confiscation; he, wherever
he may be, recognizing in another country the property taken from
him, demands it from the persons whose title rests upon the confiscation decree. In such an instance, the confiscating government already has the purchase price. In the Sabbatino case, the confiscating
government was the plaintiff; thus the usual roles of plaintiff and
defendant in such a case were reversed. 66
The judge of the district court who first decided the Sabbatino
case characterized the anomalous situation over which he was asked
to preside as
Plaintiff is not a private litigant who may have acted in good faith reliance
on the decree but is the financial agent of the Cuban Government and in my
view stands in the shoes of that government in seeking to enforce the
nationalization measure in the courts of this country. It is only a short
step from the last premise to the conclusion that the Cuban Government is seeking directly the aid of this court in implementing its decree.
In such circumstances, it would be almost incomprehensible for the forum
to implement a foreign violation of international law (assuming arguendo
that the decree is so violative) by extending to the forum the operation
67
of this international wrong.
66. One writer characterized the situation thus: "The Sabbatino case itself was a
freak case, in that it was the plaintiff which claimed under an expropriation, and
the defendant who, by sleight of hand, bad taken possession of the proceeds of the
expropriated property." Lowenfeld, supra note 42, at 900.
67. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
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Thus did the court view the audacious act of the confiscator becoming a litigant in United States courts. Thus did Cuba, as plaintiff,
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the district court. Thus did
the insult induce the creation of the new law applied.
The judge noted that there is at least "a short step" between the
request to enforce a sales contract for the purchase of the sugar,
the title of which under Cuban law was held by the Cuban Government, and a decree of the court refusing to recognize within the
United States the validity in Cuba of the Cuban confiscation decree.
It was this gap which the Sabbatino Amendment attempted to bridge.
Throughout the Sabbatino litigation, the Republic of Cuba appeared officially, voluntarily as a plaintiff, asking the court to give
it satisfaction for a breach of a commercial contract in a failure to
pay and for conversion of bills of lading. Unofficially in every court,
Cuba appeared as a nation which had become communistic, the
confiscator of United States property (of that very sugar which it
had sold and for which it now sought the payment). The self-styled
innocent and wronged plaintiff suing on a breach of a commercial
contract was the exploiter, the wrongdoer who had possession of
that sugar by its own misdeeds. Here was the insult which had been
added to the injury.
D. The Act of State DoctrineDefined by the Courts68
The court of appeals in the Sabbatino case defined the act of state
doctrine as follows:
The Act of State Doctrine, briefly stated, holds that American courts will
not pass on the validity of the acts of foreign governments performed in
their capacities as sovereigns within their own territories. The action of
foreign nations accorded this respect may be executive, legislative, or judicial
in nature, although court judgments, because they ordinarily involve the
resolution of private disputes and do not ordinarily reflect high state policy,
do not usually come within this category .... This doctrine is one of the

conflict of laws rules applied by American courts; it is not itself a rule
of international law . .

.

. The act of state doctrine has had a place in

American jurisprudence for a very long time. It may date from the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293

(1808)

....

69

The meaning and application of the act of state doctrine became
the central legal question of the Sabbatino case.
68. In comments about the Sabbatino case, some misunderstanding of the act of
state doctrine has appeared. The definitions hereafter expressed are from the decisions
of the courts of the United States. There is no inconsistency in these definitions, either
with prior United States courts' decisions or those of the highest courts of other
countries.
69. 307 F.2d at 855-56.
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The court of appeals quoted a statement from another case:
[E]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through
the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.7 0
These definitions are wholly consistent with the statement of the
United States Supreme Court in the Sabbatino decision. The issue
raised was one that has been raised before in the United States
and often in foreign countries: Does the court of one country recognize that the national will of another country has been accomplished where the national intention, as here, was a transfer of title?
Or, may the courts of that country decide that the law, wholly
executed in the other country, is not valid if contrary to international
law? All countries whose courts had decided this issue heretofore
had recognized the transfer of title by an act of state whether or not
that act was contrary to international law; but all countries also
recognized that any act of confiscation was wrongful under international law, as a violation of the rules of conduct to be observed
toward foreigners and their property. A confiscator thus became liable
for his wrong.
The district court in Sabbatino did not define an act of state, but
comments concerning an act of state throughout the decision indicate no inconsistency with the definition of the court of appeals.
The lower court stated:
The action centers about title to a sugar shipment which plaintiff, the financial agent of the Cuban government, asserts by reason of expropriation of the
hereinafter C.A.V.,
property of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey,
a Cuban corporation, under a nationalization decree. 71
The district court recognized that an act of state is effective only
within the territory of the country executing it. To have it "enforced"
in another country on property in that other country, the law must be
compatible with the law of that other country or a treaty must have
been negotiated requiring the courts to enforce the act extraterritorially. The district court said:
I come now to defendants' second claim. Regardless of what the intent
of the nationalization decree may have been, I could not give effect to
that decree if it purported to affect property interests in sugar which
It is
-was located outside of Cuba "at-the-time -the decree took effect ....
70. 307 F.2d at 856, quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
71. 193 F. Supp. at 376.
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clear, however, that the decree purported
to take effect before the ship
72

carrying the sugar departed from Cuba.

The purpose of the Cuban act is also defined by the district court.
[Tihe decree assumed 'to order the nationalization, through compulsory

expropriation, and, therefore, the adjudication in fee simple to the Cuban
State, of all property and enterprises located in the national territory, and
the rights and interest resulting from such property and enterprises . . .

listed below.' (as in original)73

Yet, in spite of the clear definition indicating complete understanding
on the part of the courts as to the meaning of an act of state, both
in the judicial decisions and generally in discussion concerning the
Sabbatino case, certain words and phrases seem to have been
wrenched from their ordinary meaning.
E. A Glossary of Some Equivocal Words
Certain rather ordinary English words seem to have acquired new
and different meanings in the course of the Sabbatino litigation and
legislation. A glossary is needed which will give the meanings of
these words or phrases as they are used in the decisions in Sabbatino
and in congressional explanation and discussion. The two principal
but simple words to consider are the words "recognize" and "enforce." A Sabbatino gloss of these two words will also explain what
is a "valid act of state" as that phrase is now used, and an "executed
act of state" as used in the Sabbatino case and in statements by the
Congress or in testimony before the Congress. Two other phrases,
"decision on the merits" and "rule of law," are used with new meaning.
1. "Recognize.'-Prior to Sabbatino, this word had always been
used both popularly and in legal terminology with dictionary meaning, "acknowledge formally as existing." It appears in the Sabbatino
matters in two connections.
First, as applied to the Government of Cuba, the Castro Government was "recognized" by the United States Government. There are
three stages of assertion of political control which affect recognition:
(1) no-government, meaning anarchy, which status may accompany
civil war or military occupation of an area for the time being;
(2) de facto government, meaning one which has governmental
control over an area and is capable of keeping order within that
area but is not "recognized" as the legitimate government of that
area; and (3) de jure government, meaning one which is "recognized"
as the legitimate government of that country. The Castro Govern72. Id. at 379.
73. Id. at 379 n.4.
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ment was "recognized" as the legitimate Government of Cuba by
the United States.
Second, a de jure government within its territory can commit any
act of state which any other government can commit, and its
executed acts of state on persons and property in its jurisdiction
and under its control have been "recognized" as valid throughout
the world. This is a conflict of laws principle. As to Cuba in Sabbatino, the lower courts refused to "recognize" that Cuba had sovereign
power to create a valid act of state to be executed or "enforced"
by it within its own territory, if contrary to international law. This
was a new concept in United States jurisprudence and inconsistent
with the political recognition already granted. Heretofore, the validity
of a recognized sovereign's acts within its own territory had always
been recognized. The reversal of the Sabbatino case by the Supreme
Court confirmed the act of state doctrine. The Sabbatino Amendment re-established the new idea.
2. "Enforce."-An act of state in any country can be "enforced"
by that country which enacted the law, only when the state has
jurisdiction over the persons and property and possession or control
over those persons and property on which it wishes to impose the
national will. Here in the Sabbatino case, as admitted by all the
courts, the national will of Cuba was to transfer title to the Government of Cuba without compensation, of all property in which nationals of the United States had an interest. Cuba had seized the
sugar and had both jurisdiction and physical control over it and
thus "enforced" the national will. The Supreme Court referred to
this as an "executed act of state," and, however wrongful it was, and
even if alleged to be contrary to international law, having been fully
"enforced" by a "recognized" sovereign government, it was and is
valid in Cuba.
Sometimes a country which has announced its national will wishes
to impose that will upon assets in another country belonging to
corporations of its own country. The country which wishes to impose the act of state has no jurisdiction over that property and
certainly does not have the assets in its possession. While the act of
state of one country generally has no extra-territorial effect in any
other, if the act of state is in accord with the laws of the other
country, that other country by comity may voluntarily "enforce" the
foreign act of state within its own territory.
It is not the policy of the United States to "enforce" confiscatory
decrees of a foreign country, which are contrary to international
law, on persons or property within the United States. The United
States Constitution, fifth amendment, provides that:
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[N]o person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

This is the "ordre publique" of the United States. It is one of
the basic tenets on which the United States was founded and has
prospered. The United States has extended this protection to the
private property situated within the United States of foreigners
irrespective of where those foreigners live. Recently a United States
court of appeals has reiterated the proposition that the fifth amendment to the Constitution applies to the property of foreigners.14
Although the United States generally refuses to enforce the confiscatory decrees of a foreign government on property within the
United States, we have unfortunately not always been consistent in
our application of this principle. In one notorious and flagrant exception, the United States enforced a confiscatory decree of another
country on property which had been in the United States long before
the foreign country enacted the confiscatory decree, which purported
to change title to property not only within the confiscating government's jurisdiction but to that property within the United States
jurisdiction. It was in 1933 that the President of the United States
entered into an executive agreement with a representative of the
Soviet Government. This agreement was known as the "Litvinov
Agreement," 75 under which the United States promised to "enforce.'
within the United States the confiscatory laws of the Soviet Government and take, without compensation, all property of Russian corporations then within the United States, property previously brought
here for business reasons or perhaps for the safety believed to be
afforded by the protection of the laws of the United States.
This willingness of the United States to lend its assistance to the
Soviet Government in confiscating the property of Russian citizens
held in the United States in the name of Russian corporations was
intended to remove all controversy between the United States and
the Soviet Government. The confiscated property was thereafter used
to pay claims of United States citizens against the Soviet Government for its confiscation of their property in Russia.
Prior to this agreement, the Soviet Government had attempted to
secure recognition of its title to privately-owned Russian property
in the United States, but the courts in this country had consistently
74. Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U. S. 898 (1966).
75. For the text of the agreement and discussion as to its application on property,
in the United States (which had not been in Russia at any time when the Soviet
Government was in control), see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Forfull explanation, both majority and minority opinions should be examined. "
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refused to enforce the Soviet decrees on property in the United
States. The Litvinov Agreement required them to do so. Of course,
courts in the United States had recognized transfer of title to Russia
of property in Russia and in the control of Russia. 76 The necessity
of enforcing confiscatory decrees on property in the United States
was bitterly attacked, but a divided Supreme Court sustained the
validity of this agreement, the minority stating its conviction that
even an executive agreement could not cause the states composing
the United States to change the basic policy that confiscatory decrees
are not enforced within the United States.
There have been a few other minor alleged instances in which some
have found a lapse from the basic United States policy. Even as to
these, it has been arguable whether or not they really deprived anyone under the jurisdiction
of the United States of his property with7
out due process of law.

"Recognition" of the imposition of the national will of a foreign
country on persons and property within that country is not "enforcement" of a foreign confiscatory decree. Such "recognition" does not
give effect to such a decree; it merely recognizes an effect which has
taken place elsewhere.
The switch of words with different meanings is clearly shown to
have occurred in the first Sabbatino decision by the district court.
We may view the language used by the district judge as a syllogism.
The major premise was expressed by the judge when he asked the
hypothetical question: Whether or not he may "... refuse recognition
to the act if it is in violation of international law." (Emphasis added. )78
The judge thus considered the legal issue to be whether title to the
sugar was held by the Government of Cuba, due to its fully executed
act of state on that sugar, or whether the title remained in C.A.V.,
because the seizure by Cuba was contrary to international law, and
therefore the legal conclusion in Cuban law-transfer of title-would
76. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
77. For example, at the beginning of World War II, the Netherlands, attacked by
Germany, passed a decree transferring to itself all Dutch property, including all those
outside of the Netherlands. (Norway made a similar decree.) United States courts
upheld this decree because the court found that it was intended as a protective vesting,
not to deprive the owner of his property and was not, therefore, a confiscation. Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
(England found the same as to the Norwegian decree, Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co.,
[1942] 2 K.B. 202, appeal dismissed.) Some, too, found in the tangled legal problems
arising out of the Spanish Civil War that in one instance transfer of title to the
Loyalist Government of a Spanish ship was recognized where the evidence was hardly
sufficient to show an "executed" act of state. But this property too was returned
promptly to the former owner at the end of the war when the Franco forces triumphed
over the Loyalists. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. The Navemar,
303 U.S. 68 (1938); The Navemar, 103 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1939).
78. 193 F. Supp. at 380.
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not be "recognized." The judge's next statement on this subject was
wholly irrelevant to the case: "If the Cuban nationalization decree is
not enforceable in the courts of this country plaintiff cannot recover."
(Emphasis added.)7 9 Of course the nationalization decree was not
"enforceable" in the United States without a treaty. No confiscatory
act is enforceable in the United States without a treaty or executive
agreement. But the judge was not asked to "enforce," in the United
States, an act of state of Cuba. Cuba had already enforced that act
of state on the sugar in Cuba. The judge sitting in the Southern
District of New York could not "enforce" anything on that sugar.
The sugar was not in the jurisdiction of the United States and not
in the possession of the court.80 The judge found correctly that whoever held title to the sugar should receive the proceeds of the sale
of that sugar. The purchase price was not the "res;" the title to the
sugar was the issue. However, having construed the phrase, "enforce" in the United States, as the equivalent of the phrase, "recognize" what had happened in Cuba, he comes to a conclusion which
did not logically follow from his major premise:
Since the Cuban expropriation measure is a patent violation of international

law, this court will not enforce it. It follows that C.A.V. owned the sugar
which was sold in the present case. (Emphasis added.) 8 '
This is not the first time in history that such a switch of words or
phrases has occurred; Mr. Justice Holmes complained of this same

type of transfer of meaning when, in his famous dissent in the
Northern Securities case, he said: "Much trouble is made by substituting other phrases assumed to be equivalent, which then are reasoned from as if they were in the act .... Y82
3. "Decision on the merits.'-The next phrase which requires a
special gloss is "decision on the merits." Until the Sabbatino decision, and the subsequent legislation, a "decision on the merits,"
as indicated by any good legal dictionary, meant a decision on the
legal and equitable rights of the parties, rather than a disposal of
the case on some technical consideration of pleading or rule of
practice. These rules, sometimes called dilatory pleas, mean that
79. Id. at 379.
80. "Analysis of the doctrine [act of state doctrine] as thus stated by the Supreme
Court indicates that invocation of the Doctrine rests upon the confluence, of four
factors: (A) the taking must be by a foreign sovereign government; (B) the taking
must be within the territorial limitations of that government; (C) the foreign government must be extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit; (D) the
taking must not be violative of a treaty obligation." Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300,
308, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
..
81. 193 F. Supp. at 386.
82. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904).
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the merits of the case cannot be examined because some condition
is lacking; usually circumstances are absent which, as found by a
court, would prevent a fair trial on the merits, as where a necessary party is missing. Other matters raised by the original proceedings which might cause dismissal without trial of the issues might
be prior jurisdiction in some other court, or failure to begin the
case within the prescribed time (statute of limitations). As applied
to an act of state of a foreign country, a "decision on the merits"
heretofore had always meant a determination whether the foreign
act of state was fully executed. 3 In the Sabbatino case, all of these
factors showed a fully executed act of state, as the Supreme Court
in Sabbatino found. This, before the Sabbatino Amendment, constituted a decision "on the merits."
Under the Sabbatino Amendment, the phrase "decision on the
merits" now has an entirely different meaning, for under this new
law as already interpreted by the district court, the meaning is that:
tN]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving
effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of
title or other right to property is asserted by any party. . . based upon a
confiscation or other taking . . .84

Under this language, the district court could have decided "on the
merits" and in so doing could have made a decision conforming
with the Supreme Court decision; but instead it recognized the new
meaning. This new meaning of "on the merits" is not to be found
in the act; there is nothing there to change the phrase "decision on
the merits" from the meaning of a determination whether or not
certain property has been subjected to a fully executed act of state
(even if that act fails to conform to the tenets of international law)
to the new meaning that no property rights are lost or acquired under
a law contrary to international law. No other country has ever had
such a law; no court has so defined "on the merits."
Prior to Sabbatino, any breach of international law created a liability to the country offended, or whose nationals had been offended. This liability could be discharged by payment for the value
of property seized or the amount of damages created. Now under
the Sabbatino Amendment, the courts must find that no title has
passed. The original owner of the property still owns it and the
extent of the liability of the confiscating sovereign, who attempted
to take title, has not been determined nor is there any rule of law
to determine it.
83. See note 80 supra.
84. Sabbatino Amendment, see Appendix I, p. 541 infra.
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4. "Rule of Law."-The phrase "rule of law" was assumed as a
name or designation by a group of business corporations associated
voluntarily as a committee calling themselves the "rule of law" committee.8 Their purpose was to advocate the passage of the Sabbatino
Amendment. But if "decision on the merits" has been correctly inteipreted by the district court's recent decision under this amendment, no court in any great independent trading country has ever
handed down a decision (unreversed or unrepudiated) "on the merits"
in accordance with a "rule of law" when faced with an "executed"
act of state contrary to international law.
Perhaps the premise from which the "rule of law" committee determines a decision "on the merits" can best be explained as a reversal of an old English equity maxim. "Equity considers as done,
that which ought to have been done." In denying validity to a fullyexecuted foreign act of state, they have changed this maxim to "Courts
will consider not done, that which ought not to have been done."
But the question of "enforcement" is not solved. In the old maxim,
the equity court would not make such a decision without jurisdiction
necessary to carry its edict into effect over the recalcitrant person,
or the property affected, and would put pressure on the person before the court who should have done the act which the courts found
"ought to have been done," or else would do it for him. But in the
reversal of this maxim, as applied internationally, there is no jurisdiction or control to wipe out that "which ought not to have been
done." Perhaps the committee, calling itself the "rule of law" committee, should adopt a different name.
III. PROOF OF CONCRSSIONAL MISINTERPRETATIONS OF FOREIGN LAw
AND FOREIGN CouRT DECISIONS IN CONSIDERING AND PASSING

m SABBATINO AmmNDmr
It is enlightening to see the birth and growth of an erroneous idea.
When full-blown, the erroneous belief that foreign courts made
exceptions to the act of state doctrine, when some other country
had harmed their nationals, influenced the Congress. This can be
shown by the statements concerning the foreign cases cited to the
courts or to the Congress. Yet there is no creditable authority that
the laws of any great independent trading nation have permitted
courts of such a country to refuse to recognize the validity of titles
changed under the laws of any other nation by a fully executed act
of state, whether or not that act was within or without the tenets
or principles of international law.
85. H.R. 7750 Hearings 577.
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First we may see (a) how the foreign cases were introduced into
the Sabbatino litigation; then (b) what was said by witnesses before

the Congress both by those who presented the foreign cases and by
those who criticized the interpretation of these foreign cases; and
lastly (c) the decisions themselves, analyzed for the facts involved,

and the foreign court's final determination on the relevant facts.
A. ForeignCasesIntroduced Into the SabbatinoLitigation
The district court began the citing of foreign cases in its decision
in the Sabbatino case. The cases were cited in a footnote under
this rubric in the text: "Foreign forums have evidenced some wilingness to examine the validity of foreign acts under international

law."8 The court did not analyze the cases nor say what they held.
The application of the act of state doctrine was left to inference.
The court of appeals cited a much longer list of foreign cases, and
stated concerning them
The act of state doctrine appears to be well established among British
courts. 87
Elsewhere, however, courts have been more willing to inquire into the
legality of steps taken by foreign sovereigns. 88

Not a decision in any case in that list determined that an act of
state of any foreign country was "illegal," whether or not contrary

to international law. In only one case did a court inquire into the
legality of the act of state complained of under the laws of the
country which had promulgated that act of state. 89 That court found

the act of state complained of to be legal and not contrary to international law.90 In a subfootnote,9 1 a case of a court of a British Pro-

tectorate was cited which indeed did hold that an act of state of a
86. 193 F. Supp. at 380.
87. 307 F.2d at 855 n.6. In this footnote the court mentions The Rose Mary,
[1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden), as an exception to British decisions supporting the act of state doctrine. This case is no
authority for such a conclusion. See Part III, § C, p. 468 infra.
88. Ibid. The word "legality" is used by the Court of Rome for its inquiry into the
compatibility of the law with the Constitution of Persia. The court of appeals appears
to have used the word as synonymous with "contrary to international law." Any lawv
of a country duly enacted and enforced by its courts is obviously a law of the country
and cannot be "illegal" under the laws of the country of which the questioned law
is a part.
89. The Miriella, supra note 50. The Court of Rome found the nationalization of
Iran to be legal in Iran. It was not contrary to that country's constitution.
90. Ibid. Since there was an indication that some payments would be made, the
court found the oil nationalization law was not contrary to the generally accepted
rules of international law.
91. The Rose Mary, supranote 87.
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foreign country contrary to international law was invalid. This same
case was cited by the district court 92 and appears in all lists of
foreign cases. It is the one unappealed lower court case so holding,93
which was not repudiated by its government. That this case, not
decided by the court of an independent country, is discredited will
be shown.
Both the majority and minority Supreme Court opinions cited
foreign cases relating to the act of state doctrine. 94 The majority confirmed that English courts supported the act of state doctrine, but
recognized this one inconsistent case of the British Protectorate. It
cited other cases, however, under this statement: "Civil law countries,
however, which apply the rule make exceptions for acts contrary to
their sense of public order."95 But none of the cases cited shows any
such exception.
The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court cites foreign cases
under the following somewhat cryptic statement: "The courts of
the following countries, among others, and their territories have
examined a fully 'executed' foreign act of state expropriating property .... " 96 However, the meaning is clarified by the statement at the
end of the list of foreign cases:
The Court does not refer to any country which has applied the act of

state doctrine in a case where a substantial international law issue97is sought
to be raised by an alien whose property has been expropriated.

B. ForeignCases Discussedby Witnesses Before Congress
The statement by Mr. Justice White, with the list of cases he
cites, was presented to the Congress in support of the Sabbatino
Amendment as shown by the testimony before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs.
Mrs. (Congresswoman) KELLY. "...

Can you give us a list of the coun-

tries that you refer to that have taken this action?'
Mr. McDOUGAL. 'We can submit you a list of those whose decisions
are comparable to what is proposed in the Sabbatino amendment.'
Mrs. KELLY, 'Will you do that?'

Mr. McDOUGAL. 'Yes.'
92. 193 F. Supp. at 380.
93. See note 21 supra.

94.
95.
96.
97.

376 U.S. at 421 n.21, 440 n.1, 446 n.6.
Id. at 421-22 n.21.
Id. at 440 n.1.
Id. at 440-41 n.1.
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(The following information has been submitted for the record:)
April 2, 1965

Hon. Edna F. Kelly,
Committee on ForeignAffairs,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MiRs. KiELLY: You were kind enough at the hearings of the com-

mittee on Tuesday to suggest that I might send you some further information on the attitudes in other countries about acts of foreign states in
violation of international law.
The best statement on this I know is that of Justice White in the opening
pages of his opinion in the Sabbatino case, a copy of which I enclose.
You will note that Justice White summarizes:
'This country and this Court stand alone among the civilized nations
of the world in ruling that such an issue is not cognizable in a court of law.'
Your courtesy is much appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
MYERs S. McDOUGAL,

Sterling Professor of Law.98

The quotation from Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion, with the

interpretation by the witness, is susceptible of being construed as a
conclusion that foreign courts do not follow the act of state doctrine
if the sovereign act of state of one country is damaging to the nationals

of another country and is found by the latter's local courts to be in
violation of international law. An analysis of the cases and the decisions does not support such a conclusion.99
The Senate never held public hearings on the Sabbatino Amend-

ment. However, when the amendment was introduced, one of the
Senators who introduced it asked leave to present certain arguments

in support of it in the Congressional Record. In this he answered
an adverse, critical statement concerning the Sabbatino Amendment
98. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1047.
99. For list of cases see note 103 infra. Assuming, as we must, that the statement
was understood to mean that the decisions in the eleven cases cited were exceptions
to the act of state doctrine and that doctrine was not followed by the courts whose
decisions were cited, the witness was in error. Only two of the eleven cases made
exception to the act of state doctrine and neither is authority for failure or refusal
to adhere to that principle because: (1) One case was decided in a British
Protectorate on the basis of English law which a higher English court in another case
decided was a misinterpretation of English law; and (2) The other case was a German
lower court case purporting to invalidate an Allied seizure of German external assets.
The Allied Command, then the government of Germany, removed all such cases from
the jurisdiction of German courts, and required recognition of the transfer of title to all
German external assets as embodied in surrender terms resulting in no exception to
the act of state doctrine. Later decisions of a court in the Federal Republic of Germany
indicate adherence to the act of state doctrine as general German law. For (1) above,
see mention of case in testimony by principal witness in favor of Sabbatino Amendment and criticism by the Attorney General as to both cases, Part III, § C, p. 468 infra,
and for discussion of (2) see Part III, § C, p. 485 supra, and also analysis of each
case, Appendix II, p. 541 infra. The remaining nine cases either supported the act
of state doctrine or were irrelevant.
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which had appeared in the Washington Post. He inserted the full
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in the Sabbatino case, in-

cluding the list of foreign cases, and added a memorandum referring
adversely to the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino and mentioning favorably Mr. Justice White's dissent, and then appended a
list of additional foreign cases under this statement:
Court decisions of Austria, Belgium, British Territories, Germany, France,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom,
briefly abstracted in appendix I, confirm both the majority's comment that
most nations do not follow a rigid rule and Justice White's point that the
holding in Sabbatino is unique. All of the named countries permit judicial
inquiry into compliance of a foreign act with the standards of international
law, and some permit measurement against the standards of public policy. 100

An identical word-for-word memorandum to that submitted by the
Senator, both as to comment and cases cited, was offered to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by
the principal witness there in behalf of the Sabbatino Amendment. 101
But the Committee on International Law of the Bar Association
of the City of New York in urging the passage of the Sabbatino
Amendment made the most unequivocal of all statements concerning the legal holdings in foreign cases. The committee's statement
read:
At the same time, the Sabbatino Amendment adopts the so-called "international law exception" to the Act of State Doctrine invoked by Judge
Dimock in the Sabbatino trial court to find against Banco Nacional. This
concept also prevails in the courts of many other countries throughout the
world, including Austria, Belgium, British Territories, Germany, France,
Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. (See Appendix I.) 102

The committee's report contained an Appendix I consisting of a list
of foreign cases with brief comments and occasional quotations.
In the face of this evidence, it can scarcely be denied that Congress had reason to believe that foreign courts frequently decided
cases on the basis of exceptions to the act of state doctrine, and
handed down decisions similar to those of the lower courts.in Sab100. Washington Post, July 27, 1964, p. A14, quoted in 110 CONG. REC. 19546
(1964). See also 110 CONG. BEc. 19546-60 (1964).
101. H.R. 7750 Hearings 593-96. The only difference in these two memoranda is
that a page reference to a cited case in the Congressional Record is given as 275, while
the memorandum in the Hearings lists this page number as 257. The correct page
number is 257.
102. 20 REconD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 294, 296-97 (1965) [hereinafter cited BAR Comnm.]
(submitted to the Committee on Fdreign Affairs of the House). See H.R. 7750 Hearings 1315-25, 1316. One member of the committee dissented and was one of those
testifying against the adoption of the Sabbatino Amendment in the hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. See testimony of Professor Louis
Henkin, H.R. 7750 Hearings 1060.-
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batino and similar to the one which the district court has now handed
down under the Sabbatino Amendment. But that this was an unfounded belief is easily demonstrated.
C. Analysis of ForeignCases
1. Foreign Cases Cited in Dissenting Opinion.-We may commence
our inquiry as to the meaning of the foreign court decisions with
the list of cases appended to the footnote of the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice White. He lists eleven decisions, 103 in two instances
listing both the higher and lower courts' decisions of the same case.
One case appears in every list submitted to the Congress. This is
not surprising for it is the only case, in which any court not overruled by a higher court, or whose decision was not repudiated by
the legislature of the country in which the court sat, that upholds
the exception to the act of state doctrine. 1 4
The principal witness in behalf of the Sabbatino Amendment, as
part of his testimony to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, also included this one case in his memorandum, and referred to it when questioned by Congressman Fount
tain concerning the practice of other major trading countries of th6
world.
Mr. FOUNTAIN. 'How does the rule which you are proposing in this
,amdment compare with the practice of other major trading countries of
the world?'
103. 376 U.S. at 440. Cases cited therein include The Rose Mary, supra note 87;
Volatron v. Moulin, Cour de'Appel d'Aix, March 25, 1939, [1939] Dalloz Hebdomadire
I. 329, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 10) (Fr.); Soci6t6 Potasas Ibericas v. Bloch,
Cour de Cassation (ch. civ.), March 14, 1939, [1939] Dalloz Hebdomadaire I. 257,
[1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 54) (Fr.); N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatscbappijen v.
Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., Dist. Ct., Bremen, April 13,
1959, affd, Ct. App., Bremen, Aug. 21, 1959, [1963] Int'l L. Rep. 16 (Fed. Rep. Ger.);
Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans Case, Amtsgericht Dingolfing, Dec. 7,
1948 [1948] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 12) (Fed. Rep. Ger); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.
O.R.Co. (Unione Petrolifera per rOriente S.p.A.) (The Miriella), Civ. Trib. Venice,
March 11, 1953, 78 I Foro Italiano I. 719 (1953), [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19 (It.)
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co. (Unione Petrolifera per l'Oriente S.p.A.), Civ.
Ct., Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] Foro Italiano I. 256, [1955] Int'l L .Rep. 23 (It.);
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, [1953] Int'l L. Rep.
305 (No. 20) (Dist. Ct. Tokyo), appeal dismissed, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 312 (No. 20)
(No. 20) (High Ct. Tokyo); Senembah Maatschappij N.V. v. Rupubliek Indonesic
Bank Indonesia, Dist. Ct., Amsterdam, Dec. 22, 1958, [1959] 73 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 218, 7 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor International Recht 285 (1960), aJJ'd,
Ct. App., Amsterdam, June 4, 1959, [1959] 350 Nederlandse jurisprudentie 855, 7
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 400 (Neth. 1960); N.V. do Bataafsche
Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Comni'n, Ct. App., Singapore, April 13,
1956, [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810. A digest of each case is given in Appendix II, p. 541
infra
104. See The Rose Mary, supra note 87. Note that this was not a decision of an
independent country, but of a British protectorate (Aden). It was later distinguished
and criticized by a higher British court. For a comprehensive discussion of The Rose
Mary, see text at p. 468 infra.
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Mr. OLMSTEAD. 'There has been only one case, I think that was squarely

in point. There have been a number of act of state doctrine cases in
foreign courts. 105

When Attorney General Katzenbach testified, he was asked this
same question and gave a similar answer. Congressman Fulton prefaced his question to the Attorney General with a statement of his
own belief that the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino was contrary to the trend of judicial decisions throughout the world.
Mr. Fulton's comment and question were as follows:
Mr. FULTON: 'Here the United States in direct opposition to the main
trading nations that have decided cases based on Sabbatino related facts.
The United States has thus taken a course that is entirely different as to
foreign expropriation than any other trading nations and I think we are

wrong.
'I would like to state this: That no major trading country has applied
an act of state doctrine in foreign expropriation cases where the prima facie
case of violation of international law has been made out by the litigant.
I would like one of your legal eagles to dispute that.'
Attorney General KATZENBACH: 'We will be happy to, Congressman." 06

Thereafter, the Attorney General supplied to the Congress a memorandum showing that the Congressman entertained an erronous view
of foreign law and giving an analysis of each case in Mr. Justice
White's dissent and citing the first case in Mr. Justice White's list by
10 7
name, saying that it
...

is the only fully reported decision standing squarely for the proposition

that where property is nationalized by a foreign state without adequate

compensation, the nationalization is illegal under international law and the
forum state will not recognize the passage of title from the confiscating
state to the third parties.108

Thus the principal witness in favor of the Sabbatino Amendment
(who had signed a brief amicus curiae before the Supreme Court
urging affirmance of the lower courts' Sabbatino opinions), and the
Attorney General of the United States (who had argued the Sabbatino case before the Supreme Court urging reversal of the lower courts'
decisions) who appeared before the congressional committee as a
witness againstthe Sabbatino Amendment both agreed that there was
only one case of all those cited which squarely supported the lower
courts' opinions in Sabbatino. An examination of cases cited shows
the correctness of this conclusion. This case was Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. v. laffrate, popularly known as The Rose Mary case because that
was the name of the ship involved.
105.
106.
107.
108.

H.R. 7750 Hearings598.
Id. at 1257.
The Rose Mary, supra note 87.
H.R. 7750 Hearings 1257.
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2. The Decisions of Foreign Courts Considered.-Why this case
cannot be relied upon as authority for the rule applied is easily
shown from the facts of the case.109 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
had, under concession agreement, extracted and refined oil within
the country of Iran from 1933 to 1951. Then the Government of
Iran, under the leadership of the aged and unstable Premier Mossedagh, breached the agreement, seized all of the property of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, transferred title to itself and operated
the oil fields itself by an agency selling the oil for export. Although
one foreign court found that this nationalization was not contrary
to international law because some promise of compensation had been
made, for our discussion we may assume that this was a typical
nationalization decree and that courts would have been justified in
finding, as some did, that there was no compensation, or at least
inadequate compensation, and that the action for this reason was
contrary to international law.
In 1952, five ships loaded with oil purchased from the Iranian
Government set out for Italy. Another ship at about the same time
began its voyage to Japan. One of the ships en route to Italy,
namely The Rose Mary, never arrived. Its captain had received an
ambiguous and contradictory series of orders from the owners and
from the charterer, some of which directed him to break his voyage
to Bari, Italy, and instead to enter the port of Aden. Forty miles
off that port, he was met by a tug carrying the agent of the ship's
owners, who directed the captain to go to Aden. A British R.A.F. airplane from Aden also came out and circled the ship, and ultimately
the captain turned his ship to Aden. Immediately, the AngloIranian Oil Company, as holders of the former concession in Iran,
began legal action in Aden, claiming title to the oil; they argued
that title had not passed to the Iranian Government because a confiscation without compensation was contrary to international law and
invalid. The judge in Aden agreed with this contention and awarded
the shipload of oil to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. That decision,
holding invalid a foreign act of state which a court of another country
finds contrary to international law, had the approval of, and was the
goal sought by, the proponents of the Sabbatino Amendment.
However, a closer examination of this case will show it is no
authority for such a conclusion of law. Two factors immediately
appear: Aden was not an independent country, and not a great
trading nation. The British colony of Aden occupies but seventyfive square miles; the urban population was 220,000 at approximately
109. The facts of this case and all statements concerning the Colony and the
Protectorate of Aden are taken from the report of the case itself and from Aden and
South Arabia, Bnmsu INFomwr o SmwicE, R 5671/65 (1965).
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that time (Census of 1955)-seventy-seven per cent were Arabs; fifteen
per cent were Indians and Pakistanis; seven per cent were Somalis;
and three per cent were Europeans. Included in this three per cent
were all the British servicemen giving the military support for Britain's
obligation to protect the neighboring Arab tribal territories.1 10 The
area of the Protectorate which surrounds the colony of Aden on the
landward side has a population estimated at a million, wholly Arab.
The various tribes, each of which has, to a large extent, its own tribal
autonomy, each by treaty requested the protection of Great Britain.
By agreement with these tribes, the Protectorate will become an
independent country in 1968.
But at the time of The Rose Mary case, a British judge sat in
this Protectorate to determine commercial questions; most domestic
questions were determined by Muslim law. Against this background,
it is easy to determine that The Rose Mary decision is no guidance to
independent great trading nations of the world. In the first place,
the jurisdiction may seriously be questioned. Who wanted that ship
to enter Aden harbor and why? This question is unanswered in the
case. Aden did not want the oil, had not ordered it, and, in fact, had
some quantity of oil which it bought and itself refined. The case
was not to protect the rights of any national of the Protectorate. The
prpose was obviously to prevent the Iranian Government from selling the confiscated oil to Italy. So in the first instance, the court of
Aden set itself up to prevent Italy from becoming a "thieves market,"
a doubtful procedure internationally. Italy did not wish to be saved
from this fate. When the other ships arrived in Italy, the courts there
recognized the "act of state" when presented with adverse claims to
the oil.
The captain of The Rose Mary testified that he had entered Aden
because he was afraid he would be bombed. But the judge brushed
this aside as no objection to his court's jurisdiction though no explanation was ever given why a warplane was sent out to find and encircle the ship. If the ship entered Aden involuntarily, the court should
not have taken jurisdiction-that is a principle recognized in United
States law both in early times and now."' Was diverting this ship
from Italy itself a violation of international law against Italy? The
action was solely to protect British interests. But stronger than all
of these unanswered questions or suppositions is the fact that a later
and higher court in England itself, in another and different case,
110. The figures in text add up to 102%. This is explained by the fact that percentage figures are approximate and "rounded off." Explanation by British Information
Service.
Ill. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 CranchY 116 (1812); Rich v.

Naviera Vacuba S. A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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stated that the judge deciding The Rose Mary case had based his
decision on English decisions which he had misinterpreted." 2 Concerning this, the Attorney General pointed out, in testifying before
Congress in regard to the Sabbatino Amendment:
Subsequent decisions in England, however, have criticized the result in
The Rose Mary and113have disagreed with the Aden court's rationalization of
English precedents.

One must observe that this decision by the court in Aden was
never appealed; had there been an appeal, the final appeal would have
been to the Privy Council of England. The Supreme Court of the
United States in Sabbatino, as did the court of appeals, found that
England upholds the act of state doctrine. Thus The Rose Mary
cannot be relied upon as a precedent, yet it is the only decision
unappealed and unrepudiated which has held that a court (of a
protectorate in this instance, not an independent country) may declare
null and void the law of an independent foreign country for any
reason. This decision was never followed anywhere until Sabbatino.
Also it is an obvious error to list the decision of The Rose Mary case
as a decision of England.
The remaining, four ships loaded with Iranian oil bound for
Italy ultimately arrived at their destination. In another suit, also by
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, claiming title to the cargoes (as it
had done in Aden), the courts of Italy upheld the validity of the
transfer of title to the Iranian Government and from that government
to the private buyers who had brought the oil to Italy. Italy protected
the title of these buyers, repudiated the claim by the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company and confirmed the right of anyone to sell in Italy oil
purchased from the Iranian Government which had acquired title to
the oil fields by nationalization.
These cases are also cited by Mr. Justice White. The first case

was in a court of Venice in regard to one shipload of oil. The relief
asked was a temporary injunction against the sale of the oil. This was
denied on the basis of the act of state doctrine, the court holding
that enactments by a foreign country in its own territory are not
contrary to public order in Italy. It observed:
The recognition in Italy of the validity of the effects which these acts had
already had in Persia cannot be termed cooperation to make them bemore than an acknowledgement that the
come effective; it constitutes no
effects have indeed taken place. 114

This case, with a case involving the other three ships, then came before
112. In re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] Weekly L.R. 183 (1 Ch.).
113. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1258.
114. The Miriella, supranote 103.
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a higher court at Rome which upheld the decision of the lower court
at Venice; after reviewing the nationalization law _and the principles
of the act of state doctrine, it came to the final decision that the
acts were not contrary to international law because compensation had
been promised." 5 Thus the Italian courts recognized good title,
created by the nationalization laws of Persia or Iran.
The sixth shipload of this oil duly arrived in Japan and again title
to the oil was claimed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The
district court in Tokyo admitted that a rule of international law
makes an act of confiscation-a seizure without compensation-a
wrongful act, but it questioned whether or not the courts of a third
state have the power to declare invalid such an act of another state." 6
Later the High Court of Tokyo stated that it would not pass upon the
validity or invalidity of the Iranian law, admitting that such a determination resulted in denying ownership to the claimant, the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company." 7
The principal witness in support of the Sabbatino Amendment
before the congressional committee, in commenting upon these cases
in Italy and Japan, stated,
There were two companion cases that arose out of the Iranian seizure.

One in Italy and one in Japan. In those two cases they reached a contrary result on the merits. 118

Similarly, the Attorney General of the United States, testifying against
the Sabbatino Amendment, said,
The tribunals in other major trading countries have, on the same facts

as were presented in The Rose Mary, reached diametrically opposite re11 9
sults.

We may properly pause here to question the meaning of "on the
merits." Here five courts considered the same facts presented by the
same plaintiff, presenting the same issues. Since the claimant was
not a national of Iran (the confiscating country), its claini to continued ownership raised the "international law issue." One lower
court (of a protectorate with a trading community of only 220,000)
found the act of state null and void, while four other courts (two
115. Ibid. This one court in Rome found that the reference in the Iranian law
to compensation was sufficient to render the law compatible with the principles of
international law. Of course the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had received no payment. None of the other foreign courts which considered the Iranian oil seizures
based their decisions on a finding that compensation was intended.
116. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushik Kaisha, supra note 103,
at 305.
117. Id. at 312.

118. H.R. 7750 Hearings599.
119. Id. at 1258.
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lower courts and two higher courts) found it valid. Inevitably,
from these cases a decision "on the merits" must be to recognize the
valid transfer under a fully executed foreign confiscatory act of state.
If these cases in Italy-and Japan were decided "on the merits," then
The Rose Mary case could not have been correctly decided "on the
merits."
For a discussion of the remaining cases cited in the decision of
Mr. Justice White, reference is made to Appendix 11120 of this article
where each case is briefly reviewed, showing that the laws of no
country had ever rejected the act of state doctrine until the passage by
the United States Congress of the Sabbatino Amendment.
As stated above, two identical memoranda of law were presented
to the Congress, one in the Senate and the other to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House. 121 An examination of the cases listed
in these two memoranda of law shows that only three of the cases
cited therein were omitted from the longer list of foreign cases submitted by the Committee on International Law of The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. These three cases will be considered briefly; the remaining cases will be considered with those
listed by the International Law Committee, included among which
are the cases listed by Mr. Justice White.
3. Three Cases in the Identical Memoranda Which Were Submitted.'2--None of these cases involved an executed act of state. In
none of them was the property, the title or right to which was in
120. See p. 541 infra. An analysis of each case in Mr. Justice White's dissent can
be found in the testimony of the Attorney General, H.R. 7750 Hearings 1257. For a
complete analysis of all cases cited by any of the courts in Sabbatino prior to the
Sabbatino Amendment, see Reeves, The Act of State Foreign Decisions Cited in the
Sabbatino Case: A Rebuttal and Memorandum of Law, 33 ForuHANI L. REv. 599,
618-70 (1965).
121. See notes 100 & 101 supra.
122. M. v. Aktieselskabet K. H., June 13, 1934, 145 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 16, [1933-1934] Ann. Dig. 501 (No. 217) (Fed. Rep. Ger.);
Union des fepubliques Socialistes Sovietiques v. Intendant Gen6ral Bourgeois s Qualit6
et Soci6t6 de La Ropit, Cour de Cassation (ch. req.), March 5, 1928, [1928) Sircy
Recueil G6n6ral I. 217, CLuNEr 674 (1928), [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 67 (No. 43) (Fr.)
[hereinafter cited as La Ropit]. For a complete statement of the facts underlying the
La Ropit case, see The Jupiter (No. 1), [1924] P. 236 (C.A.); The Jupiter (No. 2),
[1925] P. 69 (C.A.); The Jupiter (No. 3), [1927] P. 250 (C.A..). These cases
concerning another La Ropit ship which had escaped under the same conditions
are summarized in [1925-1926] Ann. Dig. 136 (No. 100). Cf. Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Martima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76, 76 n.1 (concerning The Jupiter) (1938), and subsequent decisions in the same case, The Navemar,
24 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.NY. 1938), and 102 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1939). Issues became
moot by recognition of different Spanish Government and return of ship to private
ownership. 103 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1939). Case No. 1268/1937 (Ct. of 1st Instance
of Piraeus), 4 (Delta) Ephemeris ton Hellenon Nomikon 560-61 (Athens 1937)
[hereinafter cited Ephemeris].
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dispute, at the time of the confiscation decree or at any time thereafter
within the domain of the confiscating government. In the first case,
the confiscator was France and the property, a bank account, was
payable only in Danish crowns in Denmark. France had no jurisdiction over this account, and the court found that Danish law, not
French law, was controlling of the rights to this account. In the
second case, the confiscating government was the Soviet Government
but the ship claimed was in France. In the third case, a creditor of
Spain claimed that a ship belonged to Spain which was in Greece
and had not been seized by Spain. In no one of these cases was the
property affected by the law of the confiscating government.
To see the irrelevancy of these cases, one must remember that
the act of state doctrine is based upon the independence of sovereigns
and upon the conflict of laws rules. The first rule laid down by Mr.
Justice Story in his work on conflict of laws published in 1834-a rule
which antedated publication of the work (for the rule had been the
law of the United States from its inception and is still the law of
the United States regardless of the Sabbatino Amendment) -reads
as follows:
It is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force, proprio

vigore, except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country.
They can bind only its own subjects, and others who are within its
jurisdictional limits; and the latter only while they remain therein.12 3

The three cases come within that rule. The laws of one country can
have force in another only by "comity"-that is, if the laws of one
country are compatible with the laws of another, as reflected in its
constitution, general laws, or public order, these foreign laws will
be enforced. Other foreign laws will not be enforced. A brief review
of the above-mentioned three cases will show conclusively that they
are strictly within these ancient rules and neither offend nor are
exceptions to the act of state doctrine.
(a). M. v. Aktieselskabet K. H.-In the first case mentioned, 124 the
French Government after World War I, seized the property in France
of a German partnership which had done business in France. This
German organization had a current account in a Danish bank with a
substantial credit balance which the French sequestrator requested
be paid to him. The bank thereupon drew its draft on a French bank
in compliance with this request. This payment was voluntary as the
court found (in translation)
123. STonY, CoannurvauRts o-, CoNFmicr OF LAWS § 7 (8th ed. 1883).
124. See M. v. Aktieselskabet K.H., supra note 122. The following discussion of this
case and the quotations are based on a translation of the original German report.
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It needs no further discussion that defendant did not act 'in the name or
under the direction of a French court or administrative body . . . when

executing the French sequestrator's demand for payment.'

Of course, the French sequestrator was the proper person to receive
assets of that German partnership but only those which were in
France under French jurisdiction, the control over which could be
taken under French law. This was not the situation, however, in
regard to that Danish bank account situated in Denmark. The court
found
Defendant maintained and still maintains its principal place of business
in Copenhagen. The plaintiff's allegations, according to which it was
agreed upon Copenhagen as the place of performance and exclusive venue
in accordance with defendant's standard business terms, have not been
contradicted by the defendant.

Later, and after the voluntary payment by the bank, a German court
acquired jurisdiction in a suit by a partner of the German partnership
to secure the full balance of the account. The Danish bank pleaded
its payment as a defense but the German court held that a change in
French law could not affect the obligations under Danish law of the
Danish bank to pay only in Denmark and in Danish crowns. The
court thereupon applied Danish law stating "Correspondingly the
principles of the German conflict of laws consider the Danish law as
applicable to defendant's obligation in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary." The Danish bank was thereupon required
to make a second payment.
A similar problem has existed in the United States. Beginning a
few years before the commencement of World War II, after Germany
had shown evidence of its ruthless treatment of certain businesses
within the German Reich and its expansionist policies outside of
German borders, many New York banks, brokerage houses and
corporate debtors faced the same problem which faced this Danish
bank; they were met with adverse claims to bank and brokerage
balances, and to securities held for, or corporate obligations payable
to, a certain named foreign corporation or partnership. One demand
would be by some German-appointed liquidator of that foreign
business for payment of the accounts, or delivery of the property to
him. The second claim would be by the officers of that company with
which the New York banks and brokerage houses had done business
and for whose business this liquidator had been appointed. In most
instances, the former officers of the company had fled from Germany
or Czechoslovakia or elsewhere.
The Legislature of New York in 1939 enacted two' z5 bills to
125. Civil Practice Act ch. 805, § 51-a (1939), as amended, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 216(a)
(1966); Laws of 1939 art. 28A, ch. 804, as amended, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1006 (1966).
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protect such innocent obligors from the dangers of double payment
of debts and delivery of securities or other property to one business
entity while another also claimed the right to receive it; a further
qualification was that personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over
both claimants for an ordinary interpleader action. Some years later
the Court of Appeals of New York State made the following statement
concerning the purposes of one of these bills which had become a
law of New York in 1939:
The enactment of section 51-a of the Civil Practice Act ...

was prompted

by the existence of unsettled political conditions in Europe and the Orient
at a time when business enterprises owned by political refugees were taken

over by foreign liquidators appointed by their governments. In the confusion which followed there were instances where both refugees and
liquidators made claim against New York businessmen, banks or insurance

companies for the same debt. In those circumstances such New York
debtors could not safely pay either claimant without a judicial determi126
nation of the question as to which claimant was entitled to be paid.

In the German case cited above, by making the voluntary payment,
the Danish bank assumed the risk of double liability. A confiscatory
law is enforceable only on property within the jurisdiction of the
confiscating state. The case merely exemplifies the legal principle
that unless a debtor can secure an adjudication of adverse claims he
is in serious danger of being forced to pay the same debt twice.
(b). La Ropit case,'-2 7 -It is scarcely necessary to review this case,
for the statement concerning it published in the two memoranda shows
that it was not an exception to the act of state doctrine. When the
Soviet Government was in control of only a small area around
Moscow, it published decrees purporting to confiscate all ships of the
Russian merchant marine. Many ships were in the port of Odessa and
sailed immediately. They never returned. Years later, France recognized the Soviet Government as the legitimate government of Russia,
and the Soviet Ambassador then asked the French courts to seize those
ships long since in French ports, or trading out of French ports, and
hand them over to the Soviet Government. Those ships had never
been in the jurisdiction of the Soviet Government and most certainly
had never been in its possession. Here the Soviet Government asked
the French to do the confiscating for it, because it had no power to
confiscate property on French soil. Of course, the Government of
France refused, and the principles involved are contained in the
quotation following, as it appears in the two memoranda submitted
in behalf of the Sabbatino Amendment.
126. Solicitor for Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304 N.Y. 282,
291, 107 N.E.2d 448, 118 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1952).
127. See La Ropit, supranote 122.
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The Supreme Court [of France] refused to apply Soviet law in a case
involving a claim of the Soviet Russian Government to part of a nationalized
merchant fleet which had escaped from Russia after the nationalization be-

cause confiscation without compensation was contrary to 'one of the fundamental principles of our social institutions.'12 8

(c). A Greek case,12"-The third case mentioned is a Greek case.
During the Spanish Civil War, the Loyalist Government passed a
confiscation decree nationalizing all ships of the Spanish merchant
marine. One ship, the Inocencio Figaredo, at the time of the decree,
was not in any Spanish port nor thereafter did it ever come into
the possession, or under the control, of any representative of the
Spanish Government. It was in the charge of the captain who had
remained loyal to the owners, and they had fled from Spain. In
this case, the ship was not even claimed by the Spanish Loyalist
Government. It was attached as property of the Spanish Loyalist
Government by a creditor of that Government, who asked the Greek
court to declare that title was in the Spanish Loyalist Government
so that he could sell the ship and satisfy his claim against the Spanish
Loyalist Government. Of course the court refused and succinctly
stated, "Furthermore it is not established that this ship had been
confiscated by the Spanish Government and is now in the possession
of the Spanish Government." 130 There have been several cases recently

concerning the Cuban seizures which have been decided quite in
accordance with the principles set forth above and, of course, without
exception to the act of state doctrine. For example, Cuba seized the
well-known Cuban corporation, Cuban-owned Ron Barcardi, S. A.
This company had assets in the United States at the time of the
nationalization. The "nationalized" company, and those who had
been officers of the company before nationalization, each claiming to
be representatives of, or successors to, Ron Barcardi, claimed these
United States assets. The federal court for the Southern District of
New York decided that the nationalization of Ron Barcardi did not
destroy the identity of131
the company, and therefore it could still sue
in United States courts.

128. H.R. 7750 Hearings 595. See notes 100 & 101 supra. When the United
States recognized the Soviet Government in 1933, the United States agreed (as
France did not) to enforce within the United States the Soviet confiscatory decrees.
This executive agreement was sustained as enforceable. The United States courts
would doubtless otherwise have acted as always before and refused enforcement.
See vigorous dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Stone in United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 246-51 (1942). See also Part II, § E, p. 455 supra.
129. See Ephemeris, supra note 122.

130. Id. at 561.
131. Compania Ron Barcardi, S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). Before the final order was entered awarding the assets to the "old"
company, the "nationalized" company withdrew from the case as to these assets which
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In a later case, this same United States federal district court was
asked to enforce a confiscatory decree of Iraq upon property, which
before the foreign decree and at all times since then, had been
within the United States. The judge said:
Sabbatino, as well as the other 'act of state' cases, applies only to a taking

within the territory of the foreign sovereign. We are here concerned with
an attempted taking of property outside that territory .... 13.

The judge further pointed out that:
The New York courts have consistently declined to enforce a cause of action
based upon a foreign decree which purports to seize title, without payment
133
of compensation, to property in New York.

C.A.V. itself comes under this rule. It is a Cuban corporation, although

predominantly owned by United States nationals. A creditor of
C.A.V., operating under a New York statute for the preservation of
external assets of foreign nationalized corporations, caused a receiver
to be appointed for the New York assets of C.A.V. However, before
the case was even argued before the Supreme Court, the receivership
was dissolved and the old C.A.V. Company (not the nationalized company) was put in possession of those assets in New York which had
never been confiscated because they had never been under the
jurisdiction and control of Cuba since nationalization.
4. The Report of the Committee of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York.-This is the longest of the memoranda involving
foreign cases submitted to the Congress in support of the exception
to the act of state doctrine as ultimately propounded in the Sabbatino
Amendment. The report of this committee is also the most explicit
as to the committee's interpretation of the meaning of these cited
foreign cases, for it definitely states that the international law exception to the act of state doctrine, which the Sabbatino Amendment
adopts, "prevails in the courts of many other countries throughout
the world."'134 The committee lists seven countries and the British
1
territories referring to the list of cases in its Appendix I for its proof; 35
but with the exception of The Rose Mary case (discussed and shown
above as thoroughly discredited), not another one of the thirty-four
cases which the committee report cites is authority for any exception
to the act of state doctrine.
had continuously been outside of Cuba. The final order was entered without opposition
and not reported.
132. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
133. Id. at 575.
134. See note 102 supra.
135. BtAn Comm., supra note 102, at 294, 296-97, 302.
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While each case will be reviewed briefly in Appendix II to this
article, 136 a few remarks here may be helpful in clarifying various
situations to which the cases relate.
We may omit entirely the first case cited, for the committee in its
statement indicates that the court in that case found the act complained of was not contrary to international law. The committee in
its report said: ".

.

. (holding sufficiently definite provisions were

made to compensate Germany for its interest in a power station
which was partially nationalized by Austria) ."137 The Sabbatino
Amendment exempts from its provisions any case wherein the court
finds the act complained of is not contrary to international law.
(a). The "Koh-I-Noor" cases.'3-These are cases of extra-territoriality. They reflect the rule that a confiscatory act has validity only in
the country which promulgated it. L. & C. Hardtmuth was a partnership which had long done business in Czechoslovakia. It manufactured pencils which were widely distributed. In many countries,
their trademark "Koh-I-Noor" was registered. After World War II,
Czechoslovakia nationalized the company, and thereafter the nationalized company sought judicial confirmation of the claim that it
was the successor to the original partnership and had a right to use
the trademark "Koh-I-Noor" wherever it was registered. The courts
of every country where the nationalized company raised this issue
decided that a registered trademark under the laws of the countrya country foreign to Czechoslovakia-was an external asset of the
original partnership and was not in any way reached by the foreign
confiscation of the company. The committee cites the legal actions
brought by this nationalized company under the laws of Austria,
France, and Italy-all were the same, all confirmed that an act of
136. See App. II, p. 541 infra.
137. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1320. "In the following cases municipal courts have reviewed, under their own public policy or international law, takings of property by
foreign states. Those cases which discussed the issue, from which excerpts are quoted
below, recognized the principle that compensation is required." BR Coml. 302, supra
note 102. This proposition is conceded throughout the article. The issue not conceded in this article and not proved by any of the cases cited by the Committee of
the Bar Association is their thesis that courts of one country do not recognize as valid
fully executed acts of foreign states on property within their own jurisdiction and
control if the act is contrary to international law.
138. Koh-I-Noor, L. & C. Hardtmuth v. Koh-I-Noor Tuzkarna, L. & C. Hardtmuth,
Sup. Ct., Aus., June 2, 1958, [1958-11] Int'l L. Rep. 40. Entreprise Nationale L. et C.
Hardtmuth, Fabrique de Crayons Koh-I-Noor v. Fabrique de Crayons Koh-I-Noor L. et
C. Hardtmuth, (Ct. App. Paris) [1958-I] Int'l L. Rep. 50 (Fr.). Registration of
Trademark, Koh-I-Noor, Fed. Trib., Ger., March 8, 1963, [1963] Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift 1541, exemplifying the same principle but referring to a metal company, not
pencil company. Koh-I-Noor Tuzkarna L. & C. Hardtmuth Narodni Podnik v. Fabrique
de Crayons Hardtmuth L. & C., S.r.l., App. Ct., Turin, June 17, 1958, [1958-I] Int'l
L. Rep. 44 (It).
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state has no extra-territorial effect. 139 The laws of a foreign country
purporting to effect a transfer of title to property in another country
will not be "enforced" in that other country unless those laws are
the same in principle as the laws of the country which is requested
to enforce those foreign laws, or unless a treaty requires it.140
The rule of law expressed in the "Koh-I-Noor" cases is merely this:
Confiscation of a business by one country does not transfer assets
belonging to that company which were, at the time of the seizure, in
a foreign country.
Patents, trade names and trademarks are property situated in the
country which has granted registration of the patent, trade name or
trademark. "Koh-I-Noor" and similar cases, therefore, merely show
that the confiscation by Czechoslovakia did not transfer the title, nor
permit the nationalized company to use the trademark in another
country where that trademark was registered before the date of
confiscation. Thus, trademarks come under the same rule as all other
property not in the jurisdiction or under the control of the confiscating
country. They are assets or property in the country which grants the
registration.
This rule is the same in the United States. The United States has
recognized that the seizure by its Alien Property Custodian does not
transfer title to trademarks of the business seized, in those other
countries where those trademarks were already registered. This has
been confirmed by the United States Supreme Court on facts stated
by the Court as follows:
Ingenohl had built up a great business as a cigar manufacturer and
exporter having his factory at Manila. In 1908 he established a factory
at Hong Kong and thereafter goods from both factories were sold under

the same trademarks, the outside box or package of the Hong Kong goods
having a label indicating that they came from there.

The trade-marks

were registered in Hong Kong and the cigars covered by them bad acquired a reputation. In 1918 the Alien Property Custodian seized and
139. One of these Koh-I-Noor cases was not of the pencil company but of a metal
company using Koh-I-Noor as one of its trademarks. See note 138 supra. The committee using Koh-I-Noor case in Switzerland, Koh-I-N6or Bleistift Fabrik L. & C.
Hardtmuth v. Fabrique de Crayons Koh-I-Noor L. & C. Hardtmuth, S.A.R.L., Fed.
Trib., Sept. 13, 1957, [1957] Int'l L. Rep. 46. Decision characterized in report as:
"The Czechoslovak expropriation decrees could not transfer assets situate in Switzerland. Trademarks and trade names constituted such assets." The committee also cites
another trademark case, Zeiss v. Zeiss, Cour d'Appel Paris (First Chamber), April 2,
1963, [1964] Journal de Droit International (91 CLruNB) 616. See App. II, p. 552
infra for discussion of this case. See also Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, App.
II, p. 543 infra.
140. The Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Government was such an international
agreement and the United States enforced the confiscatory decrees of the Soviet Government on property which had been placed in the United States by Russian corporations. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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sold all the property 'wheresoever situate in the Philippine Islands ...
including the business as going concern, and the good will, trade names
being the above mentioned
and trade-marks thereof, of Syndicat Oriente,'
141
business of the plaintiff in the Philippines.

In this case the seizure was by the Alien Property Custodian under
his war powers; in the case cited by the committee the confiscation
was by the Communist seizures in Czechoslovakia. The question in
both cases was: Did the seizure of the business give any rights to
trademarks of the business previously registered in another country?
The Hong Kong court refused to recognize the right of the purchaser of
the business from the Alien Property Custodian to use the trademarks
registered in Hong Kong. The seizure had no extraterritorial effect.
Under British law, a judgment in favor of the former owner of the
business for costs in the case was rendered in Hong Kong against the
purchaser. The former owner of the business, and under the Hong
Kong decision still the owner of the trademark there, brought suit in
the Philippines to recover costs due him under the Hong Kong judgment. In this suit, the Hong Kong judgment was attacked and the
Supreme Court of the United States reviewed it. Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous court, said:
If the Alien Property Custodian purported to convey rights in English
territory valid as against those whom the English law protects he exceeded
the powers that were or could be given to him by the United States ....
The validity of the section of the Code of Civil Procedure is drawn in
question, and also the construction of Trading with the Enemy Act which
to authorize what in our opinion it could not auis treated as purporting
142
thorize if it tried.

An examination of the cases cited by the committee will indicate
that nearly half of them are cases of just this sort-that is, they
involve a request by a confiscating country for extra-territorial enforcement on property which was not in the jurisdiction or under the
control of the confiscating government. These cases are completely
irrelevant to any exception to the act of state doctrine. To create a
valid act of state as to particular property, it must be an executed act
of state and at the tirhe of the expropriation the property must be
43
within the territory of the confiscating country and under its control.
(b). Military Occupation Cases.-The committee cites four cases
where the seizure complained of was not by any recognized government, either de facto or de jure, but by an occupying military
141. Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 543 (1927).
142. Id. at 544-45.

143. The type of case mentioned above relating to foreign property of a confiscated
company has been the subject of various articles: for example, I. Seidl-Hohenveldem,
Austria: Nationalization of Foreign Joint Stock Corporations in Country of Registry:
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power. 144 The rights of a hostile occupying military power are
governed by the Hague Convention on the rules of land warfare.
This is a multilateral treaty signed by 103 countries. 45 The committee's own definition of act of state indicates that only a recognized
government can commit an act of state, and the acts complained of
in these four cases were not acts of state. As part of its recommendation for improving the Sabbatino Amendment, the committee suggests, "The statute might be amended to read 'recognized foreign
state...' since the Act of State Doctrine has been invoked only as to
cites as its
acts of recognized foreign states."1 46 The committee
147
authority the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino.

Since one of these cases appeared in the list attached to the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, the Attorney General testified
concerning it as follows, emphasizing that it had been wrongly

classified as an English case.
The second 'English' case cited by Mr. Justice White is N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Comm'fn (Singapore
Ct. App. [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810). This case is inapposite to a discussion
of the act of state doctrine, for no act of state was involved. The Japanese
forces, while occupying the Dutch East Indies in World War II, had
exploited some private oil concessions and some of the oil was traced to
storage tanks in Singapore. The private owners of the concessions prevailed over the claim of the local government who desired to seize the
oil as enemy-owned. At no time had the Dutch Government, the local
government of Singapore, or the British Government recognized Japan
either de facto or de jure as the government of the invaded area where
the oil wells were. 148
No Effect on Assets Located Abroad, 4 Am. J. CouP. L. 242 (1955); Sommerich,
Foreign Confiscation and Public Policy, 3 Am. J. CoMP. L. 87 (1954) (referring particularly to the Dralle case).
144. Belguim: Deville v. Servais, Ct. App., Li6ge, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 448 (No. 157).
Also cited in both memoranda referred to in notes 100 & 101 supra.
British Territories: N. V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, supra note 103.
Also cited in both memoranda, notes 100 & 101 supra.
The Netherlands: Hunzedal Ltd. v. Smit, Dist. Ct., Amsterdam, Jan. 3, 1940,
[1919-42] Ann. Dig. Supp. 33 (No. 20).
Switzerland: Rosenberg v. Fischer, Fed. Trib., June 3, 1948, [1948] Ann. Dig.
467 (No. 150) (Swit.). Also cited in both memoranda, notes 100 & 101 supra.

145. Hague Convention of 1907, including Convention IV. See 1

MALLOy, TrATms,

CONVENTIONs, INTERNATIONAL AcTs, PnOTOcOLS AN AcAREEMNTs BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AmICA AiN OTmz PowERs 1776-1909, 2269 (1910).

146. Supra note 102, at 308; H.R. 7750 Hearings 1324.
147. The United States Supreme Court had stated that the act of state should be
recognized unless changed by treaty. 376 U.S. at 428. See also The Netherlands v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 90 F. Supp. 655, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1951): "The 'acts of state'
doctrine has never been applied to official conduct of an enemy nation in territory beyond
its boundaries under its temporary wartime military occupation." That part of this judgment, which held that a military occupant could not transfer good title, was affirmed.
The rest of the judgment was reversed, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
148. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1258.
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(c). The Zeiss case.-This was one of another series of cases
relating to trademarks in courts of various countries in Europe and
in England and Egypt. 49 Only one of these cases was cited in the
report of the committee of the Bar Association of the City of New
York and that was the French court of appeals' decision in V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firm Carl Zeiss.50 It was appealed and the final

determination was made by the Court of Cassation. 151 The other
after the French
Zeiss cases were tried and decided both before and
report referred. 152

decision to which the committee

The firm of Carl Zeiss and Carl Zeiss Foundation had their
principal place of business in Jena (Iena), Thuringia, Germany. This
area of Germany was first seized by the American troops which thereafter evacuated the area under the terms of the Yalta Agreement;
the area was then occupied by Soviet troops under Soviet occupation authorities. That area is now part of East Germany. Most
of the managers of the firm and the foundation left J6na with the
American troops and set up business at Heidenheim, West Germany.

The Soviets created the "Peoples owned" Zeiss Company out of the
old Zeiss factory at J['na. That company and the Zeiss company

at Heidenheim contested in six countries the issue as to which
had the right to use the Zeiss trademark. Although up to this
time there is no final decision in England on that issue, in no country
has the Soviet-created Zeiss Company been permitted to use the

trademark. The courts of the various countries, in reaching consistent
conclusions, emphasized different features of the case, but each

decision was harmonious with United States law. 15 3 There was no
act of state issue in the Zeiss cases for, as stated in the committee's
149. In the Netherlands, Zeiss v. Zeiss, supra note 139, and in Germany, Egypt and
Austria. Reference to these last can be found in a digest prepared by M. Magdalena
Schoch, United States Dep't of Justice, in MacChesney, Judicial Decisions, Am. J. INT'L
L. 671, 687 (1959). There was also at that time a case pending in England between
the same parties on the same issues, on which no final decision on the ultimate rights
of the parties has been made. 1 All E.R. 467 (1965); 2 All E.R. 536 (1966).
150. Zeiss v. Zeiss, supranote 139.
151. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss J6na v. Firra Carl Zeiss, Ct. of Cassation, 3 JoxmNAL DU Dnorr
INTmwATONAL (CLuErT) 622 (1966), supra note 102, at 305, also reprinted in H.R.
7750 Hearings 1322. See also Zeiss v. Zeiss, supranote 139.
152. See Appendix II, p. 552 infra, for statement of facts. Issues are taken from
discussions in various courts.
153. The issues in the Zeiss cases before the courts of six countries were not the
same as in Sabbatino. The title to property seized in a foreign country was not the
issue. The issue was which of two companies had the right to use the Zeiss trademark which, as to either of the companies, would be an asset in a foreign country.
Even if one considers that the Zeiss company had been nationalized in "Eastern
Germany" and there had been no contention that the Zeiss company which had
moved to Heidenheim was the true successor of Zeiss, there still would have been no
issue of any exception to the act of state doctrine or an issue on which the Sabbatino
Amendment would have had any effect, for a confiscatory act has no extraterritorial
effect.
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own report, an unrecognized government cannot commit an act of
state, and this fact was considered of importance by some courts in
the Zeiss cases, although it nowhere appears determinative. A principal issue was which of two contending companies was the "old"
Zeiss or the successor of it, and which company had the right to
use the foreign registered trademark.
(d). Greece.-The committee cites the country of Greece in its
list of those countries in which it alleges the concept also prevails
which the Sabbatino Amendment is designed to create in the United
States. However, in the committee's supporting list of cases, no
citation is made to any Greek case.
(e). Federal Republic of Germany.-The committee report cites
three decisions of German courts,M each of which appears to support
the thesis that German courts, administering German law, make "an
exception" to the act of state doctrine when the foreign act of state
which is found to be contrary to international law purports to affect
property of a German national in the territory of that foreign country
committing the act of state. One of these three cases definitely made
such a decision; 155 it found that property of a German had been
"confiscated" in Czechoslovakia and later came into Germany.
It
was recognized by the claiming party, from whom the property had
been taken, and the court restored the property to her, holding the
foreign seizure ineffective to transfer title because the act of state,
under which it was seized, was contrary to international law. The
two other cases cited are not final decisions as to the title of the
property under consideration, but the court in both instances clearly
indicated its adherence to the thesis that title to property belonging
to Germans and situated in a foreign country was not changed by
a confiscatory act of the country in which that property was located.
However, none of these three cases can be accepted as "an exception" under German law to the act of state doctrine, for at the time
154. Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans Case, Amtsgericht Dingolfing, Dec.
7, 1948, [19483 Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 12) (Ger., Am. Zone); Expropriation Case Soviet
Zone of Germany [19493 Ann. Dig. 19 (Ct. App., Nuremberg 1949). Confiscation of
German Property in Czechoslovakia Case, Fed. Sup. Ct., Ger., Jan. 29, 1953, [19533
Int'l L. Rep. 31.
155. Confiscation of Property of Sudetern Germans Case, supra note 154, was decided in the Amtsgericht of Dingolfing in Bavaria. The Amtsgericht has sometimes
been translated as "county court;" more accurately, it is a local court of limited
jurisdiction from whose decisions there is no appeal. Perhaps it might properly be
referred to as a small claims court. The decision was not officially reported and can
be found only in the works of law commentators. There is doubt that the property
here was seized by any official act of the Czechoslovakian Government, but as the
court decided the case on the basis that there was a seizure of property and that
this seizure was a "confiscation," that interpretation is accepted here.
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they were handed down they were contrary to the law of Germany.
This curious conflict between the court decisions and the German
law which the courts were obligated to administer is easily explained when one observes that the decisions-there were in fact
several other similar cases not cited-were decided in Germany after
World War II and before Germany again became an independent
nation, i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany; thus, these cases were
decided under laws imposed by the Allied Government. During a
period after World War II, the government of Germany was that of
the Allied powers and the laws of Germany were those imposed by
the Allies. Germany had unconditionally surrendered and its territory
was under joint occupation of the victorious Allies. The laws of
Germany included not only the terms of the surrender but also the
Potsdam Agreement on Reparations, the Paris Agreement, 156 together
with such administrative laws as were necessary for carrying these
laws into effect. The Allies had determined, and Germany as the
vanquished nation had agreed, that the Allies should take German
external assets as reparations. The Potsdam Conference provided:
Each signatory Government shall, under such procedures as it may choose,
hold or dispose of German enemy assets within its jurisdiction in manners
designed to preclude their return to German ownership or control .... 157

Of the three cases cited by the committee, two were seizures of
Sudeten Germans' property within Czechoslovakia; the other was a
seizure of German property within the Soviet zone of occupation.
These seizures in Czechoslovakia were prior to the Communist coup
of 1948 and were taken as part of the Allied reparations. Russia
was to have, in addition to the external assets of Germany within
Russia, certain German assets within Germany itself. Section 1 of
the Potsdam Agreement provided: "Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R.
shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by
the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets .... "I"
156. Potsdam Agreement. Tripartite Conference at Berlin, Potsdam Conference,
July 17, 1945, released by the White House, August 2, 1945, 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL.
153-61 (1945). Paris Agreement. Conference at Paris from November 9, 1945, to
December 21, 1945, Agreement executed January 14, 1946, released by the White
House, January 15, 1946, 14 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 114-24 (1946).

157. Ibid.

158. See note 156 supra. If the property was taken in the Soviet zone for reparations, German courts had to recognize the change of title. If, however, this was a
"confiscation" not recognized by the Allies as part of the reparations, then the seizure
was not an act of state. "East Germany" was not recognized and no title transferred
under German law. Whatever political force within a particular territory an "unrecognized" goverment has, its acts within that territory need not be considered as
valid-not as an act of state-by any country which has not "recognized" it as either,
or both, the de facto or de jure government of that territory. Only a government can
make a valid act of state. "East Germany" is recognized by the Soviet Government
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Other sections added additional property to be sent to Russia from
the Western zones.
The Allied Governments took office with these rules imposed
as the law of Germany and immediately took administrative steps to
accomplish them.159 In spite of these facts, however, certain local
German courts tried various methods of thwarting this purpose by
attempting to restore to the former owners identifiable property
brought into Germany. In most instances, the value of the property
was negligible; a second-hand sewing machine was the sole property
discussed in the one fully-decided case, some used household furnishings in another. Also, most but not all of these cases were brought
in lower courts in which the decisions were not even published and
from which no appeals could be taken. However, after some of these
decisions had been made, the Allied Government of Germany undertook to stop these local court efforts to flout the law and defy the
surrender terms imposed on Germany by passing Decree Law HICOM
No. 63 which took from all German courts the right to decide cases
concerning German property taken in reparation. 6 °
One of the very cases of the three cited by the Bar Association
committee was decided after this law was in effect. The court did
not decide "title" but remanded the case to the lower court to
determine exactly how possession had been acquired. The court was
fully aware of Law No. 63. It said:
The purpose which Law No. 63 is designed to serve quite distinctly favours
an interpretation that the property of Sudeten Germans shall be considered
'German property.' While Control Council Law No. 5 provides for the
expropriation of persons owning property situate abroad, even where such
as a separate autonomous state but is not recognized by the Federal Republic of
Germany or the United States and other countries. "East Germany" cannot, therefore,
create a valid "act of state" as to countries which do not recognize it. Also an unrecognized government has no legal capacity to sue in the courts of any country which
has not "recognized" it as an existing government of a particular state. The refusal
to entertain a suit by a non-recognized government is the same under New York
law. See Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
159. This was done under Control Council Law No. 5, 1945. An explanation of
Control Council Law No. 5, the necessity thereafter for changing the law and imposing HICOM Law No. 63 (Official Gazette 1951, 1107) is contained in a statement under the title of True Meaning of the "Divesting Law," [July 1-Sept. 30, 1951]
U.S. HIGH Co~nleR Fon GmudANY, 8TH QuAR jmnrx REPoRT oN GmumNY 54-58, by the
High Commissioner for Germany and published under the United States seal with
the authority of the United States High Commissioner for Germany. This document was
printed by the Publishing Operations Branch of the United States Army.
160. Ibid. Also for discussion of the decisions in Germany, and the effect on the
German courts, of Law No. 63 of the High Commissioners for Germany, see Graue,
Germany: Recognition of Foreign Expropriations,3 Ar. J. ComP. L. 93 (1954). The
Dingolfing case cited by the committee is reviewed. Also Law No. 63 is discussed in
one of the cases cited by the committee.
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property is situate outside territory subject to the jurisdiction of the Control Council, Law No. 63 does not provide for any expropriation but confines itself to sanctioning the validity, within the Territory of the Federal
Republic, of liquidations of German property which have taken place
or are still to take place in foreign countries.161

The German courts finally held that the transfer of all Sudeten
German property seized in Czechoslovakia must be recognized.
The act exempted from the jurisdiction of the German courts all issues
connected with German property outside of German territory such as it
was on December 31, 1937. The Bundesgerichtshof held that Czechoslovakia is a foreign state and that the Sudeten Germans are Germans in
the meaning of the act, and that, as a consequence, the property of the
Sudeten Germans is German property. Thus, all complaints based on
illegality of Czech expropriatory measures must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. 162

The Allied Government of Germany clearly expressed the purpose
of Law No. 63 as an implementation of the general Allied policy
toward German reparations:
[Ilt appeared desirable to protect all persons who had acquired German
assets, taken as reparations, as well as the owners of restituted property,
from any risk of having to defend their title against attack by former
German owners if such property should be brought into Germany, no
matter how remote such risk, and how devoid of a legal basis such attack
might appear.163

A clearer statement of the repudiation of these courts' decisions can
scarcely be imagined.
The committee cites these cases under the heading, "Federal
Republic of Germany."'6 This is not wholly accurate, for Germany
was not an independent country in regard to Germany property,
either internal or external, seized as reparations by the Allies. Germany
was bound by the surrender terms and the implementing agreements.
The cases were cited by the committee as an exception to the act of
state doctrine, but they were not in accord with the law of Germany

and in reality were only sporadic efforts to evade Allied reparation
agreements. They are a terrible example of what the courts of other
countries may do if some foreign country believes its nationals have
been injured by some act of the United States. The Sabbatino
Amendment now makes possible this type of retaliation against the
United States on the determination of any local court in the world.
161. Confiscation of German Property in Czechoslovakia Case, supra note 154.
162. 8 BG-Z, 378 (Jan. 29, 1953). See also Graue, supra note 160.
163. See 8TH QuARuirLy REPoRT ON GCRNcrLr, op. cit. supra note 159, at 55.
164. 20 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 294, 304 (1965). See also H.R. 7750 Hearings 1321.
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None of the other German cases cited by the committee support
any exception to the act of state doctrine.
D. Conclusion
All of the foreign cases cited in testimony and memoranda are
briefly digested in Appendix 11.165 Not one case of all of those cited
is authority for the proposition that any independent nation in the
world has ever eliminated from its jurisprudence the principle of
law embraced in the act of state doctrine, permitted its courts to
ignore it, or made any exception to it. Under the Sabbatino Amendment this country and the courts of this country will now stand alone
among the civilized nations of the world in ruling that the issue of
the validity of a fully executed foreign act by one state in its own
territory is an issue which is justiciable in a local court of law of
another State.
IV. THE

SABBATiNO AMENDMENT IN RELATION TO T

CONSITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES: UNANSwERED QUEsTIONs

The Sabbatino Amendment creates many questions which the courts
must answer; many of these questions ultimately must be answered by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
A. Does the SabbatinoAmendment Impairthe Independence
and Sovereignty of the United States?
The principles embodied in the Constitution of the United States
long antedate that document. In fact the Constitution was to
preserve the principles proclaimed thirteen years before. It was for
these truths, self-evident to our forefathers, that the American Revolution was fought. By this revolution, the United States achieved
and still holds absolute national freedom and absolute sovereignty.
This independence was first proclaimed, not by the United States,
but by a confederation of thirteen independent states in the year
1776. "That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be
166
Free and Independent States."
What the founding fathers meant by "Independence" and "Sovereignty" which first were won on the battlefield, then confirmed by
the adoption of the Constitution, has been explained many times.
Two of the best known definitions are by Chief Justice Marshall and
Mr. Justice Story, who sat together on the high court. Marshall said:
165. Infra p. 541.
166. Declaration of Independence.
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The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent in that power
which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the
full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source. 167

Story, in his famous textbook on the Conflict of Laws, gives the

following definition:
The first and most general maxim or proposition is that which has been
already adverted to, that every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its own territory. The direct consequence of this rule
is, that the laws of every state affect and bind directly all property, whether
real or personal, within its territory, and all persons who are resident within
it, whether natural-born subjects or aliens, and also all contracts made and
acts done within it. A state may therefore regulate the manner and circumstances under which property, whether real or personal or in action, within
it, shall be held, transmitted, bequeathed, transferred, or enforced; the
condition, capacity, and state of all persons within it; the validity of contracts and other acts done within it; the resulting rights and duties growing out of these contracts and acts; and the remedies and modes of
administering justice in all cases calling for the interposition of its tribunals
to protect and vindicate and secure the wholesome agency of its own
laws within its own domains. 168

Inseparable from independence and sovereignty is the equality of
all independent nations. This principle of absolute equality was
considered by Chancellor Kent to be universally acknowledged by
the great international law writers of his day. After reviewing them,
the best known of which were Grotius and Vattel, Kent states under
the heading "Right of Interference with other States" that:
1-Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal
consideration for their rights whatever may be their relative dimensions or
strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or
manners. This perfect equality, and entire independence of all distinct
states, is a fundamental principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence of this equality that each nation has a right to govern itself as it
may think proper, and no one nation is entitled to dictate a form of
government or religion, or a course of internal policy, to another.160

This principle of equality of nations was early confirmed as a basic
principle by Chief Justice Marshall:
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than tho
167. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
168. STORY, op. cit. supra note 123, at § 21.
169. KENT, COMENTuES ON Awmmeu
c

LAW 21 (14th ed. 1896).
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perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results
from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. ....

As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of
nations ....170

This principle has continued to the present and has been written
into the Charter of the United Nations. Article II, Section 1 of the
United Nations Charter reads:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in

Article I, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members.

Thus whatever limitations the 'United States places upon the
sovereignty of Cuba, by that very act that same limitation is placed
upon the sovereignty of the United States. Whatever wrongs Cuba
has done to the nationals of the United States, it is still the recognized
Government of Cuba and a member of the United Nations. The fact
that it owes the United States Government perhaps a billion to a
billion and one-half dollars for damages suffered by nationals of the
United States does not change this situation.
By a court's decision under the Sabbatino Amendment, we have
denied to Cuba the attributes of absolute independence, that is,
absolute sovereignty. "There is an end to the right of national
sovereignty when the sovereign's acts impinge on international law."' 7 '
The decision in which that statement was first made was overruled by
the Supreme Court. Now the Congress has overruled the Supreme
Court and reinstated the principles of that lower court decision.
The court of appeals, in what is now the ruling decision in
Sabbatino, said: "[T]he very proposition that something known as
international law exists carries with it the implication that national
sovereignty is not absolute but is limited." 172
Under this decision of the court of appeals, now approved by the
Congress, under the Sabbatino Amendment, no nation has the sovereign power to pass a valid law and enforce it, transferring titles to
property of aliens, which the courts of some other country may not
declare to be contrary to international law, and therefore null and
void within the territory of that country which had passed the act.
"Refusal by municipal courts of one sovereignty to sanction the
action of a foreign state done contrary to the law of nations will
often be the only deterrent to such violations." 7 3
170. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
171. 193 F. Supp. at 381.

172. 307 F.2d at 860.
173. 307 F.2d at 868.
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With this condemnation of Cuba-that it is not a wholly sovereign
state, as the words "independence and sovereignty" had always meant;
that it cannot validly enact and execute an act of state contrary to
international law which transfers title to property of United States
nationals; and that it must bow to the determination of courts of
other countries as to the validity or invalidity of any such national
attempt-the United States at the same time places itself in the same
subservient position to courts of other countries as our courts have
placed Cuba.
The United States has always claimed that whether or not it, as
a sovereign state, might have in any way violated international law,
any constitutional act of its legislature, or any decision of the Supreme
Court, or any executive act if within given powers, was valid within
its own territory and must be so recognized by every other nation.
The validity of the act cannot be questioned by our courts and, until
the Sabbatino case, our courts had never questioned the validity of
the executed acts of state of any other sovereign country. Of course
the United States by any act against foreigners or their property
might subject itself to an international claim and if it submitted to
an international court, might even be required to pay damages, as it
has in the past.
The Constitution of the United States does not guarantee to
foreigners that they or their property will not be subjected to acts
contrary to international law. The proof that the United States has
always insisted it had the right to enact laws contrary to international
law, which were valid as to private property within the United
States and which would support judicial decrees that would be
recognized outside of the country as valid, in regard to all such property within the United States, can be shown in many ways. There are
no exceptions. The following instances are illustrative:
(1). Decision on Validity of Seizure Under United States Law-Not
InternationalLaw.-In a number of cases foreigners have claimed our
executive department had seized their property in a manner contrary
to international law. In such instances, when they brought suit, the
decision of the United States court based liability upon the question
whether or not the act of state by the United States itself was contrary to United States law. International law is the law of the United
States only insofar as it has not been changed or superseded by congressional action or treaty.7 4 Executive action, even if authorized by
the laws of the United States, may be contrary to international law as
also may a decision of a court. If the seizure was under the law of
174. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (1925).
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the United States, which at that time was the same as international
law, the foreigner received redress not because of a violation of international law, even though it was such a violation, but because the
seizure was contrary to United States law. Since in such cases United
States law and international law were the same, these statements as
to the right and power validly to change the United States law so
that it does not conform with international law are dicta. They do,
however, clearly show the understanding by the courts of the law of
the United States in this respect. Among these are the following
well-known statements:
This usage [international law] is a guide which the sovereign follows or
abandons at his will; the rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity,
and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and

although it cannot be disregarded by him, without obloquy, yet it may
be disregarded. (Emphasis added.) 175
If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rules respecting
captures, which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government will

manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Till such an act be
passed, the court is bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law
of the land. (Emphasis added.)' 7 6
A quotation from a case frequently quoted and cited in the Sabbatino
case, but only in part, reads:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as

questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling

executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations ....
This rule of international law is one which prize courts, administering
the law of nations, are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect
to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter. (Emphasis added.)177

In the first paragraph of the above quotation, the theme of the first
sentence (unmodified by the restriction in the sentence immediately
following it) runs like a leit-motif through the Sabbatino litigation.
That first sentence is a half paragraph and states a half truth, a very
dangerous half truth. From the incomplete idea expressed, the unwarranted conclusion has been deduced that local courts of the
United States have the duty to "apply" international law and that in
so doing they may and should disregard any foreign act of state175. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
176. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
177. The Paquete Habana, supra note 174, at 700, 708.
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legislative, judicial, executive-found to be contrary to international
law, or declare that foreign act to be null and void.
The premise is untrue and the conclusion unsound. The plain fact
of the matter is, local courts of the United States or of any other
nation may not apply international law. Local courts apply only
local law of their country, of if relevant, that of a foreign country.
The Supreme Court in the very case relied upon, confirms that any
local court, in seeking to find what is applicable United States law,
must determine first, if there is a relevant controlling legislative act
or an executive act or judicial precedent or clause in a treaty. If a
court finds none of these, any court of the United States may then,
but only then, properly find that a revelant provision of international
law is local law of the United States and thus the law of the forum
and apply this tenet of international law, not because it is international
law, but because it is the law of the United States. In any case,
where foreign law is relevant to an issue before United States courts,
the same rule applies. In determining the law of a foreign country,
the United States courts determine what is the relevant local law of
that foreign country. The lower courts in Sabbatino failed to do this.
(2). Refusal of Jurisdictionof Diplomatic Claims.-When the executive has acted strictly in accordance with the laws of the United States,
even though those laws may be violative of international law and
action under them equally wrongful, the courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction to declare that any damage has occurred. Such
a complaint by a foreigner of wrongdoing by the United States Government against him or his property is a diplomatic claim only. The
courts of the United States can neither declare the law and the
actions under it null and void nor return the property to the foreigners, nor grant compensation for the damage caused by the law or
the act.
There is no power in this Court to declare null and void a statute adopted

by Congress or a declaration included in a treaty merely on the ground

that such provision violates a principle of international law. .

.

. When,

however, a constitutional agency adopts a policy contrary to a trend in

international law or to a treaty or prior statute, the courts must accept
18
the latest act of that agency. 7

(3). Prior United States Rejection of Sabbatino Amendment Principles.-The consideration and rejection of the principle embodied in
the Sabbatino Amendment can be seen from the successive drafts
of the proposed Convention for the Protection of Foreign Property
put forward by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De178. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
904 (1960); see also Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
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velpment (O.E.C.D.). In the 1962 edition, Article V appears on page
25 under the heading "Breaches of the Convention." This is divided
into two sections as follows:
(a) The breach of this convention shall entail the obligation of the party
responsible therefore to make full reparation.

(b) Each party shall have regard to the principle that any measures taken
by any state, whether or not a party to this convention, which are in
conflict with the provisions of Article II or III thereof shall not be recognized within the territory of that party as valid.

The provisions contained in Articles II and III prohibit the taking
of foreign property without compensation, a circumstance which has
throughout this article been considered a breach of international law.
Section (b) of Article V above therefore clearly appears to embrace
the principle desired and expected to be enforced under the Sabbatino Amendment. This is further shown by the notes and comments immediately following section (b) in relation to this one
feature.
This provision, however, was not acceptable to the experts of the
interested countries. The 1966 proposed draft of the O.E.C.D. conventions, upon which, however, the O.E.C.D. Council has not yet
taken a position, contains no such provisions, and Article V is limited
merely to section (a) which remains unchanged.
(4). Departure From Non-United States Precedent.-In the Sabbatino case itself, the court of appeals observed that no international
court had ever demanded return of property taken contrary to international law, but admitted that international courts enter judgments
only for money damages against countries which have been found to
have acted contrary to international law.
It has been argued that the wrong under internatonal standards is not
in the taking but in the failure to pay compensation for the taking. It

has been pointed out, moreover, that international tribunals have never
granted restitution of the property taken. Therefore, the argument runs,
the expropriator possesses good title to the property seized subject to a

duty to pay damages for the injury caused. But international tribunals are
not the sole custodians of international law. As we stated earlier in this

opinion, municipal courts also play a part in the development of that body
of law ....

Furthermore, municipal courts are competent to give a restitutory

remedy. In fact, the New York court which holds the proceeds 179
from the
sale of sugar involved in the present case is in such a position.

The lower court's justification for the Sabbatino decision omits the
significant fact that no municipal court had ever tried to restore prop179. 307 F.2d at 868. For discussion of the possibility of municipal courts' giving
a restitutory remedy, see Part IV, § D, p. 508 infra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 20

erty and not been overruled, and that no decision of any independent
nation of the world has ever been so decided. This reasoning was
the basis on which the Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals,
stating that Cuba had title under its act of state, and of course owed
prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with
United States standards.
(5). Decisions Against United States in International Tribunals.In a number of instances, foreign countries have accused the United
States of a breach of international law, and the United States has
consented to an adjudication by an international tribunal. Perhaps
the best known case is that of the Norwegian Shipowners.'8" At the
beginning of World War I, various Norwegians had contracted for
the building of ships in United States shipyards. The United States
as a wartime measure requisitioned the rights of all the Norwegians
in their contracts for ships, in whatever state of completion each ship
then was, or if the keel had not been laid, the United States substituted itself for the Norwegian contractor. The United States made
payment to the shipowners which Norway, in their behalf, protested
as inadequate. An international tribunal found that the United States
had violated international law by failure to pay adequate consideration. The tribunal entered an award against the United States which
was paid. No question was raised as to the title of the ships, and
certainly no ship was seized in any foreign port on the ground that
if there was a breach of international law, no title had been transferred.
One international tribunal found that six cases of the United States
Supreme Court had been decided contrary to international law and
awarded damages which were paid. The title to the property, under
each Supreme Court decision, however, was not affected. 8 '
Now we must read the Sabbatino Amendment and the decision of a
United States court under it as if some other nation had done to the
United States as we have done to Cuba. Whatever power the United
States has over Cuba as a sovereign, this same power resides in every
country in the world over the United States. This fact that the Sabbatino Amendment is of very limited efficacy and, if applied against
the United States, would likewise be of limited efficacy does not
180. Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States), I U.N. Rep. Int'l
Arb. Awards 307 (1922).
181. See Part IV, § I, p. 524 infra. See also [1910] Fonrxcml REL. U.S. 600
(1915). Identic Circular of Secretary of State P. C. Knox, transmitted with letter
dated Nov. 3, 1909. See also [1907] FOREIGN RE.. U.S. pt. 2, 1165 (1910): "Nor
are instances lacking of the submission of questions to a mixed commission which
have been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States sitting as a court
of appeal in prize eases and in which the United States has by virtue of an adverse
decision of a mixed commission reimbursed the claimants."
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answer the question. If the amendment is of any use against a country which the courts of the United States have held to be a violator
of international law, the amendment reciprocally is of equal use to
any country accusing the United States of a breach of international
law.
Two questions are immediate and important: (1) Does the Sabbatino Amendment impair the independence and sovereignty of
Cuba? If so, it also impairs that of the United States. (The equality
of nations means nothing less.) If the answer is affirmative, (2) Did
the people of the United States, the citizens in whom resides the
sovereignty, the power and dignity of the United States, ever grant
to the government they created, the power to impair the independence and sovereignty of the United States?
But the government of the people, by the people and for the people is a tripartite government. The executive department protested
vigorously the enactment of the Sabbatino Amendment. Of course
the President did sign the Foreign Aid Bill to which the Sabbatino
Amendment was attached as a rider, but there is no reason to believe
that the executive department changed its view as to the desirability
of this amendment.
The supreme judicial power of the United States, the Supreme
Court, has not yet spoken on this question, so it is Congress alone of
the three departments of government which has shown enthusiastic
approval of its own act in creating and adopting the Sabbatino Amendment, and this brings us to the next question.
B. Does the ConstitutionGive to the Congressthe Sole Right to Act

as Agent of the United States in GrantingExtraterritorialityto
United States Courts Over the Acts of Other Countries,and
ReciprocallySimilar Authority to the Courts of Foreign
CountriesOver Acts of the United States Government?
Specifically can Congress in the name of the United States extend
to every nation, and to the courts of every nation, the right and power
to determine the validity of the laws of the United States as applied
within the United States on property of their nationals within the
United States? A state or nation and the government of that state or
nation must not be confused. They are separate. In the United States,
sovereignty is in the people. The people created a form and system for
orderly government. That government is the agent of the sovereign
people.
The government of the colonies by Great Britain was not an agency
for the benefit of the colonists. In the interests of the mother country,
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that government exploited the colonists. It was agent for England
and had little concern for the colonists' lives and fortunes.
...whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends
[life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government .... 182

The Government of the United States was established in 1789, deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed. The distinction between the sovereignty of the United States and the frame of
the government which, as the agent of the sovereign, rules within
its territory and conducts its foreign relations, is well expressed in
the preamble to the Constitution.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.

To assure that there would be no usurpation of sovereign functions
by the Government of the United States, the ninth and tenth amendments were inserted and read as follows:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively,
or to the people.

Whoever may be elected or appointed to an office created by the
Constitution may then exercise the power granted to him as an officer

of the United States Government for the orderly administration of
the state. No person has the authority either as an individual or as a
member of a body created by the Constitution, to exercise any governmental powers not granted by the sovereign people. The Government of the United States is one of limited authority.
The State itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The
government is an agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a perfect
representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The Constitution of the State is the limit of the authority of its government, and both
government and State are subject to the supremacy of the Constitution of the
United States, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof.183

The Constitution sets up the frame of government which shall
govern the state.
182. Declaration of Independence.
183. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 290 (1884).
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Wbat is a constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the
mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental
laws are established. The consitution is certain and fixed; it contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is
paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered
only by the authority that made it. The life-giving principle and the deathdoing stroke must proceed from the same hand.
What are Legistlatures? Creatures of the constitution; they owe their
existence to the constitution; they derive their powers from the constitution,
it is their commission; and therefore, all their acts must be conformable to
it, or else they will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the
people themselves, in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity. Law
is the work or will of the legislature, in their derivative and subordinate
184
capacity. The one is the work of the creator, and the other of the creature.

The Constitution of the United States has no extraterritorial effect.
The Government of the United States cannot authorize any of its

officers to interfere or change the laws of any foreign country:
The Constitution can have no operation in another country. When, therefore, the representatives or officers of our government are permitted to
exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such conditions as the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being
obligatory upon the other.18

This is true as to every country in the world. Nations treat with
each other on a nation-to-nation basis, and internation persuasion can,
and always has, followed the general rule from diplomatic protest to

war. In order that the United States' high-minded intentions toward
Cuba in helping it to freedom from the colonial rule of Spain should

not be misinterpreted, the Congress of the United States, on April
20, 1898, passed a resolution which contained the following provisions:
1. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent.
o

0

*

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for
the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.186

The resolution also demanded that the Government of Spain relinquish
its authority and government which it had exercised in the island of

Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba.

Now for the first time in the more than the half century of rela-

184. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
185. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).

186. Resolution of April 20, 1898, 30 Stat. 738-39.
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tions between the United States and Cuba, the United States by the
Congress and the courts has advised Cuba that it cannot enact any
valid law affecting the rights of nationals of the United States in
Cuba which does not have the sanction of the municipal courts of
the United States.
Is this the position of the United States? Do the Congress and the
courts singly or together have the authority under the Constitution
to create such an international attitude between two sovereign states?
[Y]et, it is also true, in respect to the State itself, that whatever wrong is
attempted in its name is imputable to its government, and not to the State,
for, as it can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and do
must be lawful. That which, therefore, is unlawful because made so by
the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is not the word or
deed of the State, but is the mere wrong and trespass of those individual
187
persons who falsely speak and act in its name.
To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations.'188

The question must be answered: Does the Constitution of the
United States grant to the Congress and to the courts the extraterritorial power which they have attempted to exercise in the enactment of the Sabbatino Amendment and the decision under it?

But qustiofs, relating more directly to internal rather than international affairs, arise under the Sabbatino Amendment.

C. Has the Congress, in Enacting the SabbatinoAmendment, Limited
the Powers Granted to It by the Constitutionand Also Encroached

Upon the Prerogativesof the Executive and JudicialBranches
of the Government?
The Constitution of the United States provides that the power
of government is to be exercised by three independent branches or

departments.
The object of the constitution was to establish three great departments of
government; the legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments.
The first was to pass laws, the second to approve and execute them, and
the third to expound and enforce them. 18 9
187. Virginia Coupon Cases, supra note 183, at 290.
188. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918). Compare above with
statement in court of appeals decision in Sabbatino: "Refusal by municipal courts of
one sovereignty to sanction the actions of a foreign state done contrary to the law of
nations will often be the only deterrent to such violations." 307 F.2d at 868.
189. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816).
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The mere establishment of a government based upon three great
divisions is not self-operating.
It is also essential to the successful working of this system that the personsintrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted
to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall
by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.190

It was recognized at an early date that it was the Congress which
would have to show restraint in its activities not to encroach uponthe other departments of government.
The power of making laws is the supreme power in a state, and the
department in which it resides will naturally have such a preponderance
in the political system, and act with such mighty force upon the public
mind, that the line of separation between that and the other branches of
the government ought to be marked very distinctly, and with the most

careful precision.
The Constitution of the United States has effected this purpose with
great felicity of execution, and in a way well calculated to preserve the
equal balance of the government and the harmony of its operations. 191

In deciding the Sabbatino case, the Supreme Court gave a definite
warning that the act of state doctrine must be considered against the
background of the Constitution.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutionar underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions
in the area of international relations. 192

Seldom has one department of government encroached upon another either deliberately or inadvertently. Each has recognized that
the United States Government has two outstanding features: it is a
government of only delegated powers; and it is a government of checks
and balances. It is not surprising, therefore, that instances of one
government department's endeavoring to usurp the authority of another, or to control its functions, have been rare. However, one
must remember the "court packing" plan 193 of the days of the
great depression. This was an effort of the executive departmentthe President of the United States-through enactment of the Con190. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880).
191. KxNT, op. cit. supra note 169, at 221.

192. 376 U.S. at 423.
193. See proposal for the reform of the federal judiciary, submitted to Congress on
Feb. 5, 1937. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, p. 1, col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1937, pp. 8-10, 16 (editorial).
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gress, to change the trend of decisions of the Supreme Court. Although proposed by a very popular President, in a period of great
economic crisis, and in the face of some very unpopular decisions of
the high court, the attempt was defeated.
There is a case decided by Mr. Justice Marshall, acting as a circuit
judge of a state court, which concerns an effort by a legislature of a
state to make by legislation, decisions which as judicially determined
should only have been made by the courts of that state. Concerning
this legislative effort, Mr. Justice Marshall said:
The bill of rights of this state, which is declared to be a part of the
constitution, says, in the fourth section, 'that the legislative, executive, and
supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other.' The separation of these powers has been deemed
by the people of almost all the states as essential to liberty. And the question here is, does it belong to the judiciary to decide upon laws when
made, and the extent and operation of them; or to the legislature? If it
belongs to the judiciary, then the matter decided by this act, namely
whether the act of 1789 be a repeal of the 9th section of 1715, is a
judicial matter, and not a legislative one. The determination is made by a
branch of government, not authorized by the constitution to make it, and
is therefore, in my judgment, void. 194

In this case, considered by Mr. Justice Marshall, the legislature of a
state had directed the courts of that state to assume that a certain
previously enacted local law had been repealed and therefore should
not be applied to any pending case. The United States Congress, in
passing the Sabbatino Amendment, sought to impose this same type
of restriction on all United States courts, not in relation to laws of
the United States, but to the laws of any foreign country. Justice
Marshall's question, quoted above, is relevant to this congressional
action which directed all courts in the United States in determining
title to property in a foreign country to ignore certain laws (those
failing to meet a certain standard; conformity with international
law) of that country and apply others, without regard to the laws in
effect within that country-" ... does it belong to the judiciary to
decide upon laws when made, and the extent and operation of them;
or to the legislature?"'
This division of governmental powers exists unchanged today, just
as it did at the time of the founding fathers. But a few years ago,
the eminent lawyer and scholar, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, wrote a book
entitled The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Present
Day Significance,'95 which stressed the idea that separation of powers
194. Ogden v. Witherspoon, 18 Fed. Cas. 618 (No. 10,461) (C.C.D.N.C. 1802).
195. VANDimmT,THE DocnuE OF THE SEPARATrON OF PowEns AND rrs PRESENTDAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953).
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keeps the checks and balances necessary to a democratic government.
He felt that the rise of Hitler was possible because the Weimar Constitution had failed to create a government of checks and balances. And
it is significant that the act of Cuba in confiscating the property of
United States nationals, the dramatic and damaging incident which
was the original cause of the Sabbatino Amendment, was under a law
which forbade the courts to hear any complaints of the victims.
In a review of Justice Vanderbilt's book, there is the following
statement:
To the absence of sanctions against presidential government in the Weimar
Constitution, blame for the ascendance and despotism of Hitler is attributed.
To the distrust with which judicial interference came to be regarded in
France is ascribed their consequent constitutional separation of judicial and
administrative functions and jurisdictions. In a survey of the written

constitutions of twenty Latin-American nations, it is found that all subscribe
to the doctrine of separation of powers but that the reason why power has
been concentrated and individual rights impaired is that these countries have
a long history of revolts and revolutions, as a result of which strong
military leaders have achieved power through means outside the framework
of the established government. Following the survey of constitutional
doctrine in these many countries, Justice Vanderbilt observes that there is

no more depressing a fact than the lack of understanding to be found in
regard to the relation between the separation of powers and the rule of law,

for force and
and the relation between the rule of law, as a substitute
tyranny, and individual freedom and dignity of man. 196

There can be little doubt that by the Sabbatino Amendment the
Congress has encroached upon the other departments of government.Ys7 More curiously, the Congress has encroached upon itself.
It has permanently banned itself from the exercise of certain powers
granted to it by the Constitution-the sovereign people-and has attempted to exercise power over the act of a foreign state; such powers
were never given to it.
1. Encroachment by Congress on Congress.-Until the passage of
the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress could validly enact any law
affecting the rights and property of nationals of other countries within
the United, States even though such a law, not contrary to the Constitution, was contrary to international law, or might be so considered
by a foreign court. Now Congress has made a pronouncement that no
such act is valid, even though, until the Sabbatino Amendment, no
court in the United States or in any other country could declare it
196. Gardiner, Book Review, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 144 (1955).
197. For discussion of the Sabbatino Amendment in relation to separation of powers
of government, see Cardozo, Congress Versus Sabbatino: Constitutional Considerations,
4 CoLum. J. TRArSNAT. L. 297 (1966).
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null and void. Congress has permitted the determination of the
validity of its own acts to be determined by the courts of any foreign
country.
The Congress has amended the Constitution of the United States.
That document was created for the benefit of the governed, not for
the benefit of foreigners. 19 Claims by a foreigner that he had been
damaged in the United States by an act of the United States in conformity with United States law but contrary to international law
could be a diplomatic claim only. Now our Government is for the
benefit of the foreigner as well as the governed, and, under the
Sabbatino Amendment, the foreigner's court can make such determination.
If Congress has now stultified itself by permitting foreign courts
to veto its actions, done under the authority of the Constitution, has
not Congress broken faith with the citizens of the United States in
granting to other countries a privilege-a privilege even if strictly
bounded by the terms of the Sabbatino Amendment? But the Congress has done even more than this, for it has seriously affected and
changed the powers of the other two departments of government.
2. The Effect of the Sabbatino Amendment on the Courts.-A short
while ago, if one had said that the Congress of the United States
would enlarge the jurisdiction of United States courts to include an
extraterritoriality throughout the whole world and then direct the
United States courts how to decide cases involving the sovereign
acts of foreign countries, he would scarely be believed. But we need
not frame our own definitions on the Sabbatino Amendment's effect
on the courts, for a court itself has told us:
(2) The direction to the courts is mandatory. It is provided that 'no
court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination' in a case which it describes. These
words are not prospective as had been urged. They are mandatory in their
the courts to give retroactive effect to the
intention and effect and require
199
directions of the Amendment.

In the fact [sic] of a constitutional assertion of power by Congress, the
courts have no choice but to accommodate their administrative practices to

the congressional direction.
198. The United States, however, has extended to foreigners the protection of the

Constitution. "Throughout our history the guarantees of the Constitution have been
considered applicable to all actions of the Government within our borders-and even
to some without. This country's present economic position is due in no small part
to European investors who placed their funds at risk in its development, rightly
believing they were protected by constitutional guarantees; today, for other reasons,
we are still eager to attract foreign funds." Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
199. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 964 (1965).
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I hold (1) that this is a case within the purview of the Hickenlooper
Amendment; (2) that the Amendment is supervening law which must be
applied here despite the opinion of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino; and
(3) that I am therefore required to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law as the Amendment
2 00
provides.

Congress not only legislated a new rule of law, different from the
law under which Farr Whitlock had legally negotiated a contract for
a shipload of sugar, but it overruled the Supreme Court in this case.
This apparently was intended.
Under this congressional mandate, the courts of the United States
must pronounce title to land and personal property within the jurisdiction of another sovereign power. ° ' It is useless to say that the
decision does not affect titles to property in Cuba; that was its obvious
intent. No one has doubted that the sugar discussed in the Sabbatinb
case was in Cuba and that title to it was transferred under the laws
of Cuba. It is familiar constitutional law that when an act of the
Congress is declared unconstitutional, it is null and void; the rights
of all parties, who have been affected by executive action under the
law and have protested that the law was unconstitutional, return to
the status quo ante. If money has been paid under protest, it will
be returned. Only one decision of the United States Supreme Court
in any one case is sufficient to accomplish that result. The law is
invalid. Under the Sabbatino Amendment, the law of Cuba which
transferred title to all property in Cuba owned by United States ndtionals is declared invalid in Cuba. Title to sugar owned by C.A.V.
is not the only title which by this decision remains unchanged. If
the Cuban confiscation law did not transfer title, the United States
owners of property before the confiscation still own the land as well
as the personal property, such as the sugar.
The Sabbatino Amendment and the subsequent decision enlarge
the jurisdiction of all courts in the United States to give them the
privilege to determine title to land and to personal property everywhere in the world if a law purporting to deprive the owner, a United
States national, of title is found contrary to international law and if
somehow the court can find some basis of jurisdiction. Every other
country now has a precedent to invoke the same as to any property of
its nationals in the United States.
We may note that heretofore,
The title of land cannot be affected by a judgment of any state not the

situs of the land...

2 02

200. Id. at 971.
201. The Sabbatino Amendment purports to apply only to titles but is not limited
to titles to personal property.
202. 2 BEAT , CoNrucr oF LAws fr450.8, at 1423 (1935).
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It is a principle too firmly established to admit of dispute at this day,
that to the law ofthe State in which the land is situated must we look for
alienation, and transfer, and for the
the rules which govern its descent, 203
effect and construction of conveyances.

There never has been any prior variation of this law in the United
States.
The title under Connecticut is of no avail, because the land in controversy
is ex-territorial; it does not lie within the charter-bounds of Connecticut,
but within the charter-bounds of Pennsylvania. The charter of Connecticut
title can
does not cover or spread over the lands in question: of course,2 no
4
be derived from Connecticut. Here then the defendant fails. 0

Assuming that Congress has the constitutional authority so to enlarge the jurisdiction of United States courts, a collateral question
arises. Is it a proper exercise of constitutional authority for Congress
to grant to the courts of the United States jurisdiction to determine
title to land in foreign countries (even if the United States decision
is contrary to the laws of that country) and not at the same time
grant to United States courts the necessary power to enforce the
decision? The way to enforce a decision in favor of a title holder,
who has been ousted from possession, is for the court to throw out
the usurper and put the rightful owner into possession. But when a
United States court determines a title controversy to property in a
foreign country in favor of a United States citizen not then in possession, that decision cannot be enforced by the present power of the
United States courts; it can only be enforced against the will of that
foreign country by the intervention of armed force. It is not to be
presumed that Congress, in passing the Sabbatino Amendment, intended to compel the executive to take such an action. But the
dilemma is this: the decision of the court is but a futile expression
of opinion, or it is a judgment which can be enforced internationally
only by armed forces.
A specious plea may be made that because the Government of
Cuba appeared by its agent in United States courts as the owner of
property in Cuba, those courts had jurisdiction to hand down a judgment against Cuba not interpreting the laws of Cuba but repudiating
them. The analogy here appears to be that when the courts of one
jurisdiction have before them the owner of land in another jurisdiction as a party to a case involving equitable title, the courts may
direct the apparent owner of land which lies in another jurisdiction
to convey that property to someone who in justice should have the
203. McGoon v. Scales, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 23, 27 (1869). See also Clarke v. Clarke,
178 U.S. 186, 191 (1900); Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 627 (1877).
204. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, supra note 184, at 305.
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title. There are, however, several controlling reasons why such a
contention if made in relation to the Sabbatino case would be fallacious.
Cuba, by its agents, entered the courts of the United States not as
a hostage but as a litigant. The issue was a right to receive a certain
sum of money as purchase price for sugar which was never within
the United States or under its control. The case was not decided as
a conflict of laws case; had it been, the law of Cuba would have prevailed. So said the United States Supreme Court. The courts deciding the Sabbatino case were under no illusion as to title to that
property under Cuban law. The decision made by the lower courts
and now re-established under the Sabbatino Amendment did not
direct the litigant, Cuba, to transfer title of the sugar to C.A.V.; such
a decision would have admitted that Cuba had title to the sugar but
had wrongfully acquired it. The decision by the lower courts was,
and now is, in spite of the reversal by the Supreme Court, that Cuba
had no title.
The courts of the United States have no authority to demand that
Cuba change any of its laws to conform to a decision of United
States courts which is inconsistent with those laws. A diplomatic
request of course could be, in fact may be said to have been, made
by the Department of State, the only proper agency of the United
States Government to make such a request.
The converse of this proposition may be examined. When the
United States appears in an action abroad, held before the courts of
some foreign country, the executive department of the United States,
through its Department of Justice, appears legally in the action as an
agent of the United States of America. Nothing that agent can be
compelled to do outside of his authority as a litigant to determine the
rights of the United States in a particular case can bind the United
States itself. The United States by no decision of a foreign court,
except in specific matters to which it has consented to be bound, can
be compelled to take a legislative or executive action. In no case can
a foreign court coerce the Congress of the United States. As much
as the Congress has damaged the position of the United States abroad
by the Sabbatino Amendment, it is scarcely to be believed that Congress would be willing to subscribe to the broad proposition that whenever the United States Government appears, by the Department of
Justice, in the courts of a foreign country, the decision of those courts
would supersede the enactments of the Congress over persons and
property within the United States.
3. The Effect of the Sabbatino Amendment on the Executive.The greatest encroachment by the Sabbatino Amendment is on the
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executive. The first effect which must be noted is that effect on the
recognition of sovereign governments and the negotiation of treaties.
Under the legislative enactment, couched in cryptic words at once
both undefined yet specialized, the United States can give hereafter
only a qualified recognition to foreign states. It must reserve to itself
the right, and assert the power, to declare null and void any enactment of any foreign state which the courts of the United States
may find to be contrary to international law, if that enactment affects
title to property of United States nationals. Hereafter every treaty
should also then carry this reservation, and in creating any treaties
the right of that other country, reciprocally to declare acts of the
United States contrary to international law to be void, should be included as a necessary privilege to that other country.
With the passage of the Sabbatino Amendment, the duty of the
State Department to try to collect compensation from foreign governments for any property they have seized from United States citizens
becomes undefined. Prior to this new law, the State Department
would demand "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. This
was the recognized duty of the State Department. In the interests
of the United States as well as in the protection of United States
nationals, whose property may have been seized, the United States
has made lump-sum settlements with foreign countries and has divided this amount among the United States nationals who were deprived of their property abroad. In its position as a branch of the
executive, the Department of State has recognized that, in its sound
discretion, it must determine how near to the ideal of "prompt,
adequate, and effective" compensation it can come in obtaining from
foreign countries an offer of settlement, and accept such an offer
when convinced it can obtain no more.
Now the Congress by the Sabbatino Amendment has changed the
rules. It has placed a limitation upon the amount which United
States nationals may receive. It has done this in two ways. First, it
has done so by declaring that United States nationals still own all
of their property in Cuba. Surely the Government of Cuba does not
owe as much for property to which it has no title as it would for
property to which it has title. Congress has replaced the basic concept of confiscation (that of a "forced sale" of the property, under
which the confiscating government owes the full value of the property) with some undefined concept of damages for wrongful occupation of property. Perhaps this could be defined as the difference
between the amount due from a forced sale as against the amount
due on a forced lease.
The second way the amount of compensation due has been reduced
by the Congress is that Congress has substituted for the United States'
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rule of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, the rule that

the amount due is that which would be required under international
law. This is a lesser amount. The Attorney General of the United

States pointed this out to the Congress in his testimony as follows:
I think that this committee should be extremely hesitant to adopt into law

an amendment which in my judgment could not fail to have the effect of
jeopardizing the protection of investments abroad by U.S. citizens and
U. S. corporations.
I think that would be the effect of this amendment, and I will tell you
why: The United States has taken the position throughout our history
that when an investment owned by Americans abroad has been nationalized,
that that can only be done if full, fair, and prompt consideration for that,
for the full value of that investment, is given and given in currency that is
convertible into dollars or given in dollars.
I think that is the rule that the United States should promote. It is the
rule the State Department consistently has promoted, and it has a good deal
of support in international law. But that rule in international law has to a
considerable extent been weakened in recent years. It has been weakened by
the fact that a number of countries, debtor countries, countries which are
being invested in, have taken the position that that rule was too harsh.20 5
The courts that considered that [Sabbatino], including the Supreme Court
of the United States, said there was considerable doubt as to whether or not
international law really did provide that a country nationalizing and
expropriating would have to make fair, prompt, and effective compensation.
They recognized this had been our position, but they said it was extremely
doubtful that was the position of international law. That in itself, that
opinion 206in itself, has weakened the protection of foreign investment
abroad.

Prior to the time this testimony was given, C.A.V. had filed with
the Department of State a claim for the full value of its property in
Cuba. 207 C.A.V., with all other persons and corporations who are

nationals of the United States and had investments in Cuba, may
now also file claim with the United States Foreign Claims Settlement

Commission. 20 8 But how much shall C.A.V. now claim?

If the amount of losses is less by the Sabbatino Amendment than

it was before this amendment became the law of the United States,
the Treasury Department may also be required to revise its rules in

regard to the tax benefits it permits corporations whose property has
been confiscated abroad. Their losses, by the Sabbatino Amendment,

may not be as great as they may have claimed.
205. H.R. 7750 Hearings1234-35.
206. Id. at 1250; see also Sabbatino Amendment for reference to compensation in

considering violation of international law, Appendix I, p. 541 infra.
207. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d
63, 70-71, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

208. International Claims Settlement Act § 501, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964), 22 U.S.C.A.

§ 1643 (1964).
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Congress has also changed the basis for what was formerly known
as diplomatic claims. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino expressed the
universal theory concerning the position of one country, wronged
by the action of another country. The Supreme Court said:
The traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive

principles for determining whether one country has wronged another. Because of its peculiar nation-to-nation character the usual method for an
individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the
executive authorities of his own state to persuade them20 9to champion his
claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal.
What is now the position under the Sabbatino Amendment? Have
the United States companies which had property taken from them in
Cuba, but still have title under the Sabbatino Amendment, a direct
cause of action against the Republic of Cuba?2 10 If so, of what value is
it? Is it the duty of the United States under the recent court decisions
to put them in possession, or, in lieu thereof, pay the value of the
land and buildings and personal property out of its own tax-collected
funds, since it cannot execute judgment of the court? May the United
States make a lump sum settlement and convey a good title to Cuba
without the consent of the individual United States property owners

who still have that title in Cuba? Other unanswered questions necessarily arise.

The Sabbatino Amendment and the district court decision under it
have changed and confused the duties, the powers and the authority
of the executive department.
D. Has the Congress the ConstitutionalPower to EstablishLocal
Courtsin the United States as InternationalCourts,Without
the Consent of Other CountriesAffected?
Courts of the United States can give judgment against the United
States in favor either of citizens or foreigners only if the United
States has consented to be sued and has violated some obligation or
duty as defined by the laws of the United States. Should a foreigner,
or his country on his behalf, complain to the United States of damage
resulting from a law of the United States which was contrary to
international law, the courts of the United States cannot assume
jurisdiction. They are powerless to give relief. The courts can
209. 376 U.S. at 422-23.
210. American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.d. J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622
(D.N.J. 1966). In this case, a company whose property had been confiscated in
Indonesia had attached a ship belonging to Indonesia, claiming the Sabbatino Amendment gave a direct cause of action against a confiscating government, and deprived
that government of the plea of sovereign immunity. The court held against the claimant
and in favor of the Government of Indonesia.

ERRORS IN SABBATINO

declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and therefore null and
void. They cannot, however, declare an act of the Congress null and
void merely because it is contrary to international law.211
Prior to the Sabbatino Amendment a breach of international law
could become a judicial issue only in courts which by the consent
of the contesting parties had the authority to hand down a judgment
because of damage created by some act (judicial, legislative, or executive) contrary to international law. On several occasions, when some
foreign country has accused the United States of an act damaging to
its nationals and contrary to international law, local United States
courts have been clothed with the authority of an international court,
provided that (1) the complaining government consents to jurisdiction and (2) the particular court has received specific congressional
authorization to hear the case. In some of these cases, the court
has found against the United States; in others it has dismissed the
complaint on the ground that there was no violation of international
law by the United States.2 12 In this specific situation, one court, thus
entrusted with the right to hear and determine a direct claim against
the United States under international law, explained its unusual position for its acquisition of powers, which no court of the United States
could normally exercise, as follows:
From this it follows that the court is not to be hampered in its consideration of this case by other municipal jurisdictional statutes, of the United
States, and that the ordinary limitations of the jurisdiction of this court,

which find their basis in other statutes of the United States, such as the
Tucker Act, are not applicable in the consideration of this case. Furthermore,

by the same reasoning, decisions based upon the municipal laws of the
United States are inapplicable to the case at bar upon any point in which
the statutes upon which such decisions are based are contrary to the
principles of the law of nations. The position of the court is not different
than it would be if we sat as an arbitration tribunal, chosen by agreement

of the nations involved, to decide the questions here presented upon the
basis of the law of nations as applied to the facts in the case.213

Congress has stated in the Sabbatino Amendment that no court of
the United States shall decline to consider a case "on the merits"
where the affront to a United States national has been caused by an
act contrary to international law affecting title to property. But Cuba
has not consented to such a determination. Has Congress the power
to create an international court and condemn Cuba for a breach of
international law without the consent of Cuba?
211. Tag v. Rogers, supra note 178 and accompanying text.

212. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875); Royal Holland Lloyd v.
United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 722 (1932); Johnson v. United States, 36 Ct. Cl. 290 (1901).
213. Royal Holland Lloyd, supra note 212, at 736-37.
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The district court which first decided the Sabbatino case and the
court of appeals which affied, both acted as international courts
although no such authority has been granted to them. The issue to
be decided was the title to certain property in Cuba, but neither
court attempted to decide what the title of particular property was
under existing Cuban law; the Supreme Court found that title was

clearly in Cuba.
Instead of determining title to property which, when the title was
fixed under Cuban law, was within the jurisdiction of Cuba and under
its control, the lower courts found that Cuba bad committed an
international delinquency and that they should give a decision for
the party injured by that international wrong. Only an international
court can make such a decision and enter a judgment based upon
a breach of international law.
The lower courts then decided upon a "restitutory" remedy. Because of this international wrong, the sugar ought still to belong
to C.A.V. Not even international courts have ever given a "restitutory" remedy; they have given only money damages. Here, however,
another anomaly arose; the courts had no jurisdiction of the res which
it wished to restore to C.A.V. So to accomplish the desired result,
they in effect entered a judgment in rem "in absentia." The res was
not before the court; it never had been. Then these lower courts in
lieu of a return of the res awarded the purchase price to C.A.V.
Local courts in any country, when called upon to determine the
effect of foreign law, have competency only to decide what is the
law of the country, its application within that country and the legal
consequences of such action there. This is what the Supreme Court
did in Sabbatino. Local courts have no competence to award a judgment based upon a finding that the foreign country has committed an
international delinquency. This is the function only of an international
court.
Once again we must look to the reciprocal effect upon the United
States. The United States has always been careful to reserve to itself
the right to grant to any court, whether domestic, foreign or international, the judicial power to hold the United States liable for a
breach of international law. But here again Congress has created a
precedent against the United States interest. By the Sabbatino Amendment, the consent of the United States is no longer necessary. Any
country may now permit its local courts to act as international tribunals to determine the validity of any act of Congress within the
United States, affecting the property rights of that country's nationals,
and hand down what it would now consider a proper judgment against
the United States. This decision it would then enforce by ordering
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a remedy similar to that issued by the lower courts in the Sabbatino
case.
E. May the CongressPass a Law Which Discriminatesin Favor
of Sellers andAgainst Buyers Without Regardto the
Domestic Interestsof the United States?
The Sabbatino Amendment requires courts to ignore the act of
state doctrine whenever the act complained of violates international
law, except in one specific instance-that is, where the executive department of the Government, represented by the President of the
United States, decides that in the interest of foreign relations the
courts must apply the act of state doctrine and recognize as valid
in a foreign country the complained of executed act of state.2 14 Should
the President exercise this power, then the confiscated property of
nationals of the United States can be brought into the United States
and sold here as the property of the confiscating government. That
may rankle, but that was the law of the United States before the
Sabbatino Amendment and is still the law of the great independent
trading countries of the world.
No provision is made in the Sabbatino Amendment for the relief
of the United States in the event that the confiscated property is
urgently needed in the United States economy. The President may
not, under the Sabbatino Amendment, declare that, in the interest of
the United States, the material which has been normally shipped into
the United States from a certain source before the confiscation, is still
urgently needed.
Sugar, oil and perhaps a few other commodities are produced in
such abundance and from so many sources that perhaps the industry
of the United States would normally not be seriously affected by the
operation of the Sabbatino Amendment depriving industries of the
United States-the buyers of the foreign product-of their customary
source of supply of those commodities. But there may be types of
commodities, and circumstances of international trade, which would
badly hurt the economy of the United States; for instance, in a defense or war effort, needed supplies (which would otherwise willingly
be sold to the United States) may be prevented from entering the
United States because, by a confiscatory act, they no longer belong
to United States nationals, but have become the property of the unfriendly confiscating government. If the confiscating government's
title is not recognized, the property of course will not be brought in.
The Sabbatino Amendment permits the seller of goods under a
contract of sale, who is deprived of the goods before delivery by
214. The Sabbatino Amendment, App. I, p. 541 infra.
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confiscation, in turn to deprive his buyer of these goods unless there
is a readily available alternate market in which the customer can
supply his needs. Under the facts of the Sabbatino case, Farr, Whitlock & Company suddenly found itself with commitments to its own
customers but with only a worthless contract with C.A.V., a contract which C.A.V. could not perform. A ship, half loaded by C.A.V.,
had been supplied by Farr, Whitlock & Company to pick up the
sugar in Cuba under contract. The very action of the company, in
immediately making a contract with the confiscating government to
buy the sugar which it needed but which C.A.V. could not supply,
is proof that our problem is not merely a theoretical or hypothetical
one. If C.A.V. was under no liability to deliver the property because
prevented by force majeure, could Farr, Whitlock & Company use
this same defense as against its customers to whom it had promised
quantities of sugar in reliance upon its contract with C.A.V.? Certainly, if the Republic of Cuba had believed that a court of the
United States would find it not entitled to receive the purchase price,
it would most certainly have not sent the sugar, or would have demanded payment in advance. This would have placed Farr, Whitlock
& Company in a position where it in turn would have defaulted to
its customers or supplied them perhaps at higher cost from other
sources or paid twice for the same sugar. Must full protection of the
United States be afforded only to a United States national who
exports goods from a foreign country to the United States and not
be afforded to the other United States nationals who buy?
The sugar in the Sabbatino case did not enter the United States
market. But in the normal course of trade, the United States buyers of
raw material from a foreign source plan to deliver much of it within
the United States market. Perhaps the raw materials from a foreign
source have been relied upon in the American market and needed;
and the Sabbatino Amendment would grant to the United States
foreign investor, who has been subjected to confiscation, a method
by which he can deprive the American market of goods which have
been sent from a particular source-the confiscating country. In fact,
that is the announced intention of the Congress in the Sabbatino
Amendment. Confiscated goods shall not be sold in the United States
market.
Congress, and the court that interpreted the will of Congress, found
that the Sabbatino Amendment was based upon the constitutional
power of Congress relating to the trade of the United States with
foreign countries. "This power like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitu15
tion."
215. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

ERRORS IN SABBATINO

The power of Congress to regulate trade of the United States cannot be questioned. But that is not the problem here. Congress, by
the Sabbatino Amendment, in no way prohibited imports into the
United States. Of course, it could have. Rather it left the decision
as to whether confiscated goods should be prevented from entering
the United States market to those United States nationals who had
owned those goods at the time of confiscation. Our first question,
therefore, is: Does Congress have the power to delegate its authority
to regulate the commerce of the United States to private citizens of
the United States and, more particularly, to that limited class of
United States nationals who have foreign investment?
The language of the Sabbatino Amendment is broad. The courts
shall not decline the protection of this act to anyone who has a right
to bring an action in the courts of the United States and claim identified property as his own. And this leads to our second question:
Does Congress have the power to delegate its authority to regulate
commerce with the United States to foreigners whose investments
have been confiscated in a foreign country?
F. Canthe Congress Changethe UniversalRule That a judgment
"In Rem" Is "Good" as Against the World?
The judge of the district court in the first Sabbatino case had
argued by analogy,
Even if one were to suppose a requirement of international law that a state
afford full faith and credit to the acts of another state, such a requirement
clearly would not
extend to an act of state which was in violation of
2 16
international law.
But an analysis of this supposition leads to a conclusion wholly
opposite to that which the judge drew from it. Of course, the reference
is to the constitutional provision,
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.2 17

But what did this provision mean? The first law which Congress
passed on this subject in 1790218 made no mention of any extraterritorial effect of public acts of a state. It was not until 1823 that any
case was decided in the United States Supreme Court which dis216. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
217. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
218. 1 Stat. 122 (1790).
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cussed whether or not this constitutional provision required one state
to enforce judicial determinations made in another state.219 There
was no question of extraterritorial enforcement of Cuba's acts in the
Sabbatino case. Therefore, if the United States courts had applied
the "full faith and credit" clause to the public acts of Cuba, the
import of such application would merely have been (1) a convenient
method of proving the act of state of Cuba and the legal results in
Cuba of that act; and (2) recognition of the validity of Cuba's acts
of state in Cuba on persons and property located there (i.e., under
its jurisdiction and within the dispositive dominion of its courts).
As to the first, the ordinary rules of proof of foreign law were sufficient
in the Sabbatino case. No question was raised in any court as to the
meaning and purpose of Cuba's Public Law 851, 2° the resolutions
under it and the acts of Cuba's agents taken in accordance with the
law and the resolutions. All courts found that Cuba had seized the
sugar and an agreement to extend "full faith and credit" could not
have proved more. This leaves but one question, the central question of the Sabbatino case: the recognition of validity of Cuba's act
of state in Cuba. Here there is ample precedent that, on this one
feature of "full faith and credit," every great independent trading
country of the world has always extended to every other such country this recognition. There are no exceptions in the cases in the
United States (until Sabbatino), and there are no exceptions in the
cases of the great independent foreign countries.
But the district court by discussing analogies invites a consideration of cases analogous to the facts of the Sabbatino case. Here the
strongest possible analogy to the acts of Cuba is to actions in rem.
All of the elements of such an action were present. There was no
trial in Cuba of the rights of the parties. Cuba singled out the property it wished to seize and seized it. The Cuban courts confirmed that
Cuba had title. The action was notorious. All interested parties knew
of it though the parties were not before the court. The very law,
under which that shipload of sugar was seized, denied to C.A.V. adjudication of its claim to title; unheeded protests were made as to the
unfairness of the acts. These proceedings fit under Chief Justice
Marshall's definition of an action in rem.
I have always understood that where the process is to be served on the
thing itself, and where the mere possession of the thing itself, by the
service of the process and making proclamation, authorizes the court to
decide upon it without notice to any individual whatever, it is a proceeding
in rem, to which all the world are parties.
219. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 302, 305 (1813) (dissent of Johnston, J.).
220. Public Law of Cuba 851, July 6, 1960. For discussion of this law, see 376
U.S. at 402-04.
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Continuing, after mentioning the courts which could have jurisdiction:
.. .in consequence of the seizure which vests the possession, and of a
general proclamation of that fact, every person is a party to the proceeding,
and his interest is bound by the sentence ....221

In the early days of our Republic, there was little foreign investment by United States nationals. Most of the property belonging to
American citizens which came within the jurisdiction and control of
a foreign government was ships seized while they were pursuing their
trading voyages. Many of these seizures, the Supreme Court found
were contrary to international law, but the Supreme Court consistently
extended "full faith and credit" to the foreign court to the extent of
recognizing the validity of the transfer of title of these ships wrongfully seized, the condemnation of which was made by foreign courts,
although the owners could not appear in the courts. These cases universally hold that a judgment in rem is "good" as against the world.
A judgment in rem, adjudicating the title to a ship or other movable
property within the custody of the court, is treated as valid everywhere.
As said by Chief Justice Marshall: 'The sentence of a competent court,
proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and operates
as an absolute change of the property. By such sentence, the right of the
former owner is lost, and a complete title given to the person who claims
under the decree. No court of cobrdinate jurisdiction can examine the
sentence. The question, therefore, respecting its conformity to general or
can never arise, for no cobrdinate tribunal is capable of making
municipal law
the inquiry.'222

In the case from which the above quoted statement by Chief
Justice Marshall is to be found, a vessel owned by United States
citizens, with a cargo owned in large part also by United States
citizens, was captured on the high seas by a French privateer and
condemned as a prize under the Milan Decree of France because, as
alleged, it was trading to a dependency of England. The ship and
the goods were sold, and some of those goods ultimately came to
Philadelphia where they were claimed by the person who had owned
both the ship and the goods prior to the condemnation by the French
court. The analogy to the Sabbatino case is clear; there C.A.V. claimed
title to sugar which a court of Cuba had determined belonged
to Cuba by a Cuban decree.22 As to the validity of the decree under
221. Mankin v. Chandler, 16 Fed. Cas. 625, 626-27 (No. 91030) (E.D. Va. 1823).
222. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 167 (1895).
223. At the time the confiscation decree was enforced on the property of C.A.V.,
C.A.V. had pending in the courts of Cuba an action which the courts then dismissed
on the ground that C.A.V. no longer owned any property in Cuba but that the title
to this property was in the state. See Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera VertientesCamaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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which the ship had been seized on the high seas and taken to a
French port, Chief Justice Marshall said,
That the sentence is avowedly made under a decree subversive of the
law of nations, will not help the appellant's case, in a court which cannot
revise, correct or even examine that sentence ....
It is true, that in this
case, there is the less difficulty in saying, that the edict under which this
sentence was pronounced, is a direct and flagrant violation of national
I-w, because the declaration has already been made by the legislature of
the Union.224

The Chief Justice pointed out that if the condemning court had
made an error it could correct that error, but so long as there was
no correction by the court or the legislature of the country under
which the condemnation took place, the United States court was
bound to recognize the transfer of title.
Probably the most famous case relating to foreign judgments in
rem ever to occur in the United States involved the little vessel,
Schooner Exchange, owned jointly by several United States citizens.
This vessel was seized by France under a decree which the Government of the United States considered as contrary to international law.
Then by a series of circumstances, the ship, armed, with name
changed and manned by a naval crew as a unit of the French navy,
put into the port of Philadelphia and was claimed by those citizens
who had owned the vessel before seizure. The attorney for the
former owners argued, as C.A.V. did, that the United States court
must award to them the seized property. He said:
But consider the inconveniences on the other side. Your own citizens
plundered. Your national rights violated. Your courts deaf to the complaints of the injured. Your government not redressing their wrongs, but
giving a sanction to their spoliators. The argument of our opponents allows
no remedy to the citizen, although dispossessed of his property, within the
limits of our own territory.2=
Nevertheless, the argument of the opposing United States attorney
prevailed. He said:
This was one of the seizures under the Rambouillet decree. We do not
justify that decree, but we say, that whenever the act is done by a sovereign,
in his sovereign character, it became a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals,
or of war, according to its importance .... 226

In actions in rem, the judgment of condemnation itself is the "act
of state;" it is the final imposition of the national will even though
224. Williams v. Armroyd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 266, 272 (1813).
225. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 74, 81 (1812).
226. Id. at 77.
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the general policy may have been prepared by the legislature or the
executive. The court of appeals in Sabbatino said:
The actions of foreign nations accorded this respect . . . . [recognition of
acts of state] . . . . may be executive, legislative, or judicial in nature,
although court judgments, because they ordinarily involve the resolution
of private disputes and do not ordinarily reflect high state policy, do not
usually come within this category.22 7

A study of the early prize cases, a few of which have been cited
above, shows a consistent adherence to that principle of law now
usually referred to as the "act of state doctrine." A comparison, however, of these earlier cases with later similar decisions shows that
an "act of state" is now more closely and more narrowly defined.
Many of these early cases arose during the period of struggle between England and France-the Napoleonic Wars-and some of the
actions by foreign countries at that time would not now be considered
an act of state. Napoleon was not King of Prussia, though he made
decrees from Berlin, nor was he King of Italy when the Milan decrees
were made, though he bestowed that title of "King" on his son. Now
by treaty, The Hague Convention22-to which all the great nations
are parties-no country need recognize as valid uncompensated forced
transfers made by a conquerer within a conquered country. Transfers
by a military occupation are not valid unless the convention is observed. Only a sovereign government recognized as such can unqualifiedly commit an act of state.
Jurisdiction, too, is more closely defined than in the earlier cases.
Chief Justice Marshall himself assisted in creating and applying the
rule, now universal, that a court which has no jurisdiction cannot
condemn a prize; its decree, adequate in form, is not valid unless
the property condemned was within its jurisdiction and under its
dispositive control.2 29 Also the property, whether it remained within
the country or moved outside, must continuously have been within
the possession of the condemning government or of one who derived
title from the prize condemnation. When one considers that this narrowing of the definition to the minimum required of one sovereign
country in recognition of the sovereignty of another, one is not surprised that in several of his cases, Chief Justice Marshall felt he was
227. 307 F.2d at 855.

228. The Hague Conventions of 1907, including Convention IV to which is annexed
the rules of land warfare.

MALLOY, TREATmS, CONVENTIONS,

PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETwEEN THE Umrrx

INTERNATIONAL ACTS,

STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER

Powxs 1776-1909, 2269 (1910).
229. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 143, 160 (1808). "Can this court examine
the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal?" Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 175, 176

(1808).
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exploring an unbeaten path with few, if any, aids from precedent or
written law and complained that the legislature of the United States
had not done as much as it might have done in more closely defining
the areas where recognition of the validity of a foreign act was necessary for the reciprocal protection of the rights of sovereignty of the
230
young republic.
It has universally been said that a judgment in rem is good as
against the world. The act of state doctrine is a part of this same
principle whenever it applies to movable property. The Sabbatino
case applies to movable property. The same principles apply as to
an action determining title to a res.
Petitioners concede that the expropriation decree, if lawful and effective
under the Constitution and laws of Mexico, must be recognized as lawful
and effective under the laws of the United States, the sovereignty of
Mexico at the time of that decree being exclusive of any other. Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297; Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S.
304; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347; Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250; Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367; Earn Line S.S.
Co. v. Sutherland S.S. Co., 254 Fed. 126; Oliver American Trading Co. v.
United States of Mexico, 5 F. (2d) 659; Compania M.Y.R.R., S.A. v. Bartlesville Zinc Co., 115 Tex. 21; 275 S.W. 388. The question is not here whether
the proceeding was so conducted as to be a wrong to our nationals under the
doctrines of international law, though valid under the law of the situs of
the land. For wrongs of that order the remedy to be followed is along the
channels of diplomacy. 'A citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of
another nation, must seek redress through his own government.'23

Does the Congress of the United States have the power to pass a
valid law permitting every court in the United States to re-examine
every judgment in rem of every other country in the world and
determine the validity of that foreign country's judgment by deciding
whether or not the decision was made in accord with the tenets of
international law? 232 Conversely, does the Congress of the United
States have the power to permit the courts of every other country in
the world to re-examine every judgment in rem of the United States
courts and determine the validity of any judgments in rem within
the jurisdiction of the United States? And what shall the Congress,
the executive branch and the judiciary do if local foreign courts
"invalidate" judgments in rem of United States courts?
230. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, supra note 225, at 81; Williams v.
Armroyd, supra note 224, at 272.

231. Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937).
232. See note 246 infra and accompanying text. Six decisions of the United States
Supreme Court found by an international court to be contrary to international law.
The losing party was reimbursed for the lost sustained by reason of the United States
Supreme Court decisions.
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G. Is the Sabbatino Amendment New Substantive Law
or a New Rule of Adjective Law?
The Sabbatino Amendment, as stated in the reports of the congressional committee recommending its passage, was intended to reverse in part the results of the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Sabbatino case.233 The Supreme Court had held,
conventionally with United States precedent, that the courts of the
United States must recognize that a transfer of title from C.A.V. to
Cuba had been accomplished under Cuban law even if that law,
and seizures under it, were contrary to international law. The Sabbatino Amendment, as obviously intended and now interpreted, permitted a court on the same state of facts to come to the opposite
conclusion-that no title had been changed because Cuba's acts were
contrary to international law.
Here is a change of decision on the identical facts in the same
case; nothing has been added, nothing has been taken away but the
results are diametrically opposed. The Supreme Court held Cuba
had title. Under the Sabbatino Amendment, the district court has
held Cuba had no title. Is the Sabbatino Amendment itself a new
substantive law or is it merely the cancellation of a long-established
and long-followed rule of adjective law, which prevented courts from
making a decision "on the merits" as to the validity of a foreign act
of state? The question may seem technical, but it has far-reaching
implications.
We may start our inquiry with the brief dictionary definition of
substantive law:
That part of law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to

'adjective or remedial law,' which prescribes [the] method of enforcing the

rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. 2 4

Adjective law is not immediately concerned with the ultimate rights
of the parties, but rather with the conditions which are necessary
before a court will undertake to determine the merits of the action.
This may be termed the right of one party to prevent a determination
"on the merits." Adjective law is:
The aggregate of rules of procedure or practice. As opposed to that body

of law which the courts are established to administer, (called 'substantive
law') it means the rules according to which the substantive law is administered.235

Any case which is dismissed by a court either temporarily (with
233. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th CONG., 2d Sess. 24 (1964).
234. BLAC, LAw DIcTIoNARY 1598 (4th ed. 1951).

235. Id, at 62.
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a chance to return to court upon the fulfillment of conditions) or
permanently, without determination as to the fundamental rights of
the parties as they are alleged in a complaint and answer, or otherwise indicated in other pleadings, has been disposed of by an application of a rule of adjective law. Historically, these rules have
had different names in different jurisdictions-dilatory pleas, pleas
in abatement, pleas in bar, demurrer, or merely the rules of civil
practice, the terms of which must be met before a litigant is entitled
to a consideration of claim to fundamental rights which he seeks to
enforce.
To determine whether or not the Sabbatino Amendment is a rule
of substantive law governing the disposition of a case or is a new
rule of adjective law removing a bar which would prevent a court
from making such a determination, the proper category can be
measured by the answer to this one question: Does an independent
sovereign government-any or every independent sovereign government-have the sovereign right and power validly to enact a law and
validly to enforce within its own territory that legislative act, adversely affecting the person or property rights of a foreigner within
its jurisdiction if that law or actions taken under it are contrary to
international law?
If we are to admit that a sovereign government has such a power
and that Cuba exercised that power, then the Sabbatino Amendment
is a change of substantive law. If, however, we decide that a sovereign
government has no power validly to adopt a law or course of action
contrary to international law, then the Sabbatino Amendment is a
new rule changing a previous rule of adjective law.
If Cuba had the power to transfer title under a law contrary to
international law, it had done everything necessary to accomplish that
result. The United States has always claimed that it, as an independent power, has the right and the power to affect the personal
property of foreigners in the United States and that the result must
be recognized even though the action internationally gives rise to a
diplomatic claim against the United States. If Cuba also had this
right, then the Sabbatino Amendment, which denied this right to
Cuba, is a change in Cuban law. But Congress has no authority whatsoever to legislate for Cuba. If it has attempted to do so-to change
the substantive law of Cuba-its purported efforts are a nullity.
Even the states of the United States are independent from one
another and one state may not legislate for another:
Would the people of any one State trust those of another with a power

to control the most insignificant operations of their state government? We
know they would not. Why, then, should we suppose that the people of
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any one State should be willing to trust those of another with the power to
they have confided their
control the operations of a government to2 which
6
most important and most valuable interests?

But there are only two kinds of law: substantive and adjective law.
If the Sabbatino Amendment is not substantive law, it must either
be adjective law or affect an existing rule of adjective law. As adjective law, the Sabbatino Amendment must mean that no sovereign
state has ever had the sovereign authority validly to pass and validly
to enforce a law which the courts of some other country have found
to be damaging to their nationals and contrary to international law.
Thus, in passing the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress has merely
struck down the prohibition that the act of state doctrine exercises on
the actions of courts, and has permitted courts to determine what
have always been the rights of parties (that is, ownership of property by foreigners within any country continues unaffected by any
national act contrary to international law).
Congress sought to encourage foreign investment by removing the bar of the

of suits arising out of
act of state doctrine to a determination on the merits 37
foreign confiscations in violation of international law.

But if the Sabbatino Amendment and its interpretation is a surprising new revelation as to limitation on powers of all states, including,
of course, the United States, we will now have to accommodate our
judicial procedures to recognition hereafter of what must be the following premises:
1. There has existed from time immemorial an unwritten provision of the

Constitution of the United States that Congress may not pass, the executive
may not execute, and the judiciary may not uphold, any law contrary to
international law which adversely affects the property of foreigners in the

United States.
2. All courts of the United States must now, at the request of any
foreigner, examine a designated act of the Congress affecting the claimant's
property to determine whether that act is contrary to that unwritten section
of the Constitution now found by the Congress and the courts to exist, i.e.,
that Congress may not enact any valid law which is contrary to international
law.
3. Every foreigner now has a direct cause of action against the United

States on a plea that he has been damaged by an act contrary to the
unwritten provision of the Constitution that the United States Government
may not validly apply an act which is contrary to international law because
that act is also contrary to United States law, under which all foreigners and
their property in the United States have conventionally been protected. The
remedy is restitution of any property taken.
236. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1905).
237. 243 F. Supp. at 972.
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4. Since under the Sabbatino Amendment the courts of the United States
have declared a law of a foreign sovereign to be null and void, the Congress
of the United States must now submit to the determination of any foreign
court, that any law passed by Congress affecting property of a foreigner
which some foreign court considers contrary to international law is null and
void within the United States.

Our diliemma is this: If the United States Congress cannot change

laws of Cuba, then the Sabbatino Amendment must be adjective law.
If it is adjective law, then the act of state doctrine is a dilatory plea
preventing a determination "on the merits."
H. Does the Congress of the United States Have the
Authority To Reverse a Decision of the Supreme

Court of the United States?
In any legislative enactment, the Congress of the United States
is, and always has been, subject to two limitations. Congress, as one
of the three agencies of government has only such powers as are
delegated tor it in its agency agreement-the Constitution of the
United States. Congress, as an agent for the sovereign people, has
absolutely no powers beyond those expressed or clearly implied from
the expressed powers set forth in that document.
The second limitation on Congress is determined within the Constitution itself with regard to Congress' special role as one of the governing agents of the United States. It may not step from that role.
Also, it is prohibited from enacting any law which is proscribed by
the amendments to the Constitution.
Within these limitations, has the Congress the power to reverse a
decision of the Supreme Court? No instance of such an attempt has
been presented as precedent, and we may assume that never before
has Congress attempted to do such a thing. Once, however, a state
of the United States passed a law reversing a decision of a federal
district court. In a controversym between a group of citizens of
Connecticut and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, each claiming
to be the proper party to receive prize money for the capture of a
British ship during the Revolution, a district court had awarded the
prize money to the Connecticut citizens, reversing the previous decision of a local state court. The legislature of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania then awarded the prize money to itself and directed its
officers to take needful action to confirm the right of Pennsylvania to
hold the money which was then held by the treasurer of that state.
The Connecticut citizens invoked the aid of a United States court of
appeals and Mr. Justice Marshall, sitting as a circuit judge, found
238. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 65 (1809).
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that the legislative action of Pennsylvania could not be permitted to
stand, for as he said, if a state legislature can reverse decisions of a
federal court, "the [C]onstitution itself becomes a solemn mockery."0 9
But some of the questions raised in that case are not irrelevant to the
questions of the propriety of the Sabbatino Amendment-a legislative
enactment not of any state legislature, to be sure, but an enactment
of the supreme legislative body of the United States itself.
We may now pertinently paraphrase some of the questions asked
by Mr. Justice Marshall in this matter.
If the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of
the Union is placed by the Constitution in the Congress of the United
States, then the Sabbatino Amendment concludes the subject; but if
that power necessarily resides in the supreme judicial tribunal of the
nation then the determination by the Congress concerning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be permitted to prejudice the
question.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Sabbatino case had
before it two claimants to certain property which was never within
the jurisdiction of the United States. That Court applied the law of
Cuba, a sovereign state. It held that the title of that property-a
shipload of sugar-was in the Cuban Government when that ship
was permitted to leave Cuban territorial waters. In thus deciding,
the Supreme Court applied the law known as "the law of the place
where" (lex loci rei sitae). The other claimant to the title of that
property was the sugar company which had produced the sugar seized
by a fully executed act of state; its claim to title was that the act of
state was contrary to international law and therefore the title continued unchanged.
To the Supreme Court, this issue was a legal issue; to the Senator
who introduced the Sabbatino Amendment, it was a policy question.
He said: "We think it perfectly proper that the Congress of the
United States should have the last word on this important policy
question."2A0
Here is the issue: In a litigated matter between two claimants,
based upon an adverse claim to property, shall the final determination of what law should properly be applied, and the final conclusion as to the legal rights of the parties, be made by the Congress
of the United States or by the Supreme Court of the United States?
239. Id. at 77.
240. Letter in The Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1964, signed by Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senator from Iowa.
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I. In Passingthe SabbatinoAmendment, Has Congress
ChangedLong-EstablishedNational Policiesof the
United States? Was This Intended?
The possible ramifications of the Sabbatino Amendment are tremendous. Its use and application raises many questions, some of
them mixed questions of constitutional power and of national policy.
A few may be considered.
1. Does the Sabbatino Amendment Supersede the Connally Amendment?-When the United Nations was established as an organization,
the International Court was established as a separate but coordinate
organization. The United States adhered to the International Court
but with a reservation: "(b) Disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States
of America as determined by the United States of America." 241
The United States invoked this reservation when Switzerland endeavored to secure a judgment against the United States on the
ground that the seizure of the General Aniline and Film Company
was a seizure of Swiss assets contrary to international law. The
action by the United States was to prevent a decision by the International Court.2 42 We have learned too that a reservation by the
United States can on the principles of the equality of nations and
reciprocity, be used against us by any nation which we endeavor to
bring before the International Court.
No issue can be brought before the International Court in any
event except on a complaint that the country named as defendant
has violated international law. Under the Sabbatino Amendment, the
courts of the United States, local national courts, heard and determined an issue based on a claim of violation of international law.
Now the Congress on these same principles of equality of nations and
reciprocity has subjected the United States to a determination as to
the validity of its national acts by the courts of every country. Nor
can Congress expect that if any foreign nation objects to the treatment of its nationals by the United States that that foreign nation
will refrain from declaring the United States act of state null and
void. Nor is the foreign state likely to confine such condemnation
and decision to acts of the United States intended to transfer title,
but will declare null and void any act of state of the United States
which that foreign court finds contrary to international law.243 One
241. T.I.A.S., No. 1598 (1946); [1957-19581 I.C.J.Y. 212.

242. Interhandel Case, [19591 I.C.J. Rep. 6.
243. The first public criticism of the Sabbatino Amendment appeared in an editorial
in The Washington Post, p. A14, July 27, 1964. The editorial was entitled, "Drag on
Foreign Policy" and within it, the editorial writer said: "If American courts sat in
judgment of foreign governments, their courts would increasingly sit in judgment of

1967]

ERRORS IN SABBATINO

must assume jurisdiction-if United States courts can "sit in judgment"

and condemn, as invalid, acts of foreign countries, foreign countries
can find the same jurisdiction and power to make adverse decisions
concerning acts of the United States.
2. Has Congress Created Two Different Rules as to Judgments;
One for Seizures at Sea Which Are Contrary to International Law,
and One for Seizures on Land Which Are Contrary to International
Law?-Some fifty years ago, the United States Senate summarily rejected a suggestion that an international court, sitting as a prize court
to hear and determine a complaint by a person or government whose
ship had been seized and condemned as a prize by a court of another
country, could, if it found the seizure had been contrary to international law, declare that seizure and court condemnation to be
null. The effect of this suggestion, if implemented, would be similar
to the Sabbatino Amendment although in the earlier instance confined to the narrow admiralty question. The Sabbatino Amendment
as now interpreted lays down a general rule that any act of state
which transfers title to property of a foreigner contrary to the rules
of international law can be declared null and void.
The circumstances under which the Senate had once rejected this
very proposition were as follows. In 1907 an effort was made by
many nations, of which the United States was one, to include in
the Hague Conventions a new convention to be known as XII, to
establish a court of prize.244 Any party who felt himself aggrieved by
ours. Even if such a practice did not lead to chaos, the United States has an interest
in holding fast to a sound principle which it has established-a principle that, as the
Supreme Court has said, is conducive to promotion of the rule of law among nations."
Senator Hickenlooper's answer to this can be found in a letter to the same publication,
Aug. 5, 1964, and also in 110 CONG. PEec. 19546 (Aug. 14, 1964).
244. XII. Convention relative a l'etablissement d'une Cour internationale des prises.
Titre I. Disposition Generales
Article 8.
Si la Cour prononce la validit6 de la capture due navire ou de la cargaison,
il en sera dispos6 conformement aux lois du belig6rant capteur.
Si la nullit6 de la capture est pronounc6e, la Cour ordonne la restitution du
navire on de la cargaison et fixe, s'il y a lieu, le montant des dommagesint6r&ts. Si le navire ou la cargaison ont 6t6 vendus on d6truits, la Cour
d~termine l'indemnit6 A accorder de ce chef an propri6taire.
Si la nullit6 de ]a capture avait 6t6 pronounc6e par la juridiction nationale,
la Cour n'est appell6e a statuer que les dommages et int6r6ts. National
Archives, 13 Numerical File, 1906-1910, Cases 40/794, Dep't of State.
Official Translation of Article 8.
If the Court pronounces the capture of the vessel or cargo to be valid, they
shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of the belligerent captor.
If it pronounces the capture to be null, the Court shall order restitution of the
vessel or cargo, and shall fx, if there is occasion, the amount of the damages.
If the vessel or cargo has been sold or destroyed, the Court shall determine
the compensation to be given to the owner on this account.
If the national Court pronounced the capture to be null, the Court can only
be asked to decide as to damages. [1907] FoREIN EL. U.S. 1256 (1910).
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the seizure and condemnation of his ship as prize by some foreign
state could resort to this court. The gravamen of any such complaint
would necessarily be that the seizure and condemnation was not in
accordance with international law. The United States was favorable
to the establishment of such a court. But it emphatically objected to
the proposal that such a court should have the privilege of declaring
an act of condemnation by any court, including of course by a court
of the United States, of no effect to transfer title. The United States
Senate passed a resolution as follows:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That
the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the convention for an
international prize court signed at The Hague on the 18th day of October,
1907, and at the same time to the ratification, as forming an integral part
of the said convention, of the protocol thereto, signed at The Hague on the
19th day of September 1910, and transmitted to the Senate by the President

on the 2d day of February 1911;
Provided that it is the understanding of the Senate and is a condition of
its consent and advice that in the instrument of ratification the United States

of America shall declare that in prize cases recourseto the InternationalCourt
of Prize can only be exercised againstit in the form of an action in damages
for the injuries caused by the capture. (Emphasis added.) 245

Also in connection with the proposal for the prize court, Secretary
of State Knox composed and dispatched a circular letter to all the
participant countries stating the position of the United States. That
position was that, should any court in the United States, including the
Supreme Court, condemn a ship as prize-an enemy ship or a neutral
ship aiding the enemy-the condemnation and transfer of title must
be recognized as valid. If the proposed international prize court found
that the condemnation by our courts was contrary to international
law, the prize court's judgment would be limited to a determination
of the damages which the court found that the losing party, the owner
of the ship or cargo condemned, had suffered by reason of being
deprived of his property due to a judgment of United States courts
which was contrary to international law.
Secretary of State Knox did not claim infallibility for our courts
and freely admitted that shortly after the Civil War, an international court whose jurisdiction had been agreed to by the United
States had found that some half a dozen decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States were contrary to international law and
that the owners of these ships and cargoes which had been seized and
condemned by the United States contrary to international law had
245. CHARLES,

TREATIES,

CONVENTIONS,

INTERNATIONAL

ACTS,

PROTOCOLS

AGREEI'ENTs BE WEEN TIE UN=TED STATES OF AmERICA AND OTIER POvERIS

(1910). Resolution of the Senate, Feb. 15, 1911.

AND

1776-1909
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been unjustly deprived of their property. Damages were assessed and
paid by the United States. Thus the reservation by the Senate meant
that no international court could declare a decision of the Supreme

Court of the United States to be null and void on the ground that
the court in reaching its decision had failed to observe the tenets of

the law of nations. The following direct quotation from the State
Department letter expressed the United States position as of that time.
Questions involved in the following cases upon which decisions had been
rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States were afterwards submitted to arbitration by the United States under the British-American Claims
Convention, sitting under article 12 of the treaty of Washington, dated May
8, 1871, for decision 'according to justice and equity.'
1. Questions which the international tribunal decided adversely to the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which international
decisions were obeyed by the United States: The Hiawatha, 2 Black, 635,
4 Moore's International Arbitrations, 3902; The Circassian, 2 Wallace, 135,
4 Moore, 3911; The Springbok, 5 Wallace, 1, 4 Moore, 3928; The Sir William
Peel, 5 Wallace, 517, 4 Moore, 3935; The Volant, 5 Wallace, 179, 4 Moore,
3950; The Science, 5 Wallace, 178, 4 Moore, 3950.
2. Questions in which the decisions of the international tribunal upheld
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Peterhoff, 5
Wallace, 28, 4 Moore's International Arbitrations, 3838; The Dashing Wave,
5 Wallace, 170, 4 Moore, 3948; The Georgia, 7 Wallace, 32, 4 Moore, 3957;
The Isabella Thompson, 3 Wallace, 155, 3 Moore, 3159; The Pearl, 5
Wallace, 574, 3 Moore, 3159; The Adela, 6 Wallace, 266, 3 Moore, 3159.
It is therefore evident that the demands of justice would be satisfied by
submitting the question involved to impartial international determination,
for although the controversy is based upon the decision of a national court
of justice, the judgment of the international tribunal while satisfying the
claimant and settling the principle of international law involved, would not
affect the validity of the national judgment within its jurisdiction. The
national decision would remain in full force so far as the nation is concerned, in that it is not reversed by an international tribunal; but the
international law properly applicable to the case would have been determined by an international tribunal, thus establishing for the community of
nations the con'ect principle of international law. (Emphasis added.)246

Although the prize court jurisdiction is admittedly a narrow one,
a wholly similar situation arises when a ship, a small boat, automobile,

or airplane is seized while allegedly engaged in smuggling, and is
forfeited on proof of the illegal activities carried on by it. Here, too,
is a transfer of title without compensation which is in accordance with
international law only if the allegations as to illegal activity are

indeed true.
246. [1910] FoaRFcm REL. U.S. 600 (1915), papers relating to the foreign relations
of the United States with the annual message of the President transmitted to Congress,
December 6, 1910, Circular Note of the Secretary of State in relation to Provisions of the
Proposed International Prize Court.
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Now the Congress of the United States should clarify the Sabbatino Amendment by answering the question: Did the Congress
in passing the Sabbatino Amendment intend to repudiate the position taken by the Senate in 1907 and overrule its resolution? There
is no international prize court. The well-meant efforts to establish
one failed, but the Sabbatino Amendment permits any court in the
United States to declare any act of state of another country, which
purports to transfer title, found to be contrary to international law, to
be null and void, and reciprocally every court of every other country
has precedent to assume this same privilege.
Did the Congress of the United States in passing the Sabbatino
Amendment desire to clothe every local court of every country with
the authority proposed for an international prize court in 1907? If
so, can the Congress justify a law which permits the courts of every
country to declare null and void a decision of the United States
Supreme Court if it is found to be contrary to international law, and
snatch back the condemned property wherever it can be found from
the one who, under the decision of our Supreme Court, had title?
Has the Congress the constitutional power to do such a thing?
Did Congress intend to create two different types of law, one for
seizures at sea (in war or peace) and another for seizures on land
in war (under The Hague Convention) or in peace (with no treaty)
under the Sabbatino Amendment? 247 In short, is the act of state doctrine still valid as to seizures at sea, though contrary to international
law, when approved by a prize court, and subject to an "exception"
for seizures contrary to international law on land unless governed
by treaty?
3. Has Congress by Passing the Sabbatino Amendment Granted the
Right and the Power to Cuba by its Local Courts to Declare the Act
Reducing Cuba's Sugar Quota to the United States to be Null and
Void?-This question was considered sufficiently important by two of
the lower courts in the Sabbatino case to be given consideration.
For example, the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which by the most recent decision of the Sabbatino case is now the ruling law of that case, stated:
The appellant seeks to justify retaliatory confiscation by the Cuban

government by asserting that the United States was the first offender against
international law by an attempt to coerce Cuba through the reduction of
American purchases of Cuban sugar. If the United States bad seized
Cuban assets in this country without compensating the owners, we might
find some merit in this contention, for then Cuba would be treating
247. See 376 U.S. at 428. See note 145 supra concerning the validity of transfer of
title to material requisitioned by a hostile army as subject to the Hague Convention.
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American nationals exactly as the United States was treating Cuban nationals.
Cf. Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 205 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). But, whether she was wise or unwise, fair or unfair,
in what she did, the United States did not breach a rule of international law
in deciding, for whatever reason she deemed sufficient, the sources from
which she would buy her sugar. 24

This is a most remarkable statement in the light of the Sabbatino
Amendment (passed after this opinion was given) which became the
basis of re-establishing this opinion overruled by the Supreme Court
of the United States. (i) If the action of the United States was "unfair"
to Cuba (as the court hypothetically admits it might have been) in
reducing the sugar quota of Cuba, then it was an act contrary to
international law. International law is a code of conduct to be adhered to by all countries in dealing with foreign countries and their
nationals. (ii) Here a United States court passed on the conformity
with international law of an act of the Congress of the United States
enacted at the request of the executive. If the court found the reduction of the sugar quota contrary to international law, the court
could have done nothing about it. In case of an issue, it would have
had to enforce the law in the United States whether or not the court
believed it to be contrary to international law. Therefore, the court
of appeals' decision was gratuitous since the court had no authority
to make a determination of this issue. (iii) Cuba denounced this law
as aggression. "Aggression" is contrary to international law. Would
a formal determination by Cuba that the reduction of the sugar quota
was contrary to international law render that law null and void? If so,
has Congress, by passing the Sabbatino Amendment, subjected the
United States to liability to Cuba for resulting national damage to
that state? It would seem logical to assume that, although the Sabbatino Amendment relates solely to transfers of property contrary to
international law, other countries could and would find other types
of national acts contrary to international law also to be null and void.
(iv) A United States court declared a United States act to be in
accordance with international law. That same United States court
held an act of a foreign country to be contrary to international law
and, therefore, null and void, though it was valid under the laws of
that country.
4. Has Congress by Passing the Sabbatino Amendment Repudiated
the Adherence of the United States to the United Nations?-The only
veto permitted in the United Nations is that of the Security Council.
But in passing the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress has permitted
every court sitting in the United States to declare an act of a foreign
248. 307 F.2d 845, 866.
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country affecting property of nationals of the United States to be null
and void if found contrary to international law. Congress claims it
has this right; it has claimed further that no nation can pass a law
which is not sanctioned by the United States as in accordance with
international law if it affects United States nationals. This would
seem a gross exaggeration of what Congress has done, or intended to
do, were it not that the court of appeals in the Sabbatino case itself
had said so. In justification of its action in declaring the law of a
foreign country null and void, ineffective within its own country, the
court stated: "Refusal by municipal courts of one sovereignty to sanction the action of a foreign state done contrary to the law of nations
will often be the only deterrent to such violations."2 49
The United Nations is based upon the independence and equality
of all of the nations which are members.
J. Canthe Congress Createa Rule of World Order or Can Such
Rules Be EstablishedOnly by Treaties or By International
OrganizationsBased on Treaties?
A peaceful, prosperous world order has been the utopia of which
men have dreamed for ages. To men of good will, this ideal has
meant a world in which nations were safe from armed aggression and
economic oppression from each other; where every citizen of every
country would have his freedoms protected and a sufficiency on which
to live in human dignity. A world order created by force has frequently been tried in the history of the world but has always failed;
it has never been able to maintain itself, and, still worse, its ideals
have been based upon national aggrandizement and exploitation.
Creating a world order by agreement has been a long, slow, frustrating process. But this is the method sponsored by our own Government from its beginnings. Chief Justice Marshall set down his views
of the world order of his day,
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented
to a relaxation, in practice, in cases under peculiar circumstances, of that
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers.25 0

Only the man without hope or vision would admit that there has been
no progession toward a proper world order. Our ideals in this respect
249. Id. at 868.
250. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 74, 85 (1812).
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have recently been well stated by a former United States Government

official:
Mankind is now divided by two competing concepts of world order-one
based on coercion-the other based on consent. Because of the kind of
society we are at home, because of the kind of order we seek abroad, we
cannot simply impose our views on other peoples. Our method of building
a world order is much more difficult than the Communist method, but it is
also much more durable. It is through free association with other nations
in bilateral, regional, and global diplomacy.251
To achieve a prosperous world, capital is necessary. The nations

which have capital, sometimes called the capital exporting nations,
are willing to share their capital with those nations which need it to

raise their standard of living to the level necessary for the maintenance of human dignity. But the terms on which the capital is offered
and the terms on which it is accepted must be both fair and enforceable. To this end, the United States has made treaties with

some fourteen foreign nations, each treaty containing a clause,

Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be taken
within the territories of the other Party except for public benefit, nor shall

it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full
equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision shall have been
made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and payment
252
thereof.

Congress, impatient with the slow march toward an acceptable world
order and without the consent of any foreign country, has imposed
at one stroke through the Sabbatino Amendment a restriction on the
sovereignty of every nation, and decreed that the courts of the United
States may impose sanctions against any other country which in the
opinion of those courts failed to maintain the standards set down by
the United States courts. The Congress has, without consent, and
yet without an affirmative use of force, thus attempted unilaterally
to create terms of a world order.
The world order has not progressed farther than a decentralized
structure of nation states bound together by bilateral and unilateral
treaties. On this, the constituent nations of the world order work out
their co-existence based upon reciprocity. In a recent speech, a wellknown authority on international law has said:
Reciprocity is the most important sanction of an international law of
co-existence based on a decentralized structure of nation states. Except for
251. Gardner, Pursuit of World Order, quoted in 52 A.B.A.J. 529 (1966).
252. Treaty of the United States with Kingdom of Greece, art. VII(3) (signed Aug.
3, 1951, ratified July 21, 1953), T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
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the very limited authority of the United Nations with regard to control
over the use of force, and leaving aside the recently qualified theory of
Kelsen that war and reprisals used by states are sanctions of international
law used in behalf of the international community, reciprocity is the principal
guarantor of respect for the territorial and jurisdictional aspects of national
sovereignty.253

In passing the Sabbatino Amendment, the Congress of the United
States has repudiated reciprocity as the principal force in world order.
Can such a law have the effect desired by Congress upon world order?
Has Congress alone the power to attempt such a result?
V. A BEaTER WAY To ACCOMPLISH

=rE DESIRED lESULTS

A. Assumptions Reviewed
The Sabbatino Amendment is an expression of United States foreign
policy. It is a concrete effort by Congress to protect United States
foreign investment from confiscation-an act of state contrary to
international law. Congress believed that if all foreign countries
wherein United States nationals had investments were warned in
advance that those countries could not market in the United States
property confiscated from United States nationals, confiscation of

property of United States nationals would be less likely to occur.
The method to enforce this foreign policy of the United States
under the Sabbatino Amendment is that any confiscated property
imported into the United States will still be deemed to be the property, not of the confiscating government, but of the one who was
owner prior to confiscation. An act of confiscation in a foreign country would, by decision of a court in the United States, have no
validity to transfer the title in the land of the confiscator.
The weakness of the scheme is that its enforcement is left to the
victimized United States nationals whose property has been seized
abroad. This property might or might not be imported into the
United States. Yet, the only method of enforcement is if a victim of
confiscation by a foreign country can find this property in the United
States, he can commence an action in the nature of a replevin. In
such an action, he would claim title and right to possession, and
prove by acceptable legal proof, his title prior to the confiscating
act; only then can a court find the transfer of title abroad invalid
and restore the property or its proceeds to him. Thus the confiscating
government or one claiming title by the confiscation is prevented from
selling the confiscated goods in the United States.
253. Friedmann, The Relevance of International Law to the Processes of Economic
and Social Development, in 1966 PRocEED NGs, Am[. Soc'Y INT. L. 11.
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B. The Purpose of the Sabbatino Amendment
The Sabbatino Amendment was intended by the Congress to act
as an embargo. That this was the intention is summed up dramatically
in the slogan often quoted by its adherents, "The United States shall
not become a thieves' market." But if an embargo was intended, this
hit-or-miss scheme of invoking the Sabbatino Amendment is not an
effective method of enforcing an embargo. Obviously the way to
prevent importation of any goods into the United States is a national
prohibition against the importation of the goods. This the Sabbatino
Amendment does not do; it does not prohibit the importation of any
goods into the United States whatsoever. The Sabbatino Amendment
is not a criminal statute. It authorizes the imposition of no penalties.
If Congress wishes to continue, as a national policy, a warning to
potential confiscators that they cannot sell in the United States property confiscated from United States nationals, the Sabbatino Amendment must be replaced by a strict, well-defined embargo. Anything
short of a national prohibition, properly defined as to the type of
trade to be prevented, with criminal penalties for violation, lacks
the support of the United States Government itself and can only be
inefficient in accomplishment and costly to the very persons it was intended to help.
1. Means to Attain the End.-(a). Definition of "Property" in Effectuating CongressionalPurpose.-Now one must consider what property must be excluded from the United States market. The only
words in the Sabbatino Amendment which can be used as a definition
of property to be excluded is the reference to goods the title to which
is "... based upon ... a confiscation or other taking ... by an act4
of that state in violation of the principles of international law."21
This definition is not sufficient; in some instances it is far too broad
and in others far too narrow.
(1). "A Confiscation or Other Taking" of Property, Considered As
Too Broad a Definition.-Confiscated goods, under the Sabbatino
Amendment, are to be excluded, but no provision is made to limit
the operation of the statute to those confiscated goods which before
confiscation belonged to a national of the United States. Any foreign
corporation, not a national of the confiscating country, which can
bring an action in replevin in the United States can invoke the Sabbatino Amendment. If the goods which this foreign corporation claims
as its property were seized by a foreign country in a manner contrary to international law, and the complaining corporation was not
254. Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, as amended in 1965. See
App. I, p. 541 infra.
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a national of the confiscating government, and can prove its claim
as to prior ownership of the goods, United States courts, under the
Sabbatino Amendment, shall not "....

decline on the ground of the

federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
S. . ,,Z5 thereby determining the foreign corporation is still the
owner. Thus the foreign policy of the United States, in the warning to nations not to confiscate anyone's property who is not a national
of the confiscating country itself.
Current newspaper articles have indicated the possibility of foreign corporations causing the United States to enforce an embargo
against a foreign country which may have made no offense against
the property rights of United States nationals.
Union Miniere du Haut Katanga threatened legal action against purchasers
of products from a provisional Congolese operating mineral company. Union
Miniere issued the warning in response to seizure of its assets and properties
256

in the Congo by the government of the African state on New Years Day.

It is not necessary to show that Miniere in fact had any outstand-

ing contracts with United States nationals or that United States
nationals have bought, or will desire to buy, Katanga copper. This
controversy between a Belgian company and the sovereign state of
Katanga is here used only as an illustration of what may happen.
We may suppose that, in this situation, or any similar situation which
may at any time arise, a foreign corporation-as in our hypothesis
the Belgian company Miniere-finds Katanga copper in the United
States and commences an action in replevin to recover it. If the
copper found here had already been paid for, a successful suit would
cause the United States purchaser to pay twice for the copper or go
without that copper. After commencement of such a suit, no copper
from Katanga would be brought into the United States-that is what
the Sabbatino Amendment intends-and the United States could not
alleviate its present existing shortage of copper from that source.
In the past, various foreign corporations have sought to induce
countries, other than the ones of which they were nationals, to institute
just such an embargo, in the same manner contemplated by the
Sabbatino Amendment. Nationals of one foreign country have urged
other foreign countries to close their markets to property confiscated
from them by a third country. No country has ever instituted an
embargo against a foreign country at the request of a foreign corporation. Illustrations of unsuccessful attempts to accomplish such a result
are found in the cases cited to Congress when it was considering the
255. ibid.
256. Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1967, p. 4, col. 2.
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Sabbatino Amendment. (a) The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company asked
the courts of both Italy and Japan to declare confiscation by Iran of
the oil fields and installations nationalized from that company, an act
of state contrary to international law and, therefore, to be null and
void and, by so declaring, to create an embargo against Iranian oil.
Both Italy and Japan refused to do so. (b) Various companies whose
oil wells were seized by Mexico requested both the Netherlands and
Belgium to create this same Sabbatino-type embargo against Mexican
oil. Both countries refused. (c) Dutch Indonesian tobacco growers
asked the courts of Germany to do the same but Germany also
refused. Now, under the Sabbatino Amendment, United States courts
must comply.2 57 The United States is to treat confiscation by foreign
countries of corporations, not nationals of the United States, in the
same manner that they would treat confiscation of property invested
abroad by United States nationals.
Of course the President, under the Sabbatino Amendment, can
direct United States courts in any suit which might be begun by
Miniere, or other foreign corporation similarly situated, to recognize
the transfer of title of the copper from Miniere to the State of
Katanga, and thus create no embargo against the trade in copper
between the United States and Katanga.2- 8 But here the foreign company has been permitted to embarrass the executive department in
its conduct of foreign relations, for the President must weigh the
domestic needs for copper against the diplomatic offense to other
countries and, perhaps in the interests of United States nationals,
appear to condone the confiscatory act of a foreign sovereign state. The
United States Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case foresaw this
difficulty. "Often the State Department will wish to refrain from
taking an official position, particularly at a moment that would be
dictated by the development of private litigation but might be inopportune diplomatically." 219
At about the same time that the daily news carried the information
of the controversy between the State of Katanga and the Belgian
corporation, the same newspapers informed the United States public
that the United States had instituted a boycott or embargo against
trade with Rhodesia.2 60 Whether the latter is a wise or unwise
United States policy is a controversial question, but at least one can
notice the difference in the manner in which the national policy of the
United States is invoked. Here the United States instituted a national
257. For discussions of the instances designated herein as (a), (b), and (c), see
Part III, p. 461 supra.
258. See App. I, p. 541 infra.

259. 376 U.S. at 436.
260. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1967, p. 1, col. 8.
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policy at the request, and on the recommendation, of the United
Nations-an organization set up by multilateral treaty for mutual
national interest-and thus the policy represents an action261taken by
treaty under the auspices of an international organization.
The United States had also established as its foreign policy, under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, a complete embargo on trade
between the United States and Cuba, China, North Korea and North
Vietnam. Confiscation of the property of United States nationals is a
serious contention between the United States and Cuba and also, but
to somewhat a lesser extent, between the United States and China.
The problem only arises incidentally, however, in the other two
countries. However, the United States has been singularly unsuccessful in persuading other nations, though they be members of the
United Nations, to adopt a similar national policy in regard to trade
with these countries.
Comparing and contrasting United States experience with national
embargoes and considering the possibilities for the future, it is suggested that any embargo law replacing the Sabbatino Amendment be
confined, in the first instance, to situations in which nationals of the
United States have been wronged; embargoes against countries which
have done no specific wrong to property rights of United States
nationals should be left to the Executive, as before the Sabbatino
Amendment, and2 to obligations assumed under unilateral and multi26
lateral treaties.

It would seem to be good national policy for the United States, or
for any other independent nation, to interrupt its own economic life
by a boycott, an act of cold war, only when its own duly-appointed
representatives have determined that such an action is in the national
interest. The national interest can be the narrow one within the
confines of the country itself or the broader one as a member of an
international organization. National policy of the United States,
however, should not be dictated by a foreign corporation.
(2). A Confiscation or Other Taking of PropertyConsidered as Too
Narrow a Definition.-But on the other hand, in many situations we
cannot limit our prohibitions against importations merely to those
confiscated goods which formerly have been the property of nationals
of the United States. There are several reasons for this, and the
confiscatory decrees in Cuba illustrate them. The two great exportable
261. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 619 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §
287 (1965). See U.N. CGARmrJ art. 41.
262. The United States and Indonesia have recently entered into an agreement,
similar to those already made with a number of other countries, to insure United
States investors that any investments in Indonesia will not be subject to confiscation. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1967, p. 35, col. 2.
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products of Cuba were tobacco and sugar. Much of the tobacco industry was in the hands of Cubans as was also a substantial amount of
the sugar industry. The federal courts have recently held that sale
in the United States of tobacco products which Cuba confiscated from
Cubans did not entail a breach of international law.2 3 Here the
validity of the act of state in Cuba was recognized. This trade was
ended only by the embargo imposed under the Trading With the
Enemy Act. Except for this act, tobacco and sugar confiscated from
any Cuban could now be brought into this country. Permitting
some trade, perhaps even considerable trade, is not the way to
impose an effective embargo. The whole idea is to affect Cuban
industry so adversely that Cuba will pay for the confiscated properties,
or, perhaps still better, would not have confiscated them in the first
place if it could have foreseen that the result would have been
complete cessation of trade with the United States.
(3). Conclusion as to Definition.-If we wish to use prohibition of
trade with a foreign country as United States policy, the embargo
(1) should be invoked only if United States interests are affected and
(2) when this happens, the embargo should be complete as to trade
with the offending country subject, however, to certain exceptions.
2. Exceptions.-The Sabbatino Amendment has only one exceptionthat it shall not be applicable
... in any case with respect to which the President determines that application of the Act of State Doctrine is required in that particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and a 264
suggestion to this effect

is filed on his behalf in that case with the courts.
But what if this sudden cutting off of foreign supplies to the
United States causes loss and damage to American buyers and to
manufacturers and producers who are dependent upon property from
that source of supply and have been the buyers from those very
United States nationals whose foreign investment has been confiscated? Suddenly the merchandise from that source may be em263. F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
264. One other exception may be termed an interim provision that the Sabbatino
Amendment shall not apply ".

.

. to a claim of title or other right acquired pursuant

to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good
faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking .... " 78 Stat. 1013 (1964),
as amended, 79 Stat. 658-59 (1965), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2). Note also that the Congress interpreted the Amendment of 1965 to make it clear "'that the law does not
prevent banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions from using the
act of state doctrine as a defense to multiple liability upon any contract or deposit or
insurance policy in any case where such liability has been taken over or expropriated
by a foreign state,"' Conference Rep. on Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, H.R. 7750,
H. R. REP. 811, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965). For full amendment, see App. I,
p. 541 infra.
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bargoed. Should there not be some protection for the domestic
interests of the United States? At the time of the confiscation in
Cuba, Farr, Whitlock & Company made a contract to buy the confiscated sugar to supply its own customers when C.A.V. was unable
to fulfill its contracts. It is respectfully suggested that the Sabbatino
Amendment is seriously defective in not granting any method of
protection to United States purchasers, and to those relying on them,
when confiscation deprives them of their expected supplies, and an
exception to protect this domestic economy should be written into
any new law on the subject.
3. Embargo and Return of Property to the Despoiled Foreign Investor.-One feature which seems to have caught the imagination
of the public is that C.A.V., the despoiled foreign investor under the
Sabbatino decision of the lower courts, and then under the Sabbatino
Amendment, was granted the proceeds of the property which emotionally was "its" property. The feeling is natural; the property had been,
and still should be, its property; it seemed a sort of natural justice
that C.A.V. have possession or be awarded the purchase price of that
one shipload of sugar.
In an embargo this result can easily be obtained. If any goods are
found in the United States, brought there against the prohibition of
the embargo, these goods are smuggled goods or contraband. Any
court may condemn and declare them forfeit to the United States.
With title to these goods in the United States, a provision of our
embargo law could provide that if any United States national could
prove he or it was the owner of the goods prior to nationalization, a
type of proof now required by the Sabbatino Amendment, the property
could be awarded to him. The difference here would be that the
embargo itself would be imposed as a policy of the United States
and the goods would belong to the United States at the time of the
return. If so desired, we could extend this same right to foreigners
who could provide similar proof.
Of course, to give to a former owner "its" property, which had
entered the United States illegally, creates a preference.265 In the
Sabbatino case itself, C.A.V. seeks to be paid 100% of the sale price
for the shipload of sugar taken by Cuba. No other United States
nationals who were investors in Cuba have thus far received anything. C.A.V. would share the money it receives with no one. The
award, however, to C.A.V. of the purchase price of that shipload of
265. Note comment by the Attorney General concerning proportionate sharing of
funds for compensation by all who have suffered from nationalization. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1236.
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sugar, as determined by the two lower courts in Sabbatino, had
popular approval, and so if awarding a return of confiscated property
or its proceeds is a preference, as it clearly appears to be in such an
instance, this would be considered "just."
C. Would Such an Embargo Be a New Law?

When provisions of a new law are considered to make the purposes
of the Sabbatino Amendment effective, it will be found that such a
law differs but in few aspects from the powers which can be exercised
by the United States Government now under the Trading With the
Enemy Act and have been exercised against Cuba. The one most
significant difference lies in the obvious intention of the Congress in
the Sabbatino Amendment that United States markets should be
immediately closed to the sale of confiscated goods if any of these
have been confiscated from our nationals.
At the time of the enactment of the Sabbatino Amendment, Congress knew that an embargo had been created against Cuba under the
Trading With the Enemy Act.266 But certain of the Congressmen

expressed their displeasure that so long a time had passed between
the confiscations by Cuba and the imposition of an embargo under
the Trading With the Enemy Act by the Executive. In spite of their
knowledge that no trade then existed with Cuba, rather than modify
the Trading With the Enemy Act to include other features such as
the return of smuggled property to the wronged United States national, Congress wished an entirely new act, which would take effect
without exercise of the Executive's discretion.
Thus, in any new law creating an embargo against trade with a
country which has failed to heed the warning of the results of
confiscation of property of United States nationals, the law must
establish a method by which it is "triggered" and the embargo
becomes effective. Perhaps the State Department might be entrusted
with the duty of announcing an embargo had been placed in effect
as soon as convinced that a foreign country had confiscated foreign
investments of United States nationals. Perhaps it would be best
for Congress itself to retain this privilege and provide that the law
could be placed in effect only by joint resolution or, if Congress were
not in session, by the joint action of certain Congressional committees,
or perhaps by either method.
266. The Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 411 (1917),
as amended, 50 U.S.C., App. § 1 (1965). As to embargo against Cuba, China, North
Korea, and North Vietnam, see Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pts. 500,
505, 515 (1966).
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D. Conclusion
A law to accomplish, more efficiently than the Sabbatino Amendment, what Congress wished to accomplish would be an embargo
which (a) is not international law and does not impinge on international law-it is purely domestic law; (b) would be strictly within
the powers of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution; (c) would contain within itself the definitions of "confiscation"
or "acts in contravention of international law" and determine what
disposition should be made of property seized because brought into
the United States against the prohibition; (d) would not impinge
upon the sovereignty of any nation nor require any court to make
exceptions to the act of state doctrine, a tenet of sovereignty; (e)
would raise few, if any, constitutional questions; (f) would not
interfere with the prerogatives of the State Department in bargaining with any nation for compensation of United States nationals
whose property that country had confiscated; (g) would not attempt
to limit the sovereignty of the United States or of any country in
the world since it would operate within the confines of the United
States; and (h) would not be inconsistent with the laws and governing principles of all the great independent trading nations.
If we institute a law more effective than the present one to warn
potential confiscators that the United States will not become a thieves'
market, we may provide for the future, but we have not solved our
present problem. How may compensation be secured to reimburse
those United States nationals whose property Cuba confiscated? Not
under the Sabbatino Amendment, for the courts will have no more
confiscated property or proceeds from such property to award. Not
by private suit against Cuba by the injured party for confiscation of
his property in Cuba, for our courts have no jurisdiction over a
sovereign state for such a claim.2 67 Not by a seizure of Cuban Government property in the United States for distribution to the wronged
United States nationals, for there is not in this country enough Cuban
Government property to pay a fraction of a per cent of the amount
Cuba owes. 268 If any substantial payment is to be made to United
267. In the Sabbatino case, the Government of Cuba commenced suit by an agent
in a United States court and thus subjected itself as litigant to the jurisdiction of the
court. Discussion of possible defenses and counterclaims in such a situation is not
mentioned in this article. For reference to permissable counterclaims against a sovereign
government, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964).
Cf. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 354 (1955).
268. "The Cuban Government total of $19.6 million includes realizable assets of
some $14.6 million, but $12.3 is subject to counterclaims of New York banks. .. .
Testimony of C. D'Andelot Belin, Esq., General Counsel, Treasury Department, on
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States nationals who invested in Cuba, it will be collected through
diplomatic channels. There is no other peaceful way.
APPENnix I

The following is a copy of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
as amended in 1965.
This amendment is variously known as the "Hickenlooper Amendment," the
"Sabbatino Amendment" and the "Rule of Law Amendment." 78 Stat. 1013 (1964);
as amended, Sept. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 658-59 (1965), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in
which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced
through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of
compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That
this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a
foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of
title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit
of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the
confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President
determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular
case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this
effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
APPENDIX II

Summary and Digest of All Foreign Cases Presented to the Congress in
Support of Sabbatino Amendment
In this Appendix, a summary of the facts and digest of the decision is given, by
country, for each foreign case presented to the Congress during its deliberations on
the Sabbatino Amendment. These cases were presented in three separate documents,
with considerable overlapping of the cases. The documents are listed below, each
followed by an identifying abbreviation, which will be used in the review of each
case to show in what document or documents it appeared. Some cases appeared
in all three.
1. Copy of foreign cases listed in dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, 376
U.S. 398, 439 (1964), submitted with letter by witness before the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, identified as Dis. Op. Hearings
on H.R. 7750 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1047-48 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7750 Hearings] (testimony of
Myers S. McDougal).
2. (a) Memorandum submitted in the Senate in 1964 by Senator Bourke B.
Hickenlooper, who asked permission to print it in the Congressional Record, along
with other material, including Mr. Justice Whites dissenting opinion, 110 CONG.
REc. 18935, 18944 (1964).
(b) Identical memorandum submitted by a witness before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in the hearings held in 1965.
H.R. 7750 Hearings 594-96 (testimony of Cecil J. Olmstead).
H.R. 10327, before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Aug. 4, 1964.
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Since (a) and (b) are identical, both are identified as CONG. MEMo.
3. Report of the Committee on International Law of The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York containing recommendations for the passage of
the Sabbatino Amendment, filed with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, identified as BAR Coiai. REcono oF N.Y.C.B.A. 294309 (1965). See also H.R. 7750 Hearings 1315-25.
Many of the cases cited in the three documents above noted were also cited in
the three decisions in the Sabbatino case, including the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice White. All foreign cases relating to the act of state doctrine cited by any
of the courts in the Sabbatino case were digested extensively in Reeves, The Act of
State-Foreign Decisions Cited in the Sabbatino Case: A Rebuttal and Memorandum
of Law, 33 FoUHAm L. REv. 599 (1965) [hereinafter cited as FORDHAm].
AusTRrA
In re Rhein-Main-Donau Ag., Const. Ct., Aus., June 24, 1954, [1954] Int'l L. Rep.
212. BAR CoMzi. A certain power station in Austria, two-thirds owned by the German
Reich and one-third owned by the "Land of Bavari?' was taken over by the Soviet
Army of Occupation and certain land and buildings were transferred later to the
Austrian Ministry of Transport. Austria subsequently nationalized the installations.
Certain persons were designated by the Austrian courts as trustees of the owners
and on behalf of the German Reich as part owner took action against Austria.
They contended that the law providing for the nationalization of properties which
included this power station was a violation of international law in that it failed
to provide for adequate compensation and consequently, as the Austrian Constitution
recognized the rules of international law to form an integral part of the Austrian
federal law, that the court should declare this nationalization invalid as unconstitutional. The action was brought in the court of the country alleged to have confiscated
the property. The court rejected both arguments.
Although admitting that confiscation without compensation is contrary to international law, the court held: 1. There was no violation of international law, since the
nationalization law promised future compensation. A future law would deal with
the amount and mode of payment. 2. Even if the nationalization law had been found
to be in conflict with the rules of international law this would not have resulted in its
unconstitutionality, and, therefore, the court could not declare the act to be null and
void. Title had been validly transferred by the nationalization of the station.
NOTE: Normal rule as to international claims is that local remedies must be exhausted (or proof presented that there is no local relief) before an international claim
can arise. This action must be considered as an effort to exhaust local remedies.
Here the local court gave no relief, holding that the action of the government was
not violative of international law. An Austrian court refused to declare an Austrian
law to be null and void.
Koh-I-Noor, L. & C. Hardtmuth v. Koh-I-Noor Tuzkarna L. & C. Hardtmuth, Sup. Ct.,
Aus., June 2, 1958, [1958-1I] Int'l L. Rep. 40. BAR Commlr. Hardtmuth was a
partnership doing business in Czechoslovakia. It made pencils under the name "KohI-Noor" and distributed them widely. This Czechoslovakian partnership was the owner
of certain trademarks which were registered in Austria. It was nationilized. Certain
of the partners had left Czechoslovakia and had established a French limited company
to carry on the business in Austria which bad previously been carried on by the
Czechoslovakian partnership. The partners who had come to France asked for a
declaratory judgment of the Austrian court that the nationalized Czechoslovakian company was not the lawful owner of the enterprise in Austria nor entitled to be regarded as the owner of the trademarks registered in Austria by the original Czechoslovalian partnership. The defendants, on the other hand, speaking for the nationalized
company, contended that Austria should recognize them as the successor of the partnership and should also recognize that they were the owners of the trademarks registered
in Austria. The court held against the representatives of the nationalized company
on the ground that the nationalization of Hardtmuth in Czecholovakia and the con-
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fiscation of the partners' shares in the firm could not have any legal effect in Austria
or affect property in Austria. The partners who had moved to France and set up a
company were regarded as the true owners of the enterprise entitled to claim the
trademarks registered in Austria.
Here a foreign court refused to enforce extraterritorially a confiscation decree on
property outside the domain of the confiscating country. This action is in accord with
the act of state doctrine.
Danuvia Feinmechanische und Werkzeugfabrik Nationalunternehmen v. Seiberth, Sup.
Ct., Aus., Feb. 3, 1954, [1954] Int'l L. Rep. 38. BAR Comm. Under Hungarian
law a certain Humgarian company manufacturing machinery had been nationalized.
Prior to the decree of nationalization and the transfer of the assets of the company
to the nationalized enterprise, that Hungarian company had sent certain machinery
to the defendant in Austria. The nationalized company in this case claimed that
machinery as successors in title to the Hungarian company. The court held that
the Hungarian decree was confiscatory and was, therefore, ineffective to transfer any
title to property outside of Hungary. The assets in Austria still belonged to the
company as it existed before nationalization. Therefore, anyone who held property
of that company in Austria held it for the company or creditors of the company as
it was before nationalization.
This again is a case of extraterritoriality. Even in the very cryptic statement contained in the document presented to Congress by the Committee of the Bar Association it was clear that the decision in the case was not a repudiation of, or an
exception to, the act of state doctrine. This case was characterized as "holding
confiscatory Hungarian nationalization of a Hungarian firm did not affect property
located in Austria."
Lederer-Ponzer v. Rautenstrauch, Sup. Ct., Aus., May 31, 1951, [1951] Int'l L. Rep.
204 (No. 47). BA Com-xr. The defendant in this case did business in Vienna and
bought goods from a partnership carrying on business in Czechoslovakia. The defendant had not paid for these goods when the business of the partnership from
which he had purchased the goods was confiscated by the Czechoslovakian authorities.
This partnership (not the nationalized company but its predecessor) assigned its claim
to the plaintiff for its unpaid purchase price for the goods received by defendant
before the seller had been nationalized. The assignee sued in the Austrian court to
collect the purchase price. The court held that the confiscation of the Czechoslovaldan
partnership affected only the assets of that partnership within the confiscating state.
The debt due and collectible in Austria was not an asset subject to the confiscation
decree in Czechoslovakia.
Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, Sup. Ct., Aus., May 10, 1950, [1950] Ann. Dig.
155. CONG. MEMO; BA CoMm. The firm of Georg Dralle manufactured cosmetics
in Hamburg, Germany. A branch of this firm had been established in Bohemia,
which later became a part of Czechoslovakia. The branch office was the registered
owner, by consent of the head office in Hamburg, of certain trademarks registered in
Austria. The branch office was nationalized in Czechoslovakia and the nationalized firm
then laid claim to the trademarks in Austria, owned by its predecessor. The court
held that the Czechoslovak nationalization decree, although valid in the territory of
Czechoslovakia, had no extraterritorial effect, and that, accordingly, the respondents
were not entitled to use, in the territory of the Austrian Republic, trademarks owned
by their predecessors in title. The nationalized firm, therefore, was enjoined from
using the trademarks in Austria.
Summary as to Austria: There were five Austrian cases cited, one of which was
brought by a foreigner in the courts of Austria claiming damages from Austria by
reason of a confiscation. The court held there was no violation of international law
involved, or, even if there was such a violation such seizures were not contrary to
the constitution. For similar decisions in the United States, see Sardino v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). and
Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
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(1960). The remaining four cases were extraterritorial cases holding only that a
"confiscatory decree" of one country has effect only on assets within the confiscating
country and within the control of that country.
Conclusion as to Austria: No cited cases show any exception to the act of state
doctrine.
BELGrum

Deville v. Servais, Ct. App., Liege, Oct. 19, 1945, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 448 (Bel.)
CoNG. MEm~o; BAR Comm. This case does not involve an act of state. The German
occupying authorities in Belgium had caused to be made what they called a compulsory "sale" of a certain lorry to the occupation authorities. The defendant in this
case purchased the lorry from the German authorities at an inadequate price. The
original owner claimed the lorry, which was awarded to him. The alleged "sale"
.was held to be not valid.
The Bar Association Committee which cited this case on page 308 in the Appendix
of its report states as a recommendation: "The statute [Sabbatino Amendment] might
be amended to read 'recognized foreign state . .

.'

since the Act of State Doctrine has

been invoked only as to acts of recognized foreign states." The German occupation
authority was not a recognized state. It, therefore, by definition was incapable of
committing an act of state. A further reason why this case is irrelevant appears in the
case itself, the court stating:
The transaction cannot, moreover, be looked upon as a requisition of means of
transport since, in the first place, it lacks the form of a requisition and, further, it
contravenes the rules laid down in Articles 52 and 53 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention [No. IV] ....
In short, any transfer of property from a resident of an occupied country to an occupying hostile military authority is not valid unless it conforms to the rules of the
Hague Convention on the rules of warfare. The rule is a multilateral convention which is
signed by 103 nations of the world, including the United States. The Supreme Court
of the United States had indicated in the Sabbatino case that its opinion as to "validity"
would not apply in a case which was covered by a treaty (as is this case).
"Propetrol," "Petroservice," et "Petrolest" v. Compania Mexicana de Petroleo and
Tankage and Transport, Civ. Trib., Antwerp, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig 2Z5 (No. 11) (Bel.
1939). BAR Comm.; FommMa
653. This case was cited to courts and to Congress in
the Sabbatino matter with the designation "But see," indicating that it complied with
the act of state doctrine. This case involves shipments of Mexican oil by the Mexican
nationally-created corporation which dealt in the oil confiscated in Mexico. The quotation below is from the case as reported in the Annual Digest:
In the case of 'Propetrol,' 'Petroservice' and 'Petrolest' v. Compania Mexicano de
Petroleo and Tankage and Transport, the Civil Tribunal of Antwerp held . . . that
a decree of the Mexican government expropriating without compensation installations, etc., belonging to foreign oil companies in Mexico, could not be questioned
in a Belgian court on the ground that it violated the principles of Belgian public
order. An application to allow the seizure of oil cargoes exported from Mexico
which had been confiscated in this manner and were lying in port at Antwerp
was rejected.
Summary as to Belgium: Two cases cited, one does not involve an act of state and
is otherwise wholly irrelevant. The other case supports the act of state doctrine.
Conclusion as to Belgium: Belgium recognizes no exception to the act of state doctrine.
BnrriSH TEnrronrEs

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaifrate (The Rose Mary), Sup. Ct., Aden, Jan. 9, 1953, [1953]
1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316. Dis. OF.; CONG. MEMO; BAn Cowr.;
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ForDnAm 621. For nearly twenty years the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, predominantly
a British business concern, had under a concession agreement extracted and refined
oil within the area of Iran. In 1952, the concession was "nationalized" and the government undertook to carry on this business and sell the oil for its own account. This
case relates to one shipload of oil purchased from the Iranian Government and loaded
in Iran for a voyage to Bari, Italy. After receiving conflicting instructions from
owner and charterer of the ship, the captain finally obeyed the order to break his
voyage and put into the Port of Aden, a British colony in the British Protectorate of
Aden. There the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, under process of law, seized the oil
on the ship, claiming title, i.e., that the confiscation of the oil concessions in Iran
did not transfer title of the extracted and refined oil to the Iranian Government, because the confiscation was contrary to international law. In this one case, of all those
relating to confiscatory acts of state which are admitted to be a breach of international
law, the court agreed with the claimants and made an exception to the act of state
doctrine, holding that the oil still was the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com'pany. This was the same type of exception to the act of state doctrine made in
the original Sabbatino case and now codified under the Hickenlooper Amendment.
This case in Aden was never appealed.
The Attorney General of the United States, in testifying against the Sabbatino
Amendment before the Committee of the House admitted that the case was decided
as an "exception to the act of state doctrine," but pointed out that it was, nevertheless,
a very doubtful authority because it was based upon an English case which a higher
English court in a later and different case had criticized. The statement by the Attorney
General is as follows:
The court held that the former owners were entitled to the oil which had remained
their property and to which the Government of Iran had acquired no title. The
court distinguished prior English cases applying the act of state doctrine on the
ground that the property here was that of a British corporation, whereas in the
earlier cases the property belonged to subjects of the state which had confiscated it.
In reaching this conclusion, the Aden court also relied on a series of continental decisions. Subsequent decisions in England, however, have criticized the result in
The Rose Mary and have disagreed with the Aden court's rationalization of English
precedents. See In re Helbert Wagg & Co. (1956) ch. 323, (1956) 2 W.L.R. 183,
H.R. 7750 Hearings 1257-58.
More detailed examination of the decision in Aden shows citation of several other
English cases on which the judge relied, and which were also misinterpreted. Two of
these were also presented to the Congress: Wolff v. Oxholm and In re Fried Krupp
A.G. (for analyses see pp. 562-63 infra. The court also misapplied two French
cases: Soci6t6 Potasas lbericas v. Bloch; Union des Rdpubliques Socialistes Sovi~tiques
v. Itendant G~n~ral Bourgeois 6s Qualit6 et Soci6tg La Ropit (for analysis of each case
see pp. 551, 554 infra.
For further reasons why this case, The Rose Mary case-the only one cited holding
an exception to the act of state doctrine-is not significant authority, see p. 468 supra.
N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Comm'n, Ct. App.,
Singapore, April 13, 1956, [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810. Dis. Op.; CONG. MEmo; BaR
Cozmr.; FonnHA- 652. This case does not involve an act of state. The seizure of
oil was made by the Japanese military authorities during the time when they temporarily
held control of the area of certain oil wells. This case is irrelevant because (a) Japan,
as a hostile military power, cannot be considered as a de facto or de jure government
in the area dominated by armed forces (The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York has itself said only a recognized state can commit an act of state.) and
(b) military actions are governed by treaty. Concerning this case the Attorney General
of the United States testified before Congress as follows:
The second 'English' case cited by Mr. Justice White is N.V. de Bataafsche
Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Comar'n (Singapore Ct. App. (1956)
Int'l L. Rep. 810). This case is inapposite to a discussion of the act state doctrine,
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for no act of state was involved. The Japanese forces, while occupying the Dutch
East Indies in World War II, had exploited some private oil concessions and
some of the oil was traced to storage tanks in Singapore. The private owners of
the concessions prevailed over the claim of the local government who desired to
seize the oil as enemy-owned. At no time had the Dutch Government, the local
government of Singapore, or the British Government recognized Japan either de
facto or de jure as the government of the invaded area where the oil wells were.
H.R. 7750 Hearings1258.
Summary as to British Territories: Two cases only were cited: The Rose Mary case,
in which a British judge sitting in a court of the Protectorate of Aden held that the
confiscation by Iran of the property of an English company, Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, was invalid because the act was contrary to international law. The other
case did not involve an act of state at all but was an act of war governed by the
Hague Convention.
Conclusion as to British Territories: A British court in a territory in an unappealed
decision found that an act of state contrary to international law was invalid. This is
contrary to all other British authority. The other case is irrelevant to a discussion of
the act of state doctrine.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GElmANY

Confiscation of German Property in Czechoslovakia Case, Fed. Sup. Ct., June 29, 1953,
[1953] Int'l L. Rep. 31 (Fed. Rep. Ger.). CONG. MFmO.; BAu Co,-L'r. Both the
plaintiff and defendant in this case were "Sudeten Germans," domiciled in Czechoslovakia during the Second World War. In 1945, and while the plaintiff was a
prisoner of war, the defendant moved into a flat of which the prisoner-plaintiff was
still legally the tenant and in which there was some of his furniture. When leaving
for Germany the defendant took with him certain of this property which he alleged
had been given to him by the Czechoslovakian authorities as reward for his services
as a "recognized anti-Fascist." Before the German court, the former prisoner of war
claimed his right to the articles on the ground that it was against the ordre public of
Germany to recognize the confiscation. Here it must be remembered that when
Germany surrendered, it agreed that as part of reparations the Allies might take all
external German assets. This was also the law in the United States. The Allied High
Commission, to protect all persons who received German external assets, in 1951 passed
a certain law known as Law No. 63 which deprived all German courts of the privilege
of determining title to "external German assets" which later came into Germany. The
court returned the case to the lower court for a determination of whether or not these
assets were governed by the lex rei sitae, admitting in its statement that external
assets of Germany were taken "for the purpose of satisfying claims against Germany"
and that Czechoslovakia was a foreign state within the meaning of Law No. 63, and
the property here was owned by Germans in Czechoslovakia. In the decision of the
case the court further admitted: "The purpose which Law No. 63 is designed to serve
quite distinctly favours an interpretation that the property of Sudeten Germans shall
be considered 'German property." And further stated: "It follows that the question
as to what constitutes German property must be determined in accordance with the
legislation of the individual enemy countries carrying out such liquidations."
The only question here was whether or not the defendant had acquired the property pursuant to these laws. In short, the court was required to hold that if the
Czechoslovakian authorities had seized the property under Czechoslovakian law as
reparations, the courts of Germany must recognize the title. This is in accordance
with the act of state doctrine. The only other possibility would be that Czechoslovakia
had never, as the plaintiff contended, seized the property and given it to defendant. The
court ended its opinion by saying: ". . . having regard to Law No. 63, it now becomes
relevant to arrive at a precise clarification of the factual events resulting in the
expropriation and transfer."
If the defendant's title rested on an act of state by Czechoslovakia, German courts
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were required to hold the title valid. For a discussion of the law of Germany when
under the government of the Allies, see page 484 supra.
Ex-propriation of Insurance Companies Case, Higher Ct. App., W. Berlin, Dec. 15, 1950,
[1951] Int'l L. Rep. 197 (Fed. Rep. Ger.). BAn Coxmm. The defendant insurance
company, incorporated in Germany, was the owner of certain mortgages on real property situated in a part of Saxony which, on the conclusion of hostilities in World War
II, became occupied Soviet territory. By an ordinance of the Soviet authorities, all
property owned by insurance companies and situated in the Soviet occupied territory
was confiscated and was vested in the state enterprise which was the plaintiff in this
case. Some of the company's mortgage debtors were resident in West Berlin, and thus
not under the control of the Soviet authorities. The question was whether or not
they were liable to pay their mortgage debts to the original mortgagors or to the
newly established state enterprise which claimed to be the successor. The case held
that the validity of the ordinance, purporting to confiscate property of the defendants,
was confined to the Soviet-occupied territory, and therefore, as the mortgage debts
were owing by persons not in the territory, these debts were assets outside of occupied
Soviet territory and could not be collected by the Soviet-created company. The court
then held:
Having regard to these principles embodied in the legislation of Berlin, no court
exercising jurisdiction in Berlin can recognise legal results based on measures which
violate constitutional principle, good morals or the object of existing legal enactments.
This case is one of extraterritoriality. Money due to the original company was still
due to the original company and not to the company built by the confiscated assets
of the old company.
Expropriation (Soviet Zone of Germany) Case, Ct. App., Nuremberg, Sept. 19, 1949,
[1949] Ann Dig. 19 (Fed. Rep. Ger.). BAR CoMm. The facts of the case as set
forth in the Annual Digest are:
The applicant claimed an interim injunction to restrain the respondents from disposing of goods sent to them in the American zone of occupation by a firm in the
Soviet zone of occupation which had previously belonged to the applicant and
which had been expropriated without payment of compensation.
The applicant received the relief for which he had brought suit-an interim injunction to prevent the recipients from disposing of the property. No subsequent case is cited
to show whether there was final determination of title, i.e., which of the two claimants
had the right to receive the goods, sell them and receive the proceeds. However, the
court in its decision went beyond the findings necessary for the granting of an interim
injunction and expressed strongly its conclusion that an expropriation' in the Eastern
zone, without payment to the owners, would not be recognized in the American zone as
effective to transfer title. The case, however, is equivocal for one very important and
unresolved factor. Was the alleged "expropriation" an act of state? On the other
hand, was the "expropriation" authorized under the German Reparations Agreement?
The court stated: "In the present case the court is concerned with the extent to
which it is entitled to go behind the validity of the effectiveness of the decree of the
government of Saxony." Certainly at the date of this case, 1949, Saxony was not
recognized by anybody as an independent nation. If, then, the "expropriation" was
based upon a decree of the Government of Saxony, the American zone need not
recognize its validity. Again, if the property had been expropriated by the Soviet
Government as an independent state, there would be no act of state for none of the
Allies then recognized any "occupation zone" as a state. The Allies recognized Germany
as a nation under occupation.
On the other hand, if this property had been seized in the Soviet zone as reparations
(the reparations agreement covered all Germany), then a decision failing to recognize
transfer of title was contrary to the law of Germany as it then stood, for the law of
Germany included the Potsdam Agreement, which stated in Section 9(4):
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Reclamation claims of the USSR shall be made by the removal from the zone of
Germany occupied by the USSR and from appropriate German external assets.
The reasoning of the court, too, is faulty. The court said:
In this connection the Court need not decide whether the decree (from the Soviet
zone) is valid, but what legal effect has to be given to it in the Western zones.
International law recognizes that in principle the sovereign acts of a State are
effective only within the sphere of power of that State.
The court then follows this argument with a conclusion stating:
Where assets previously situate in the East find their way to the West after
expropriation, we must examine the question whether the firm which has been
expropriated in the East can still be regarded as the owner of these assets in the
West.
The court then offers a solution:
The applicant can rely on the invalidity of the expropriation of assets situate in
the country of expropriation only by praying in aid the rules of ordre public ....
The court here appears to try to straddle the proposition and say that it will recognize
the authority of a country within its own territory, but if goods there find their way
out of that country the title within the expropriating country is not recognized outside.
This can only be classified as a legal solecism. One Austrian commentator has expressed
the impossibility of such an argument succinctly as follows:
As a matter of principle, expropriation, however unjustified, is effective where
the property is within the territory of the expropriating state at the time of
expropriation, and it remains so even if the property is subsequently brought into
the territory of another state: in other words, a title cannot revive once it has
been extinguished. There may be states where property rights are constitutionally
protected, but still an expropriation in another state does not constitute such a
violation of the 'ordre public' (public policy) in these states as to justify a
judicial failure to recognize the principle of territoriality . . . . Views of Ignaz
Seid-Hohenreldern quoted by Graue, Germany: Recognition of Foreign Expropriations, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 94 (1954).
Lastly, the date of the case must be considered. The decision was in 1949. Although
the occupation law was in force at that time, it was not until 1951 that the Allied
occupation took from all German courts the privilege of determining any matters
involving German assets transferred to the Allies by the German Peace Treaty, the
Potsdam Conference, the Paris Reparations Agreement and the occupation laws of
Germany. In summary, therefore, it is impossible to determine, first, what the final
decision as to title might have been, second, whether or not an act of state was
involved, and third, if a final decision based upon the reasoning of this court would
have been contrary to German law, then in force, imposed by the occupation authorities.
Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans Case, Amtsgericht of Dingolfing, Dec.
7, 1948, [1948] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 12) (Fed. Rep. Ger.). Dxs. Op.; CONC. MiMo;
BAR Comm.; FoRHA-m 663. The excuse given by the Hitler Government, first, for
occupation of a part, and then, the whole of Czechoslovakia, was that the persons of
German nationality living in the western part needed the protection of the German
Reich. These were known as Sudeten Germans. Many wrongs were committed on
the Czechoslovakians, including the atrocity of the annihilation of the town of Lidice
and its inhabitants. When Czechoslovakia acquired independence and before the coup
which turned it into a Communist country, it decreed that the Sudeten Germans
could not be tolerated within the confines of that country which had reestablished its
independence, and these German citizens were required to return to Germany. Czechoslovakia seized these properties of the Sudeten Germans as German external assets
and the Allies approved. The laws of Czechoslovakia considered them as "external
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assets" and the Allies approved. Against this background, the facts of this case show
that two women in course of being deported as enemy nationals (Sudeten Germans)
were sent to a concentration camp. Each brought with her a sewing machine which
a guard at the camp took. When the women were sent into Germany, one of them
asked for the return of her sewing machine and, for reasons unexplained, was given,
not her own machine, but the one which had belonged to the other woman. Upon
arriving in Germany the woman who had no sewing machine, recognizing the machine brought in by the other, claimed it and it was awarded to her.
As an illustration of an act of state, this is a very doubtful case, for there is a
question as to whether or not it was the intention of Czechoslovakia to consider these
sewing machines as "external assets" and confiscate them. Certainly one was returned
on request. Furthermore, the action of a guard at a concentration camp in taking
the machines when the owners arrived in camp could hardly be considered an act
of state. Nevertheless, the Court of First Instance in the Bavarian town of Dingolfing
chose to consider this failure to return both sewing machines, and each to the proper
person, as a "confiscation," a policy of the state. It held such confiscation to be contrary to international law and also a violation of "natural law" which the court held
was superior to the power of any state. The "confiscation" was, therefore, null
and void.
There is no doubt that this case is a decision that a confiscation is null and void
within the confiscating country and this is,indeed, an exception to the act of state
doctrine. But it is equally clear that this case was decided contrary to the laws of
Germany, then enforced by the American occupation authorities and that to avoid
any repetition of such a case, of which there were several, the American occupation
authorities, being then the government of that part of Germany, passed a law known
as Law No. 63 which, in accordance with the Peace Treaty and other factors concerning the use of German external assets as reparations, deprived all the courts of
Germany of the power to make any decision relating to any part of the external assets
of Germany which might find their way back into the territory of the German Reich.
German courts were not allowed to thwart the policy of the Allies. Also it is incorrect to cite this case as a case of the Federal Republic of Germany. There was
no Federal Republic of Germany in 1948. This cited case was contrary to the laws
then in force in Germany. The laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, when it
came into existence, supported the act of state doctrine as indicated in another case
cited to the Congress. See p. 550 infra.
Registration of Trademark Koh-I-Noor, Fed. Trib., March 8, 1963, [1963] Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1541 (Fed. Rep. Ger.). BAR Comvr. Although this case also
relates to the trademark "Koh-I-Noor," the parties to the action were not the same
claimants discussed in the previous cases relating to the use outside of Czechoslovakia
of that same name. This trademark "Koh-I-Noor," with one other trademark, was also
used by a metal company, not the pencil company which appeared in the previously
mentioned "Koh-I-Noor cases." The original company here was a partnership in Prague
and had extended its financial interests to various other countries. The manner in
which this was done was complicated and for the purposes here will be simplified
by omitting certain details. The issues in this case, however, and the law applied,
were the same as the issue and applicable law in the Koh-I-Noor pencil company
cases; that is, a nationalized Czechoslovakian partnership has no extraterritorial right
to trademarks used by its predecessor. This is, of course, no exception to the act of
state doctrine.
The significant facts of the case are as follows: In 1902 a partnership was organized
in Czechoslovakia to manufacture certain metal goods. The partnership prospered and
the original partners created other partnerships in various other countries: 1904,
Dresden; 1919, New York (as a corporation, not a partnership); 1921, Barcelona;
1922, London. In regard to these various partnerships and in one case a corporation,
the courts of Germany found:
These enterprises which were independent from a legal point of view were connected with the parent firm in Prague by a personal union and were granted the
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right to use, each for a certain territory all of the trademarks of the parent
company.
The court also found that these partnerships were controlled by the partners of the
Prague firm.
When Czechoslovakia was seized by German forces under the Hitler Regime just
prior to World War II, the partners of this firm fled to New York because they were
Jewish. The so-called "protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia seized the property and
put it under a "trust administratorship." As such the company was operated with
"The Greater German Reich" listed in the commercial register as a public partner in
the firm. When the succeeding independent Government of Czechoslovakia arose after
the war, it, of course, refused to consider that a company could exist in that form
and nationalized the company. Omitting certain business details which are irrelevant
to this main issue, one may say that the partnerships outside of both Czechoslovakia
and Germany continued to operate and do business and after the war these partnerships sought to register the trademarks in Germany. This registration was opposed by
the nationalized Czechoslovalian company on the ground that it, and not the former
partnership, was the successor to the Czechoslovakian partnership and as such had
the sole right to register the names "Koh-I-Noor" and another in Germany. The final
decision was that the nationalized Czechoslovakian company could not use the
original trademarks outside Czechoslovakia and could not register them in Germany.
German law recognized only the right of the companies which had previously used
the trademark in other countries and these were permitted to register that mark in
Germany.
Thus the case is one of refusal by the courts of Germany to enforce any foreign
confiscation decree in Germany. The nationalization of the former German property
in Czechoslovakia, property which in turn had belonged to independent partners driven
out by the German Reich, had conveyed no extraterritorial authority and the nationalized company could not appropriate to itself the original trademarks previously in
use outside Czechoslovakia whether or not they had previously been registered in
Germany and whether or not that Czechoslovakian company had attempted to register
them at a prior date.
N. V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft
m.b.H., Ct. App., Bremen, Aug. 21, 1959, [1963] Int'l L. Rep. 16 (Fed. Rep. Ger.
1959) Dis. Op.; BAR Com
,.nv; Fo LrDAmu662. The manner in which this case has
been cited is indicative that those who cited the case recognize that the decision supports the act of state doctrine.
The Government of Indonesia first had placed controllers, or receivers, in charge
of Dutch enterprises in that island country and then had confiscated the properties,
the date of confiscation being December 31, 1958. Tobacco grown on one of the confiscated estates was sent to Germany for sale. The Dutch company which had
previously held the property on which the tobacco had been grown demanded that
the tobacco be given to it as its property. (The request here was the same as that
made in the Sabbatino case by C.A.V.) The court was asked to hold the act of state
of Indonesia null and void and ineffective to transfer title. The German courts
recognized the validity of the acts of the Indonesian Government in Indonesia and,
therefore, the title of its property sent to Germany for sale. This case was decided
by the courts of the Federal Republic of Germany.
M. V. Aktieselskabet K. H., June 13, 1934, 145 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen 16, [1933-1934] Ann. Dig. 501 (No. 217). CONG. MEMO. After World
War I the Government of France appropriated all of the assets in France of a certain
German partnership which had before that war done business in France. This German partnership had a bank account in a Danish bank. The liquidator of the French
assets of the German concern demanded of the Danish bank a balance standing on
the books of that bank in the name of the German partnership which had done business
in France. The Danish bank complied with this request and paid the balance of the
account to the French liquidator. Thereafter the German company, in a German court,
sued the Danish bank for the balance which was standing in the name of the German
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company and recovered. The principle on which the case was based was that seizure
of the German assets in France was a "confiscation," but the relationship between the
Danish bank and the German company was covered by Danish law. Therefore, the
Danish bank owed the balance of the account to the German entity as it was prior to
the confiscation. The voluntary payment by the Danish bank did not discharge the
bank's obligation to its depositor.
The Digest of the case fails to show that by the deposit agreement between the
Danish bank and the German firm, its depositor, that performance (payment on demand) was to be only in Denmark and only in Danish crowns. The bank account
was an external asset not collectible by the French liquidator since his authority only
extended over assets in French jurisdiction. The court said: "Correspondingly the
principles of the German conflict of laws consider the Danish law as applicable to
defendant's obligation in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary."
Summary as to Germany: Seven cases were cited. Of these, one court held, and
the courts in two cases assumed, that German property seized abroad by the Allies
would be returned to the original owner if the property came into Germany, on the
ground that seizure of German external assets by the Allies as reparations was confiscation and, therefore, null and void. After a number of such cases had been determined
by lower courts, the Allies then governing Germany reiterated their position that
such decisions were contrary to German law as administered and imposed by the Allies,
and deprived all courts of Germany of jurisdiction to hear any claim to property
formerly situated abroad and owned by Germans, and then brought into Germany as
the property of another. The remaining cases either supported the act of state
doctrine or were extraterritorial cases only and were not an exception to the act of state
doctrine. One case, upholding the act of state doctrine, was decided by German
courts after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Conclusion as to Germany: No case of those cited is authority for the proposition
that under the laws of Germany an act of state of a foreign country can be declared
null and void because contrary to international law.
FRANCE

Soci6t6 Potasas Ibericas v. Nathan Bloch, Cour de Cassation (ch. civ.), March 14,
1939, [1939] Dalloz Hebdomadaire I. 257, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 54) (Fr.).
Dis. Op.; CONG. MEMo.; BAR Comm.; FoRanHA 641.
Volatron v. Moulin, Cour d'Appel d' Aix, March 25, 1939, [1939] Dalloz Hebdomadaire
I. 329 [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 10) (Fr. 1939). Dis Op.; CONG. MEMo; BAR
Comm.; FoRDEAm 642.
The International Digest states concerning the case of Societe Potasas Ibericas v.
Bloch, "The facts of the case are not clear." However, reference to the report in
Dalloz Hebdomadaire of these cases indicates that there is no real question concerning
the facts of either of the two cases which are on the same state of facts. One of the
witnesses before the Congress stated that the two cases were based upon "substantially
the same facts." H.R. 7750 Hearings 595.
During the Civil War in Spain, the owners of certain potash mines in Catalonia closed
the mines and resided in France. The predominant stock ownership and management
of the company owning these mines was French and Swiss. The local government at
Catalonia wished to use these mines and passed a local decree that they would be
seized if the owners did not return and open them. The owners refused to do so.
Thereafter certain shipments of potash were received in France and were each
claimed by the holder of the bill of lading for the particular shipment. These shipments
were identified as material from the mines and the property was claimed immediately
on behalf of the mine owners. In one case the company sued in its own name and
in another a court-appointed agent represented the company. The defendant in each
case was the holder of the bill of lading of the shipments which had been made. He was
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identified as an agent of the government of Catalonia. In at least one of the cases
the shipment was at first awarded to the holder of the bill of lading solely on the
ground that he held the bill of lading, and proof offered by the mine owners as to
the ownership or right of possession was not accepted. However, this decision was
reversed. It was found in one of the cases (the Volatron case) that the holder of the
bill of lading "refused to reveal in what manner he came to possess the merchandise,
from whom he received it and at what price." On the argument of the appeal the
rejected proof to prove ownership by the mine owners was accepted as controlling and
the shipments in both cases were awarded to the mine owners. In neither case was
there any evidence of any official act by a government in nationalizing the mines. No
"act of state" or actions taken under such sovereign act were before the court. Nor
does it appear that any such act had been taken. The evidence was merely that someone had shipped potash from these mines, and on the evidence this was awarded to
the owners of the mines. After this decision, the Government of Spain at Valencia
"temporarily" nationalized the mines. The date of this nationalization decree was
subsequent to the date when the shipments of potash had been received in France.
Then the local government of Catalonia where the mines were situated passed a local
decree that this "nationalization' of the mines should be retroactive to a time prior
to the shipment of the potash from Spain to France. The higher French court refused
to recognize any transfer of title under such a plea stating: "The retroactive character
of such a provision cannot in respect of French law affect acquired rights particularly
regarding goods which have previously been landed in French territory."
The act of the persons, whoever they may have been, who seized the mines and
shipped the potash was without any government authority and the property was not
within the jurisdiction of Spain nor in its official possession when the act of state
occurred and, of course, Spain's efforts to transfer title to property in France, the
title to which had been confirmed under the laws of France, was a mere abortive
effort of extraterritoriality.
V. E. B. Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firm Carl Zeiss, Cour d'Appel Paris (First Chamber), April
2, 1963, [1964] Jom-NAL Du DRorr INTEnNATnoNAL [hereinafter cited as CLuNET] 622.
BAR COMM. The report of the Committee of the Bar Association of the City of
New York, which cited this case to Congress, states in parentheses after the citation
"text of decision on file in library of Ass'n of Bar of City of New York." This 50page opinion of the Court of Appeal of Paris appears never to have been published.
But from that decision an appeal was taken to the highest appellate court of France,
the Court of Cassation, and the decision of that court, affirming the decision of the
Court of Appeal of Paris is reported at 3 CLuNz= 622 (1966). At the time, however, when the Bar Association submitted its report, the same parties which were
parties to the case cited, had litigated the same issues there presented in other
countries, namely, Germany, Egypt and Austria. Comments on the cases in these
three countries can be found in a digest prepared by M. Magdalena Schoch, United
States Department of Justice, 53 Am. J. INTL' L. 687 (1959). Another case between
the same parties and on the same issues had been decided in the Netherlands and can
be found reviewed (in French) in 91 CLu=r 616, 621 (1964), and it also is included in the article above mentioned. There was also at that time a case pending
in England. The decision of that Court of Appeal can be found in 1 All E.R. 467
(1965) and the decision of the House of Lords, 2 All E.R. 536, 591 (1966), which
sent the case back for trial. There is no final decision in England on the issues
presented.
The Zeiss cases exist against the background of Germany's unconditional surrender,
Allied occupation and the subsequent defection of Russia as one of the four powers
which, violating the role assigned to it as an occupying power over part of Germany
with the other Allies, continued to hold that area and made efforts to set up a new
country, "East Germany," which it has recognized as an independent country although
its existence as a nation has not been recognized by the countries making up the
former Allies. Because the issues have been argued in Germany (both East Germany
and West Germany), Austria, the Netherlands, France, Egypt and England, any one
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of the cases can be relied upon for the facts. Since the issue was which of two
contending companies could use the Zeiss trademark in Germany and other countries,
decisions of the East German courts would be irrelevant; and the English courts have
not yet arrived at a final decision.
The facts of the case are important. The firm of Carl Zeiss and the Carl Zeiss
Foundation had for many years prior to World War II existed in Germany with
principal office and place of business at I6na (J6na), Thuringia, Germany. It had
plants in other parts of Germany and also one in Austria. There were two organizations,
because at the death of the founder, Carl Zeiss, in 1848, a "foundation" had been set
up to secure and administer certain funds. The income from this foundation was
used to promote scientific studies, particularly mathematics at the local university, and
for other charitable purposes affecting particularly the employees and former employees
of the Carl Zeiss works.
The area in which Ina was situated was first seized by United States troops in
occupation of Germany by the Allies, but in accordance with the Yalta Agreement,
United States troops evacuated the area in April, 1945, and Russian troops took over
the occupation. Most of the persons constituting the top management of the Zeiss
firm left I6na with the American troops and took considerable equipment with them.
They then set up their business in Heidenheim in what is now West Germany. The
Russians, upon entry, appear to have seized part of the equipment of the plant (an
irrelevant circumstance here) and at some later date after the plant had been rehabilitated and had begun to operate, the Russians then "nationalized" the Zeiss firm
Volks Eigener and foundation in T6na, giving them the name of "Volkseigener Betrieb."
This was translated in the decision in the Court of Appeal as "enterprise propritd du
peuple." This enterprise in subsequent litigation was then designated "V.E.B. Zeiss and
Foundation I6na."
The managers of the older company which had set up business in Heidenheim"
were thereafter known as "Firm Zeiss and Foundation Heidenheim." Each of these
two "Zeiss" firms 6ontended that it was the legitimate successor of "Zeiss" as it had
existed before the war and was, to the exclusion of the other, entitled to use the
name "Zeiss" and the Zeiss trademarks wherever they were registered in the countries
of Europe or elsewhere.
The division between East and West Germany became more and more acute and
after the Soviet Government on June 12, 1964, "recognized" East Germany as a new
and independent state, the governments of the United States, England and France
undertook to counteract the effects of this action by stating their collective position in
regard to this action by Russia. On June 26, 1964, these three countries simultaneously
issued a tripartite declaration regarding the agreement between the Soviet Government
and the so-called German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The tripartite declaration indicated it had been signed after consultation with the Federal Republic of
Germany, then an independent government no longer under the control of the occupying forces of the Allies. Article 3 of the agreement stated:
3. The Three Governments consider that the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany is the only German government freely and legitimately constituted
and therefore entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs. The
Three Governments do not recognize the East German regime nor the existence of
a state in eastern Germany. Dep't of State Press Release No. 300, June 26, 1964;
51 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 44 (1964). See also Am. J. INT'L L. 995 (1964).
Of the five countries, the courts of each determined that the Zeiss company which had
left Ina with the American troops and set up business in Heidenheim was the continuation of the original Zeiss and had the authority to use the Zeiss trademarks. The
issues which were discussed in these various cases were briefly: (1) There was no
act of state since East Germany is not recognized as a state; (2) The occupying
authorities of Russia could not commit an act of state since they lacked authority to
do so under the Allied agreements by which the country was governed by the Allies;
(3) Even if the seizure of the Zeiss plants in I6na could be considered an act of state,
it had no extraterritorial effect and the confiscated company had no claim on extraterritorial assets; (4) Zeiss, Heidenheim, was the successor to the Carl Zeiss firm and
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Foundation and the V.E.B. Ina Foundation was not; (5) The Zeiss registered name
and trademark was a "German extraterritorial asset" which the Allies had confiscated
as such, and thus property could be restored by individual Allied countries in accordance
with their own national interests. (This was particularly stressed in the French case.)
In all of the above there was no exception to the act of state doctrine, even assuming
that an act of state was involved.
The similarity of this decision to the decisions in the United States involving the
Bank of China is striking. The Bank of China had operated from Shanghai for years
and after the Communists came into China in 1949 continued to operate there.
However, many of the officers of the Bank of China left Shanghai and moved by various
stages to Taiwan when the Communists came in. After some indecision by United
States courts in an apparent endeavor to postpone a final decision pending more stable
political conditions, the United States courts found that the migrating Bank of China
then existing under the Taiwan Government was entitled to receive bank accounts held
for "Bank of China" by the Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco. Bank of China v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59, modified, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1953).
Enterprise Nationale L. & C. Hardtmuth, Fabrique de Crayons Koh-I-Noor, L. & C.
Hardtmuth, Cour d'Appel Paris, June 25, 1958, [1958-I] Int'l L. Rep. 50 (Fr. 1958).
BAR Comm. The facts of this case are the same as the facts presented to the Austrian
court and to the courts previously mentioned. In brief, a partnership which had
done business under the name of L. & C. Hardtmuth had carried on business in
Czechoslovakia for many years and was nationalized by a decree of the Czechoslovakian
government. The partners thereupon left Czechoslovakia and formed a partnership
and later a corporation in France to carry on the business of the former partnership.
The issue here again was as in all the other cases involving this company, would the
nationalized company in Czechoslovakia be permitted to use the trademarks in France?
The court held that the nationalization would not have any effect outside of the territory
of Czechoslovakia and that the nationalized company could not use the trade names
which were an asset of the company not in Czechoslovakia and not affected by the
Czechoslovakian confiscation.
Jellinek v. Levy, Trib. Comm., Seine, Jan. 18, 1940, [1940-1942] Ann. Dig. Supp. 24
(Fr. 1940). BAn Co's .v Three persons were proprietors of a textile business at Brno,
Czechoslovakia, and did business under the firm name of Jellinek and Seidl. They had
sent to one Victor G. Levy in France certain quantities of goods which he had sold on
their account and he had certain other pieces of cloth available unsold. The date of this
case was 1940 and the partnership mentioned, being Jewish, had been seized by
Germany while governing Czechoslovakia. Levy who held the cloth had received a
demand from a person of German nationality claiming to represent the Czechoslovakian
partnership or its successor. Thus the holder of the cloth was subject to adverse
claims. He was willing to hand back the cloth upon payment of a certain amount due
him but, of course, wished to give it to the proper person and receive the amount
due him. The court found that the confiscation by Germany in Czechoslovakia of the
partnership would have no extraterritorial effect, because the partners were "non-Aryan
persons." The former partners were entitled to the cloth and such interests as they
had before their business in Czechoslovakia had been confiscated. The court ordered
the cloth to be delivered to them subject to the amount due Levy.
Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovi6tiques v. Intendant G6n6ral Bourgeois 6s Qualit6
et Soci6t6 La Ropit. Cour de Cassation (ch. req.), March 5, 1928, [1928] Sirey Recueil
G6n6ral I. 217, CLuNTr 674, [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 67 (No. 43) (Fr.). CoNGc.
MEmo; FoRDHAm 640. This case does not involve an executed act of state. On
January 26, 1918, the Bolshevik government of Russia, later known as the Soviet
Government of Russia (U.S.S.R.), by a decree of that date nationalized the Merchant
Marine of Russia. At that time the U.S.S.R. had control of very little Russian territory.
Under the decree mentioned, it purported to nationalize a maritime company known as
La Ropit. At the time in question the ships belonging to La Ropit were based in
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Odessa, over which at that time the predecessor of the U.S.S.R. had no political
control whatever. The ships left Odessa and never returned to the jurisdiction of the
Soviet Government. Instead they sailed to France where they were operated by
persons who had previously done business in Russia under the name "La Ropit." After
France recognized the Soviet Government politically, the French ambassador brought
suit in France to gain possession of some of those ships which were then in French
ports. At that time the Soviet Government had never had these ships under its
jurisdiction and had never had possession of them. The date of the case involving these
ships was a little more than ten years after the decree of confiscation. The French
court was not asked to recognize a confiscation of any property in Russia. It was
asked to enforce in France a Soviet confiscatory decree relating to these ships. This
it refused to do. The case is, therefore, a pure question of refusal to enforce a
confiscatory decree extraterritorially.
NOTE: It will be remembered that by an executive agreement entered into with
the U.S.S.R. known as the Litvinov Agreement the United States Government did
enforce in the United States the Soviet decrees of confiscation of property of Russian
companies nationalized in Russia. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
For a complete statement of the facts underlying the La Ropit case, see The Jupiter
(No. 1), [1924] P. 236 (C.A.); The Jupiter (No. 2), [1925] P. 69 (C.A.); The
Jupiter (No. 3), [1927] P. 122, appeal dismissed, [1927] P. 250 (C.A.). These cases,
which concerned another of the La Ropit ships which had escaped under the same
conditions, are summarized in [1925-1926] Ann. Dig. 136 (No. 100). Cf., Compania
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76 n.1
(1938) (concerning The Jupiter), and subsequent decisions in the same case, The
Navemar, 24 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), rev'd, 102 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1939). The
issues became moot by recognition of a different Spanish Government and the return
of the ship to private ownership. The Navemar, 103 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1939) (per
curiam).
Summary as to France: Five cases of French courts cited; every one of them
related to an effort of a foreign government to persuade the courts of France to hand
over property or recognize right to property which had never been in the jurisdiction
or under the control of the confiscating government.
Conclusion as to France: No one of these cases shows an exception to an act of
state doctrine. The decisions are conventional, are in accord with the United States
law before the Sabbatino Amendment, and would not be affected in any way by the
Sabbatino Amendment.
GRiEECE

Case No. 1268/1937, Court of First Instance of Piraeus, Ephemeris Hellinon Nomicon,
4 Delta 560. CONG. MEMo; FOEDHAm 648.

NOTE: A Greek case identified as one discussed by a Greek writer is cited CONG.
MEMO. In the text of the report of the Committee of The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (BAR Coam.), Greece is mentioned as one of the countries
which makes an exception to the act of state doctrine, but no Greek case is cited in
the list of cases given in support of that statement.
In this case a ship, the Inocencio Figaredo, flying the Spanish flag, while lying in
the Greek port of Piraeus, was attached by a creditor of the Spanish Popular Front
government during the time of the Spanish Civil War. His claim that this ship was
the property of the Spanish Popular Front government was based upon a decree
requisitioning all Spanish ships. His complaint against the Spanish Government was
based upon an alleged breach of a contract (charter party) with the Popular Front
government. At no time did the Spanish Government claim title to the ship or any
control of it. The evidence showed that the ship which was attached had not been in
any Spanish port since the requisition decree nor in control of the Spanish Government.
The captain testified he was employed by the owners who were not then in Spain.
The courts dismissed the case on the ground that the ship was not the property of
the Spanish Government, saying: "Furthermore it is not established that this ship
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has in fact been confiscated by the Spanish Government, and is now in possession
of the Spanish Government." Here there was no "executed" act of state. There was
no jurisdiction by Spain. The case is not an exception to the act of state doctrine.
Summary as to Greece: One case only cited. It does not involve an executed act of
state, but is a pure case of extraterritoriality in which a foreign country was asked to
enforce within its own territory an unexecuted act of state of a foreign country.
Conclusion as to Greece: No case cited showing any exception to the act of state
doctrine.
ITALY

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civ. Trib. Venice, March 11, 1953, 78 I1
Foro Italiano I. 719, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19 (It. 1953). Dis. Op.; CoNG. MEMO; BAn
Commvr; FoRDHAM
623. This is another case involving oil sold by Iran. The AngloIranian Oil Company requested the Civil Court of Venice to grant an injunction
against the delivery of the oil in one ship which had loaded the confiscated oil in
Iraq and had arrived in Venice. The court refused to grant such an injunction. In
its decision it was careful to state the principles on which the decision was based, i.e.,
the act of state principle. The court said:
The recognition in Italy of the validity of the effects which these acts had already
had in Persia cannot be termed co-operation to make them become effective; it
constitutes no more than an acknowledgment that the effects have indeed taken
place, i.e., accepting the effects produced, which in themselves-and considered
separately from their cause-are in no way contrary to public order.
In short, where legal effect under the laws of other countries was given to events
which had happened outside of Italy, those effects were recognized in Italy.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civ. Ct., Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] I1Fono
Italiano I. 256, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (It.). Dis. Op.; CONG. M=Mo; Bn CoMm.;
FowrDAvm 624. The previous case was appealed to the Civil Court of Rome. The lower
court had dealt with the oil carried in one ship; this court also considered the oil in three
other ships which had arrived in Italy from Iran. The court at Rome affirmed the court
at Venice that the claimant, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, had no title to the oil
but that the purchaser who had bought the oil from the National Iranian Oil Company,
the Government agency of Iran had good title. It was the only case of those cited
where the court felt it necessary to inquire if the action was legal under the laws of
Iran. It found that the action was legal there. It considered cases throughout the world
and mentioned particularly judgments of Antwerp and Anheim (Belgium) and of the
district court of New York (U.S.A.) which it found "definitely denied that any
foreign court is entitled to decide on the lawfulness of an expropriation carried out by
a foreign government." It mentioned also the decision of the Court of Tokyo, September 21, 1953, which had already handed down a decision concerning this very act
of confiscation and the oil produced from the confiscated properties, holding the
seizure by Iran had transferred title to the oil, but on further consideration the court's
final determination rested on its decision that the seizure of the oil was not a "confiscation" because some future indemnity had been promised. The act was not, therefore,
contrary to international law.
Koh-I-Noor Tiizkrna L. & C. Hardtmuth Narodni Podnik v. Fabrique de Crayons
Hardtmuth L. & C., S.r.l., ct. App., Turin, June 17, 1959, [1958-I] Int'l L. Rep. 44
(It.). BAR Co1v . This is another one in the series of actions brought by a nationalized
Czechoslovakian company to secure the use of the trademarks which that company
had used before nationalization. In Italy the court decided as courts of other countries
had decided that trademarks registered in Italy were assets of the corporation in Italy
and were not reached by the confiscation of the seized company in Czechosolvakia. It
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points out that the decisions in Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom
were all similar in refusing to grant extraterritorial effect to foreign seizure. The
nationalization in one country has no effect on property not within the confiscating
country. The court said:
Where the guarantee of an adequate indemnity and its payment is lacking, the
expropriation becomes a confiscation, which is a typically political act and cannot,
therefore, produce any effect outside the country of confiscation.
Svit Impresa Nazionale e Bata s.p.a. v. Soc. B.S.F. Stiftung, Cipera e Bata, 40
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 264 (1957) (Ct. App. Bologna 1956). B"n CoiMMTL.
A company known as Veca was a subsidiary of the Czechoslovakian shoe manufacturing
company known as the Svit Nardoni Podnik. This company had formerly been known
as Bata, S.A. The Czechoslovakian company had been nationalized. In 1948 the
shareholders of the Italian subsidiary of the Czechoslovakian company placed the
Italian company in liquidation. Then the representatives of the nationalized Czechoslovakian company claiming by right of the Czechoslovakian state, and also claiming
rights in Veca as a stockholder representing 40,000 shares out of the total share
capital of the company of 86,500 shares claimed a right to have the assignment of the
Italian company's property revoked. The nationalized Czech company claimed that
it had never consented to this liquidation and that, as the successor of the original
Bata Company and as a substantial shareholder in Veca the Italian company could
not be liquidated without the consent of the nationalized Czechoslovakian company.
The lower court refused this plea and the higher court at Bologna rejected the appeal.
The court stated that the nationalization decree of Czechoslovakia relied upon by
Svit Narodni Podnik would have no legal effect upon the rights to property formerly
possessed in Italy by that company prior to nationalization and therefore upheld
the liquidation of the assets of the Italian company.
NOTE: This proceeding was wholly comparable to the laws in New York under which
a receiver was appointed for the New York assets of C.A.V. in the Sabbatino case.
This was to protect the property in the United States for the benefit of creditors of
the then nationalized company in Cuba. Later the receivership was dissolved as the
court found the old company operating then in New York capable of managing its
own assets in New York which, not being in Cuba, had not been affected by the
nationalization decree. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba,
39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254-55 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Summanj as to Italy: Four cases of Italy cited: two relating to claim of the Iranian
Oil Company, being the only ones of the four cases cited which involve the Sabbatino
question, i.e., transporting of property subjected to a fully executed act of state from
one country to another with a request by the former owner that the court refuse to
recognize a transfer of title by a confiscatory decree. One was decided on the basis
of the act of state, i.e., even if the act complained of was alleged to be one of
confiscation, good title was obtained. That same case on appeal was decided on the
ground that the act complained of was not contrary to international law as some
promise of compensation had been made. The other two cases did not involve any
exception to the act of state doctrine, being purely efforts of a nationalized company
in one country to secure assets in another country which had belonged to the company
before nationalization. Both cases decided conventionally on the basis that confiscatory
decrees have no legal effect outside of the territory which promulgates such a decree
and executes under it.
Conclusion as to Italy: No case cited in Italy indicates any exception to the act
of state doctrine.
JAPAN

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabuski Kaisha, Dist. Ct., Tokyo, [19531 Int'l
L. Rep. 305, aff'd, High Ct., Tokyo, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 312 (Japan). Dis. Op.; CONG.
MEMO; BAn Comm; FoRDaHm

628. This is another case involving the seizure by the
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Iran Government of the oil concession and properties of the Anglo-Iranian company.
A Japanese company had also purchased oil in Iran from the Iranian Government agency
and had transported that oil to Japan in a tanker it had supplied for the purpose, the
Nissho Maru. Here, as in Aden and in Italy, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company claimed
title to the oil. It asked the court to declare the Iranian seizure "null and void" and
insufficient to transfer title and to declare the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the owner.
The lower court before which the case came refused to recognize the title of AngloIranian Oil Company but recognized the validity of the title obtained by the Iranian
law and the seizure of the property. In answer to the contention that a law which
was contrary to international law was void, the lower court said: "This Court is not
convinced that there exists a universally established principle of international law which
answers the question in the affirmative."
The Court of Appeals at Tokyo confirmed the lower court's opinion. In so doing
it declined to commit itself on the question propounded by the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. The Court of Appeals of Japan in regard to this same question presented to
the lower court said:
And the present Court, which has failed to find any established rules of international
law governing the matter, has confined itself to taking the attitude that it is impossible to pass on the validity or invalidity of the said Law and has not concluded
positively that the Law is valid. This has had indirectly the same effect as if we
recognized the Nationalization Law as valid; and that has resulted in our denying
the appellants' ownership of the oil in question. We do not, however, think that
these matters are contrary to the public policy of this country.
Summary as to Japan: One case cited with reference to the lower court's opinion
and to the appellate court's opinion. Both courts upheld the title which was transferred by the seizure in Iran of the Anglo-Iranian Company's property. The title of the
Iranian Government, although claimed to have been acquired by a confiscation decree
contrary to international law, was recognized.
Cpnclusion as to Japan: The laws of Japan do not recognize an exception to the
act of state doctrine.
ThE N=MrUNr

DS

P. T. Escomptobank v. N.V. Assurantie Maatschappij de Nederlanden, Ct. App., The
Hague, June 6, 1963. CONG. MEmO; BAR Co aM. This case does not involve any
claim by a confiscating government of title to property within that country's jurisdiction or under its control at the time of a confiscatory decree. The facts indicate a
somewhat unusual method of doing business but do not show any exception to the
act of state doctrine. The N.V. Assurantie was a long-established insurance company
of the Netherlands which for its convenience in doing business within Indonesia had,
prior to the commencement of the oppressive acts by Indonesia against Dutch-owned
companies, established several wholly-owned subsidiaries in Indonesia. These Indonesian corporations, wholly Dutch-owned, operated within Indonesia in underwriting
various types of insurance risks. Not all of the risks were payable in Indonesian
rupiahs, and when such obligation was undertaken, the Dutch-owned insurance company would secure a license necessary to increase foreign currency accounts in order
that it might always have sufficient currency available to it for meeting all risks not
payable in rupiahs. The Indonesian Government took two steps against these subsidiary
companies: the appointment of a receiver or "control" over them and later confiscation
of all of their assets. At the time of appointment of the receiver or control the several
insurance companies had balances in the P.T. Escomptobank at the office in Indonesia
and also in that same bank had its foreign currency accounts. Under normal law and
procedure a bank account is an asset in the country where due demand on it is to
be made. This is true both as to local currency accounts and foreign currency accounts
even though the bank in which the foreign currency account may and undoubtedly
will have its foreign currency cover accounts either in a branch of its own bank where
that foreign currency is the local currency or in some other bank in that foreign country.
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So it was with P. T. Escomptobank and the insurance companies.
However, the court found that from their inception these insurance companies in
Indonesia bad been conducted under a rather unusual type of business operation. By
their very charter their operations were conducted by an agent in the Netherlands who
had full authority from these companies to operate on their behalf. The P. T. Escomptobank claimed that immediately with the establishment of a "contror' over the companies
in Indonesia the authority of this agent in the Netherlands was cancelled. The Dutch
courts held otherwise on the ground that the laws of Indonesia had no effect upon
the business of these Indonesian corporations done in the Netherlands or of the power
of the agent who carried on their business there. The P. T. Escomptobank also
claimed that the foreign currency accounts must be paid to its "Controller" on his
demand in Indonesia. Here the courts determined that the peculiar circumstances of
the operation of these Indonesian businesses from the Netherlands were such that
the foreign currency accounts were not payable to the "comptroller" in Indonesia
but could be collected in the Netherlands. The fact that the business of the Indonesian companies was conducted from the Netherlands by an agent with full authority
appears to be a justification for considering that foreign currency assets were not within
Indonesia or subject to its exclusive control and the establishment of the "control" of
the companies in Indonesia did not cancel the plenary authority of the agent in the
Netherlands. When this extraterritorial extension of new Indonesian law was denied,
the authority of the agent in the Netherlands continued and he had, of course, the
authority to control all assets outside of Indonesia and if his authority had extended
to the bank accounts as a general manager (although not specifically stated in the
case) the foreign currency accounts were foreign assets. It is readily admitted that
the determination of the situs of these foreign currency accounts is unusual unless
fixed by agreement covering place of demand and performance and can be justified
only on the basis of a long course of dealing between the P. T. Escomptobank and
the Indonesian insurance companies under which their foreign business was conducted from the Netherlands. But even if the Dutch courts were in error in holding
that the foreign currency accounts were assets payable outside of Indonesia, its decision
as to the act of state doctrine was wholly conventional.
Senembah Maatschappij N.V. v. Bank Indonesia, Ct. App., Amsterdam, June 4, 1959,
[1959] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 855 (No. 350). CONG. MEMo; BAR CoMM.;
FoanDm2 657. This case has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. It does not
involve a confiscation. It does not involve a transfer of title to property. The act of
state complained of in this case was the act of the Indonesian Government in
placing a receiver known as the "control' over the properties of Senembah (and other
Dutch companies) in Indonesia held by Dutch persons and corporations. As this was
an act of state which in any event would not be covered by the Sabbatino Amendment
since no change of title was involved, it is irrelevant.
The case was decided in the lower court before the confiscation features of the
Indonesian oppression of the Dutch became effective. However, the higher courts
passed upon the case after the confiscation and considerable reference is made in the
case to this fact; the courts holding as part of the ruling that "control" was contrary
to international law, and with the dicta that subsequent confiscation was contrary to
international law. The facts of the case prove the conclusions expressed.
Senembah, a Dutch corporation, grew tobacco in Indonesia under a concession.
Before the oppressive acts by the Indonesian Government against the nationals of
the Netherlands began, Senembah had obtained a loan from Bank Indonesia. Although
made in Holland the loan was to be paid in Indonesian rupiahs in Djakarta. This loan
was collateralized by tobacco warrants held by the bank in Indonesia and by other
tobacco warrants held by the Indonesian bank in the Netherlands. At the time the
receiver of "control' was made over the Indonesian account, Senembah owed something over 50,000,000 rupiahs. The control demanded the collateral for the loan from
the bank and sold it for something more than the original loan. The control then
in the name of the company, but, of course, without its consent in any way, borrowed
further money from the Bank Indonesia. Senembah, in the Netherlands, considering
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that the loan was paid by the sale of its collateral for more than the face amount of
its loan, asked to have its collateral in Holland returned to it. The bank refused and
Senembah sued the bank to get it back. The court found that the loan had been paid
and gave the collateral back to the owner. There was no claim at any time by
Indonesia or the Indonesian bank that by any act of Indonesia there was a transfer
of title to property in the Netherlands. It was to secure the tobacco warrants pledged
in the Netherlands as additional collateral in Indonesia for a loan already paid by
sale of collateral, or perhaps as collateral for the new loan which Senembah had not
contracted, that the bank claimed this property as collateral. It never claimed title to
it. One source of misunderstanding in the case was found in the incorrect statement
of the facts in the unofficial publication in the Dutch law journal. They were corrected when the court of appeals decision was reported.
In his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Attorney General testified concerning this case as follows:
The Dutch case referred to by Mr. justice White, Senembah Maatschappil N. V.
v. Republiek Indonesie "Bank Indonesid' Amsterdam Ct. App. [19593 Netderlandse
Jurisprudentie, No. 73, is dubious authority for the proposition that Dutch courts
refuse to recognize the validity of executed foreign acts of state which violate
international law. Contrary to the apparent belief of some, there was no issue in
that case concerning title to property in Holland. Senembab, a Dutch company,
claimed as its own certain property in the Netherlands.
The Bank Indonesia (a government agency of Indonesia and the defendant in
the case), though admitting that the property belonged to the plaintiff, demanded
it solely on the ground that under Indonesian law Senembah bad a duty to turn
that property over to the bank. The Dutch court decided that Indonesian law,
contrary to International law, was not effective outside of Indonesia and Dutch
courts would not enforce it. To decide otherwise would have supplanted Dutch
law. H.R. 7750 Hearings 1258.
Hunzedal, Ltd. v. Smit, Dist. Ct., Amsterdam, Jan. 3, 1940, [1919-1942 Ann. Dig.
Supp. 33 (No. 20). BAR Comm. This case is explanatory of the general proposition
that acts purporting to be "acts of state" performed by a military occupying enemy
power have no validity unless in accordance with the Hague Convention. This is
the same as United States law, and it is not changed by the Sabbatino Amendment.
A Polish company of Gdynia in Poland made a contract in 1938 with a Dutch
shipyard to build a ship. In September of 1939, the Polish company ceded their
rights to that contract to a Dutch company and shortly thereafter Poland was occupied by German forces who appointed an "administrator" for the Polish company
which had ordered the ship. The facts of the case are not given with great clarity
but it is inherent in the opinion of the court that orders must have been given by
this "administrator," and his authority to speak in the name of the Polish company
was questioned. The court said he had no authority outside of Poland whatever:
In any case such a measure [the appointment], being of a political nature and
directed against persons to whom the authorities are not well-disposed, is contrary
to Dutch public order and therefore cannot apply in Holland, ...
NOTE: The decision not to recognize any authority of the German-military-appointed
receiver, trustee, "protector" or by whatever name he was called was exactly the same
legal conclusion to which United States courts came during the war. Many such
German officials, trying to speak in the names of corporations in the occupied
territory demanded bank accounts and the like in the United States. These claims
were usually treated as "adverse claims" for protection of the banks, brokerage houses
or corporations owing money to the foreign corporation over which the administrator
had been appointed. In no case, however, was the authority of the "Reichs-protector"
ultimately recognized.
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Hahn Rbhren-Walzwerk v. Stokaris (Banska 1 Hutni-Spalecnost Narodni Podnik,
Interveners), Ct. App., Arnhem, March 11, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 16. BAR ComM.
This was an adverse claim, each party claiming to be the one who held a particular
contract with a Dutch corporation known as Stokaris. One claimant was a German
limited liability company by the name of Hahn R6Bhren-Walzwerk. The other was a
nationalized enterprise under Czechoslovakian law which, claiming adversely to the
other claimant, alleged that the other claimant had not made the contract in question
with the Dutch company, but that the contract had been made by three individuals who
were then operating in Czechoslovakia together under the name of Albert Hahn RBhrenWalzwerk and were registered under that name in the commercial register of Prague.
This particular claimant also alleged that this group (or partnership) bad been
nationalized and that it was the successor and, therefore, entitled to the benefits of the
contract with the Dutch company.
The court dismissed the claim of the nationalized Czechoslovakian company on
the ground that as a nationalized company it had no claim to any assets in the
Netherlands which had belonged to the Czechoslovakian partnership prior to nationalization. The contract with the Dutch company was performable in the Netherlands.
Since this one adverse claimant, the nationalized Czechoslovakian company, had no
claim on external assets, this left the only claimant in the action as the German
corporation. This decision was, of course, in accord with conventional law in the
United States as elsewhere in the world. The case does not show any exception to
the act of state doctrine.
Summary as to the Netherlands: Four cases cited: one case does not involve an
act of state as it was by an occupation authority and is governed by The Hague rules
of land warfare. Two cases involve efforts of a nationalized company to secure assets
outside of that country and, therefore, are questions of extraterritoriality only. In one
case an Indonesian bank sought to obtain property in the Netherlands belonging to a
Dutch company whose tobacco concession in Indonesia had been placed under
Indonesian "control." The property in the Netherlands had been pledged with that
bank as collateral for a loan which the Dutch courts found had been paid in full, by
sale in Indonesia of other and different collateral. The Dutch courts rejected the plea
that under Indonesian law the Dutch company in the Netherlands was required to
turn over this property to the Indonesian bank.
Conclusion as to the Netherlands: None of the four cases show any exception to
the act of state doctrine.
SWrzEAND

Rosenberg v. Fischer, Fed. Trib., June 3, 1948, [1948] Ann. Dig. 467 (No. 50) (Swit.).
CoNe. Mz-ro; BAR Comms. The claim was made in this case for restoration of works
of art which had been seized by the German Armies of Occupation in France and
later sold to the defendant. This case does not involve an act of state. The German
occupation authorities were governed by the rules of the Hague Convention. They
could not commit an act of state because the occupation authority was not a government. Furthermore, this was an effort in Switzerland to secure recognition of the
validity of the German rules created against the French Jewish population. The court
makes the following statement which is completely explicit, indicating that an act of
state was not involved and consequently there was no exception to an act of state:
Moreover, the German authorities responsible for these acts of spoliation
formally repudiated the rules of international law. In the "statement of principle"
drawn up by the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" as a result of protests by the Vichy
Government, one reads, in particular: "There can be no question of applying the
Hague Convention, according to which private property must not be seized. The
Jew and his property are outside the law because for millenniums he has, for his
part, considered the non-Jews to be deprived of all rights." In his report Count
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Wolff-Metternich declares that he repeatedly, but vainly, drew attention to the
illegality of measures which violated the provisions of both the Hague Convention
and the Ordinance concerning the protection of the arts of July 15, 1940.
Vereinigte Carborundum und Electritwerke v. Federal Dep't for Intellectual Property,
Fed. Trib., Swit., Sept. 25, 1956, [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 24. BAn Comm. A certain
Czech limited liability company, the Vereinigte Carborundum und Electritwerke, was
the owner of a certain trademark "Carborundum" which was registered in Switzerland.
The Czechoslovakian company was nationalized. Thereafter this nationalized company
claimed the right to use the Swiss trademark. Conventionally the Swiss court held
that the trademark as registered in Switzerland was a trademark outside of Czechoslovakia and confiscatory laws have only territorial effect. The court said:
It is a generally recognized principle of international law that public law has
validity only in the State enacting it [principle of territoriality]. Accordingly, foreign
public law cannot be applied or enforced in Switzerland unless Swiss public policy
demands it-in particular, because Switzerland undertook by treaty to do so, or
because the foreign public law supports private law which is applicable in
Switzerland ....
German Assets in Switzerland (I.0. Farben) Case, Dist. Ct., Zurich, Aug. 26, 1949,
[1949] Ann. Dig. 84 (Swit.) BAR Covnxr. This was an action by a creditor of
I. C. Farben whose agent was to collect the debt due to him by I. C. Farben, in
Switzerland. [NOTE: At the insistence of the Allies, Switzerland had agreed to turn
over German assets in Switzerland to the Allies at the end of World War II. These
the Allies used for payment of reparations in part.] The Swiss court observed that
the Allies had taken the German property with no provision for creditors. The Swiss
court found that the seizure by the Allies was a confiscation and that the Allied conflscatory legislation had no extraterritorial effect. The court said:
While the mere winding up of the company by the Allies does not itself affect
the rights of creditors, the seizure of its assets without acceptance of its obligations
has serious consequences for all creditors. These creditors have been expropriated.
Summanj as to Switzerland: Three cases cited: one case does not involve an act
of state. Two cases merely held that a confiscation, in one case by Czechoslovakia and
in the other case by the Allies, including the United States, has no extraterritorial
effect. Swiss courts will not enforce in Switzerland a foreign confiscatory decree. This
is conventional interpretation of the act of state doctrine.
Conclusion as to Switzerland: Swiss courts under Swiss law recognize the act of
state doctrine.
UN=TED KiNDom

Wolff v. Oxholm, 6 M. & S. 92, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B. 1817). CONc. MEMO;
BAn CoMM.; FoRDHAm 636.
In re Fried Krupp, A. G., [1917] 2 Ch. 188.

BAR

Comm.; FonDmHM 637.

In re Helbert Wragg & Co., [1956] Ch. 323, 347-49 (dictum).
Comm.; FoaDsws 639.

CONG.

Mimo; BAn

Three cases are cited, all of which exhibit the same principle of law, which is
not an exception to the act of state doctrine. The principle of law underlying each
case is this: if anyone assumes the obligation under a contract to pay or perform
in a country other than his own and the contract was at the time of its inception legal
under the laws of both the country of the inception and the country of the performance,
then the obligation remains the same regardless of changes in the laws of the country
of which the obligor is a national. Thus, if a contract made elsewhere is payable or
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otherwise performable in the United States, performance is governed by the laws of
the United States regardless of any change in the laws of the country where the
contract was made or where the obligor resides and does business. The only exception
to this general statement would be where the parties themselves have specifically
agreed in the contract that the laws of a country other than the country of performance
shall be the governing law, relating to any alleged failure to perform the contract
according to its terms. This statement of general law, with the one exception (created
by the parties themselves), is exactly the same principle as that applied in the United
States. United States law is fully set forth in the case of Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936). There, various
German entities had borrowed money and agreed to repay it in the United States
in accordance with the terms of an indenture. By law, Germany exonerated them from
making payments in dollars. United States courts held this was not a defense. The
obligation remained in the United States. In short, a law absolving the debtors from
their obligations is not effective extraterritorially.
The three cases cited are briefly as follows:
Wolff v. Oxholm: A British partnership did business with one Oxholm, a Dane who
owed 21,000 pounds payable in England. Due to the interposition of a war between
England and Denmark the Danish debtor under war regulations of Denmark paid the
amount of his debt to the Danish treasury. Later when he came to England he was
sued for the whole amount unpaid to the English creditor. The court held that the law
in Denmark was not a defense to his obligations in England.
In re FriedKrupp, A. G.: At the commencement of World War I, a German ordinance
was issued which forbade transmission of funds to Great Britain, Ireland or to the
British Colonies and foreign possessions. One Fried Krupp had owed money to J. Wild
& Co. of England, the debt being payable in pounds sterling in England. After the
war the German company refused to pay interest on the money, claiming it was
excused from so doing under the German law. The English court said that the laws
of Germany had no effect in England and the debt, not having been paid in accordance
with its terms, conventional interest could be recovered.
In re Helbert Wagg & Co.: In 1924 a certain German company entered into a loan
agreement with Helbert Wagg & Co. of England for 350,000 pounds sterling. Payment of the loan was to be made in London free of German taxes and in every respect,
except one, it was a loan made and payable and otherwise to be performed in London.
That one exception was that the obligation was to be governed by the laws of
Germany. Payment ceased with the German moratorium about 1933 and the default
continued until after World War II. In 1956 Wagg made a claim against the German
property fund in England on the ground that the company held the defaulted obligation
of a German company. The court held that because the agreement for the payment
provided that the obligation, although payable in England, should be governed by
the laws of Germany and the German law excused the debtor, this was not a proper
claim. In short, since there was an agreement that the laws of Germany should have
extraterritorial effect the courts decided in accordance with the agreement the parties
had made. This case is strictly one of interpretation of the terms of the contract. And
in this case, but in this case only because of the terms of the contract, the laws of
Germany had extraterritorial effect.
Summary of Cases of the United Kingdom: Three cases cited: all of them held that
the laws of one country, which are changed, after an obligation has been created in
another country by a national of the first country, have no extraterritorial effect unless
the parties have agreed otherwise.
Conclusion as to the United Kingdom: English cases are no exception to the act of
state doctrine.
NOTE: All of the courts in Sabbatino admitted that England recognized the act of
state doctrine.

